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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the interface between Kenyan politics and ethnicity. More 
specifically it examines why ethnicity is at the core of Kenyan politics. Although this 
study discusses how colonialism influenced the ethnicisation of African politics, it 
focuses more on the era of post-colonial politics. The objective of the study is to 
investigate how post-colonial Kenyan leaders have shaped the content of Kenyan 
politics.        
 
This study explores ethnic conflicts in Kenya, more especially the 2008 conflict. In 
order to provide a clear framework for the analysis of Kenyan society, Zambian 
politics and its social dynamics were also examined in this study. In terms of political 
development and other variables, one could describe Zambia as Kenya’s peer. It is, 
therefore, an ideal country against which to evaluate Kenya. In terms research 
methodology, this study has taken a descriptive and an explanatory approach. 
Thematic and content analysis has also been employed as data analysis methods 
 
This study has established that the manner in which Kenyan politics are organised is 
centred on ethnicity. The study found that Kenya’s unique political and social 
components have predisposed Kenya to ethnic conflicts. For example, a political 
future within Kenyan political parties and in public office is heavily influenced by 
one’s ethnicity. Ethnicity also plays a role in the nature of political coalitions. As a 
solution to the Kenyan problem, this author has recommended that Kenya’s politics 
(and political campaigns) be based on issues related to the development of Kenyan 
society, rather than ethnicity. Those in public office should also elevate national 
identity above ethnic identity. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Much has been written about ethnic conflicts in the continent of Africa. Naturally, 
there are differences of opinion about what causes these conflicts. For some, ethnic 
conflicts in Africa are a reflection of the backwardness of the continent and the 
barbarism of its inhabitants. This particular view is informed largely by false notions 
of European superiority. Curiously, those who espouse this view ignore or choose to 
ignore one crucial fact, and that is that ethnic conflicts are not an exclusive domain of 
African societies. Europe itself, especially the eastern countries, has not been able to 
escape the incidents of ethnic violence. There is clear “evidence linking Africa’s 
current under-development to colonial rule and the slave trade” (Nunn, 2007: 157). In 
explaining ethnic conflict in Africa, one cannot ignore the role played by the 
European colonial powers, mainly Britain, France, Portugal, and Belgium. These 
countries formally declared their intention to meddle in the affairs of African states 
during the 1884 – 1885 conference in Berlin. In an attempt to regulate their activities 
in the African continent, and to avoid stepping on each other’s toes, these countries 
redrew the map of Africa. The partitioning and the balkanisation of the African 
continent were carried out without regard for the territorial arrangement of ethnic 
groups.  
 
Paglia (2007: 22) concurs herewith; she states that “the colonial empires had disrupted 
the geopolitics of the African continent by introducing artificial borders. The Berlin 
Conference of 1884-5 partitioned Africa into – what some scholars have referred to as 
– ‘spheres of influence’ among the colonial powers”. The main concern for the 
European countries was the exploitation of various natural resources; consequently, 
the feelings of African tribes and ethnic groups were the least of their concerns. 
Ethnic groups were often played against each other by the officials representing the 
superpowers. However, it would be ignorant and too simplistic to wholly blame the 
colonising nations for Africa’s ethnic conflicts. The post-colonial governments of 
African States are as much to blame for the ethnic wars as their colonial counterparts. 
African politicians used ethnicity to further their political ambitions, which 
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encouraged the politics of patronage. African leaders, such as Arap Moi, used a 
“strategic mixture of ethnic favouritism, State repression, and the marginalisation of 
opposition forces, utilising violence, detention and torture” (Steeves, 2006: 211). 
 
The violence during the Kenyan elections in 2007 should, therefore, be seen in its full 
context, as discussed above. The behaviour of the colonial masters and the equally 
unsustainable practices of the post-colonial governments conspired to produce the 
current political situation in Kenya. This comes to the surface every time there is a 
contest for power during elections in Kenya. The first chapter of this study will 
explore the research topic; and it will also examine the research problem. In addition, 
it will look at the aims and objectives of this study. The research question will also be 
introduced. The final section of Chapter 1 will outline the research design and the 
methodology employed.  
 
1.1. An Overview of the research topic 
 
Ethnic conflicts have posed many challenges – not only for Kenya – but for the whole 
the continent of Africa in general.  However, ethnic conflicts have affected African 
States differently. In some countries, ethnic conflict has resulted in devastation and 
untold misery to its people; while in countries, such as South Africa, ethnic violence 
has been minimal, and has had only a limited effect on the way of life. Along this 
continuum, there are countries whose experiences with ethnic conflict can best be 
described as periodical. Kenya can be said to belong to this group. In the absence of 
political contestation, Kenya is a relatively peaceful country with few incidents of 
ethnic violence.  
However, during the electoral process, ethnic tension starts to emerge. The question 
arises whether ethnicity should be thought of as an integral part of our identity. This 
question will be dealt with in Chapter 2 of this treatise. However, it is sufficient to say 
that Kenyan politicians make a great effort to conveniently tie ethnicity and identity to 
Kenyan politics.  This occurs mostly during elections. One could argue that Kenyan 
politicians have turned this into an art form. Electoral outcomes in Kenya are rarely 
decided on issues of policy or the performance of the incumbent president in office. 
Such outcomes are largely determined by which candidate can play on ethnic 
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sentiments effectively. Some scholars hold the view that the mere fact of being home 
to different ethnic groups or cultures poses problems and challenges for any State.  
Mars (1990: 65) contended that a “significant dimension of cultural pluralism is the 
intermittent recurrence of ethnic conflict with far-reaching implications for the 
stability of the political system”.   
 
Eriksen (1991: 263) concurs herewith; he contends that “virtually every modern 
nation-state is to a greater or lesser extent ethnically divided. This frequently implies 
[the latent] potential for various forms of conflict – from armed conflicts to 
autonomist movements and political segregation along ethnic lines”. Most worrying 
of all is the fact that these conflicts have created an environment of animosity between 
Kenyan citizens. There is a myriad of forces that lead to ethnic conflicts. Khmelko 
and Wiegand (2010: 8) contend that “one of the primary factors that all ethnic 
conflicts have in common is that there is more than one group living within [the] 
boundaries of a sovereign State”.  
 
Much has been written about ethnicity in Kenya; a variety of explanations have been 
advanced as to why the Kenyan society has been ravaged by ethnic conflicts. 
Amongst these, is the contention that ethnicity in Kenya is ‘politicised’ (Ajulu, 2002: 
251). Ajulu argues that ethnicity is politicised when it is used to dispense State 
resources and to gain political power. This research will examine several issues that 
result in a political environment, which is conducive to tension between different 
groups in Kenya. When referring to a political environment that is conducive to ethnic 
tensions, it relates to the alignment of politics and the political economy of Kenya 
along ethnic lines. Among the issues to be explored in the treatise, is whether Kenya’s 
limited experience with multi-party democracy has ‘watered down’ the content of 
Kenyan politics, which then allows for political contests to be centred largely on 
ethnicity.  
 
Ethnicity in itself does not necessarily lead to ethnic conflicts. As some authors argue, 
it is only when ethnicity is ‘politicised’ – as has been the case in Kenya – that it 
becomes a problem. It stands to reason that Kenya’s colonial history cannot be 
ignored. Oyugi (1997: 42) strongly maintained that the origin of the problem in Kenya 
(and Africa in general) is colonialism. It is the institution of colonialism that has 
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created a common centre to which all the existing ethnic groups in given colonial 
States are at once required to relate. To what extent has Great Britain contributed to 
the animosity and distrust between the ethnic groups in Kenya? It is common 
knowledge that after the Mau-Mau revolt, the British sought to appease the Kikuyu 
people by apportioning pieces of land to them. However, no such generosity was 
extended to any of the other ethnic groups. This researcher believes that the causes of 
the 2007 ethnic conflict can be found by looking closely at the current political system 
of Kenya. This study will, therefore, not embark on a comprehensive analysis of 
colonialism. The author also believes that the impact of the colonial legacy has been 
covered adequately in the literature. Of course, one cannot overlook some the benefits 
that were brought by Europeans to the African continent.      
 
1.2. Statement of the problem 
 
The 2007 ethnic conflict in Kenya was triggered by the announcement made by the 
Election Commission of Kenya. The ECK declared Mwai Kibaki to be the winner of 
the presidential elections – even though his rival, Raila Odinga, had won the majority 
of the parliamentary votes. Tarimo (2010: 298) points out that “a section of the 
population was unhappy about the outcome of the election of December 2007”. The 
unhappiness stemmed from the suspicion that the electoral results had been rigged. 
Holmquist and waGithinji (2009: 101) state that “severe violence broke out in protest 
of a flawed election process and outcome”. It was noted in this study that ethnic 
conflicts in Kenya are rather unique, in that they are periodical.  This means that a 
pattern has developed in Kenyan politics, where tension between ethnic groups is 
likely to develop around the time of elections. Although there have been many 
incidents of ethnic conflict in Kenya’s past elections, it was the ethnic violence, which 
Kenya experienced after the 2007 elections, that attracted the world’s attention to the 
Kenyan problem.  
 
This was as a result of the amount of violence and the human misery that 
accompanied the ethnic conflict. Unfortunately, those who seek positions in public 
office are also part of the problem. Kenyan politicians are known to cynically use the 
different ethnic sentiments that exist to drive their own political ambitions. To cite 
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deep-seated hatred between ethnic groups in explaining ethnic conflict would be 
simplistic. If this argument held any merit, the world would expect the prevalence of 
ethnic conflict in Kenya even during periods where there is no electoral process 
underway. In other words, if ethnic conflicts in Kenya were due to deep-seated hatred 
between ethnic groups, it would not take an electoral process to set it off. The fact that 
ethnic conflict has been a constant reality in Kenya in past elections raises the 
possibility that it might happen again in future elections – unless the causes of such 
conflict have been clearly identified.  
 
1.3. Outline of the research aims 
 
The announcement of the outcome of the 2007 elections in Kenya unleashed a wave 
of violence between ethnic groups.  This episodic ethnic conflict has been the most 
devastating yet in Kenyan history. The 2007 ethnic conflict was accompanied by the 
loss of life and human displacement. The aim of this study is to explore the factors 
that led to the ethnic violence after the 2007 elections. 
 
 
The secondary aims are: 
 
 To investigate whether the distribution of power in Kenya is arranged in the 
manner that benefits certain ethnic groupings.  
 To probe the aspect of ethnicity, as opposed to nationhood. This will be 
achieved by examining some of the different approaches to ethnicity (e.g. 
primordialism and instrumentalism). 
 
1.4. Research Objectives 
 
The objectives of the study are: 
 To understand the different social and political patterns that lead to ethnic 
conflicts at the time of elections. 
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 To determine whether certain decisions and actions taken by political 
appointees or government officials contribute to ethnic tension after these 
elections. 
 To examine the integrity of Kenyan institutions, and what role they play in 
ethnic conflicts. 
 To provide a framework for dealing with ethnic conflicts in Kenya. 
 
1.5. Purpose of the study 
 
 
Previous studies on Kenya have relied quite extensively on the colonial legacy, in 
order to explain the ethnic conflicts in this African State. While no researcher can 
ever deny the negative footprint left by colonialism on the African political economy, 
the actions and behaviour of those who occupy public office in post-colonial Africa 
have not been blameless. While acknowledging the impact of colonialism in Kenyan 
politics, the main purpose of this study is to look at the aspects of post-colonial 
politics in Kenya, in order to explain the 2007 ethnic conflict in Kenya. The reason 
for adopting this angle in this study is that while Africa can not do much to reverse 
the damage done by colonialism, there is much that can be done to change the course 
of current African politics.  
 
1.6. Research Question 
 
Having outlined the purpose of this study in the previous discussion, it is crucial to 
identify this president’s central research question. It has been noted in the introduction 
of this proposal that ethnic tensions and conflicts in Kenya usually emerge during and 
after contests for power (i.e. elections). The central question that the proposed study 
would seek to answer is the following: 
 
 Why is ethnicity a core component of Kenyan politics?  
 
Sub-foci questions: 
 
7 
 
 Why does ethnic confrontation escalate after elections in Kenya? 
 What aspects within Kenyan politics exacerbate such ethnic confrontations? 
1.7. Outline of the research design and methodology 
 
The study will be both descriptive and explanatory. The researcher believes this dual 
approach will broaden the horizon of this study. The study will adopt a qualitative 
approach. A Critical theory will form the theoretical basis for this study. The critical 
theory lends itself well to an analysis of social contexts where inequality is prevalent.   
Following various investigations since the 2007 ethnic conflicts, several reports were 
released. These investigations were carried out by independent institutions that had 
extensive resources available to produce credible research. This study will use the 
findings published in these reports for further analysis. To render the data 
manageable, they will be divided into different categories.  
 
1.8. Conclusion 
  
 
As indicated in the research question, this study is concerned with the centrality of 
ethnicity in Kenyan politics. The following chapter will review the relevant literature 
on ethnic conflicts. The literature review will visit various theories of ethnic conflicts, 
as well as the different theories of identity. Chapter 2 will also review some of the 
concepts that will be central to this study. This refers to concepts, such as ethnicity, 
ethnic identity, culture, and ethnic conflict. Like any other concept in the social 
sciences, there are different perspectives when it comes to ethnicity and ethnic 
conflict. These perspectives will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. Ethnicity is 
a multidisciplinary concept; the discussion on ethnicity will, therefore, incorporate the 
contributions of other disciplines. These include primordialism, instrumentalism, and 
modernism. These perspectives will be interrogated in some detail in Chapter 2. 
Several theories associated with ethnicity and ethnic identity will also be explored. 
What is also of interest to this author is the relationship between ethnic identity and 
national identity, and also which identity takes precedence. Chapter 3 gives a road 
map on how this study will be executed. Chapter 3, therefore, deals with the research 
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methodology. Chapter 4 will feature the research findings and their analysis. The last 
chapter will be the summary of the study; and it will also provide the concluding 
remarks.   
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Chapter 2: The Literature Review 
Introduction 
 
This chapter will review the current literature on the subject of ethnic identity and 
conflicts. The first section of Chapter 2 will initially present an overview of Kenya; 
this will include Kenya’s colonial history. The first section will further probe the 
ethnic composition in Kenya, and look at the various characteristics of the Kenyan 
community. This chapter will also include a profile of Zambia. The main reason for 
starting off this chapter by looking at various aspects of Kenya and Zambia is to 
provide a thorough context for subsequent discussions. The second section of this 
chapter will then discuss the various aspects of ethnicity. These will include: identity, 
different perspectives on identity, and various theories of ethnic conflict. 
 
2.1. Kenya: An Overview  
2.1.1. Geography  
 
Kenya is positioned in the eastern region of the African continent. “The country lies 
between 5 degrees North and 5 degrees South latitude, and between 24 and 31 degrees 
East longitude. It is almost bisected by the equator” (Kenya National Bureau of 
Statistics: 2008-09: 1). Kenya shares borders with several countries. In the South, it is 
bordered by Tanzania; Ethiopia lies to the North; in the West, it shares a border with 
Uganda, as well as with the Sudan and Somalia in the North-West and North-East, 
respectively.  
 
The Eastern region of the African continent can be viewed as fairly unstable 
politically. Although Somalia has just held what has been generally been hailed as 
free and fair elections, the government is in constant war with the Al Shabaab militia. 
Just a few days after Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud had been elected as the new Somali 
President; there was an attempt on his life by the Al Qaeda-linked group. The 
presence of an Al Qaeda-linked terrorist group underscores the volatility of the 
region.    
 10 
The provincial map of Kenya. 
 
   
 
Figure A: Source: www.mapsofworld.com  
 
As shown in Figure A, Kenya is divided into eight different provinces. Kenya also 
consists of 158 districts. “It has a total area of 582,646 square kilometres, of which 
571,466 square kilometres form the land area. Approximately 80 per cent of the land 
area of the country is arid or semi-arid; and only 20 per cent is arable” (Kenya 
National Bureau of Statistics: 2008-09: 1). Land distribution has long been a 
contentious issue in Kenya. The politicisation of land ownership was first introduced 
during the colonial era, when the British took over the land from its rightful owners. 
This injustice was not totally remedied when Kenya gained its independence from 
Britain. Land distribution became a contentious issue between the different ethnic 
groups – even during post-colonial politics.  
11 
 
This author will venture into more detail at the later stages of this treatise.   
2.1.2. Population 
 
As shown in the figure below, the population of Kenya has been increasing quite 
significantly over the years. It has been estimated that by 2011, the total population of 
Kenya would be 41 million.  
 
The growth of the Kenyan population
 
 
Figure B: Source: http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=ke&v=21 
 
 
“There are 42 ethnic communities in Kenya. The major groups are: the Kikuyu, the 
Luhya, the Luo and the Kalenjin, listed in order of [their] numerical strength” 
(Osamba: 2001: 88). As mentioned above, the population of Kenya largely consists of 
citizens of Bantu and Nilotic origin. About 2% of the Kenyan population belong to 
the Cushitic ethnic groups. It is home to about 42 ethnic groups; the Kikuyu ethnic 
group comprises the bigger part of the Kenyan population; and it stands at about 22% 
of the population. The Luhya are the second largest group in Kenya; they constitute 
14% of the population.  Historically, the Kikuyu have dominated the political and 
economic landscape. Since gaining independence from Britain, the Kikuyu have 
occupied the majority of the positions in the public sector. This has been one of the 
issues that have contributed to the tension between the Kikuyu and various other 
ethnic groups. For the purposes of this research project, it is essential to examine how 
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the ethnic groups are distributed in Kenya. This exercise is necessary because the 
government of Kenya has long been accused of allocating resources in areas where 
the Kikuyu ethnic group are in a majority. Whether this is an honest observation 
remains a matter that needs to be discussed extensively in this study. 
 
The distribution of ethnic groups in Kenya 
 
  
 Figure C: Source: http://daimakenya.com/kenyas-population-distribution/ 
 
As reflected in the above figure, the majority of the Kikuyu ethnic group are to be 
found in the central province. Nairobi, the capital city of Kenya, is located within the 
central province. A significant amount of economic activity in Kenya occurs in 
Nairobi. Kenya’s second largest ethnic group – the Luhya –  are mostly found in the 
Western part of the country. Other ethnic groups are: “The Luo (13%), who mainly 
inhabit the Nyanza Province; and the Kalenjin (12%), who mainly reside in the central 
and Northern parts of the Rift Valley; the Kisii (6%) in Nyanza; and the Meru (6%) in 
the Eastern Province” (Kagwanja and Southall: 2009: 266). The hostility between the 
Kikuyu and the other ethnic groups is best captured by Raila Odinga’s election 
campaign during the 2007 elections. During his campaigns, Odinga often used the 
phrase: “41 against 1” to describe the sentiments of the 2007 elections. This meant 
that the elections were an expression of the ‘rivalry’ between the Kikuyu and the other 
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41 ethnic groups. This utterance could be dismissed as normal political rhetoric; but it 
reflects the enmity between the various ethnic groups. 
 
2.1.3. The Economy 
 
Kenya has a comparatively more highly developed economy in the East African 
region. It has a fairly well-developed industrial economy. This makes Kenya’s 
economy a very critical part in the East African region. “Over 80 per cent of 
neighbouring Uganda’s imports, and almost all of Rwanda’s exports, pass through the 
Kenyan port of Mombasa. Other countries in the sub-region, such as Burundi, the 
Eastern DRC, parts of Northern Tanzania and Southern Sudan, also depend to a large 
extent on this port for their commercial trade” (Ilorah, 2009: 702). But the main driver 
of the economy of Kenya is the agricultural sector. When Kenya gained 
independence, the founding president of post-colonial Kenya made efforts to rebuild 
the economy. Rutten and Owuor (2007:12) state that: 
 
Throughout the 1960s and [the] 1970s the Kenyatta government embarked on a process 
of Africanisation of the economy. Land bought from the white farmers with money 
from the British government was subdivided for occupation by landless, unemployed 
and progressive farmers. Land was also sold to State-owned ventures and to wealthy 
African families. 
 
The trajectory of the Kenyan economy had to be changed, owing to the skewed 
characteristics of the economy during the colonial era. The pattern of Kenyan 
economy was skewed during the colonial era because of the artificial barriers that 
were introduced by the British government, in order to prevent the indigenous people 
of Kenya from participating in the mainstream of the economy. This started off with 
the displacement of the ethnic groups from their tribal lands, in order to make way for 
British farmers. Fertile land was allocated to the white settlers. Each ethnic group was 
subsequently allocated different pieces of land. Njororai (2006: 866) affirms that 
“colonial administrators associated ethnic groups with specific areas of the country – 
by designating areas where only people with a particular ethnic identity could reside. 
This pattern of ethnically based settlement and regionalism has persisted in Kenya 
since it became independent”. This resulted in a problem, which became common in 
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many African States that had been colonised. This, of course, refers to the problem 
where the mainstream of the economy was dominated by the white minorities with the 
help of the State, and the majority of the African people being blocked access to any 
resources that would have enabled them to benefit from the economic opportunities 
that were available in their countries of birth. The steps taken by Kenyatta should be 
seen as an attempt to reverse, or at the very least, to arrest the skewed development of 
the Kenyan economy. President Kibaki had a measure of success in dealing with some 
of the economic challenges that were experienced by Kenya. According to Kagwanja 
and Southall (2009: 264), “Kibaki’s first administration (2003 - 2007) witnessed a 
stunning success in economic recovery, as growth rose from 3.4% in 2003 to some 
7% in 2007. National poverty levels fell from an estimated 56% in 1997 to 46% in 
2006; and per capita incomes rose for the first time since the 1980s”.  
 
2.1.4. Kenya under British rule 
 
Like many African States, Kenya’s history had been interrupted by the European 
presence. As with many other African States, Kenya was deeply affected by the 
outcome of the Berlin Conference. Young (1991: 4) captured the mad scramble for a 
piece of Africa by European countries, by making the following pointed observation: 
 
Africa, in the rhetorical metaphors of imperial jingoism, was a ripe melon awaiting 
carving in the late 19th century. Those who scrambled fastest won the largest slices, 
and the right to consume the sweet, succulent flesh at their leisure. Stragglers snatched 
only small tasteless portions: Italians, for example, found only deserts on their plate. In 
this mad moment of imperial atavism – in Schumpeterian terms, the objectless 
disposition to limitless frontier expansion – no-one imagined that a system of States 
was being created. Colonial rule, assumed by its initiators to be perpetual, proved a 
mere interlude in the broader sweep of African history; the steel grid of territorial 
partition, which colonialism imposed, however, appeared [to be] permanent.     
 
The use of a metaphor by Young to describe the manner in which European nations 
raced to grab the ‘fattest African worm’ is an attempt to reflect the disorganised and 
disjointed fashion in which Europe colonised Africa. The incoherent manner in which 
European countries grabbed pieces of land has had a far reaching impact. The actions 
of colonising countries have left the African continent with difficult challenges, with 
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which she is still dealing to this very day. Young attests to this fact; he makes the 
following observation:  
 
Not only did the colonial system totally transform, in a few years, the political 
geography of Africa; but the depth and intensity of alien penetration of subordinated 
societies continues to cast a long shadow. The comprehensive linkages with the 
metropolitan economies were difficult, in many instances, to disentangle. The 
colonizer, in the majority of cases where decolonization was negotiated, retained some 
capacity to shape the choice of post-colonial successors, and often – especially in the 
French case, enjoyed extensive networks of access and influence after independence. 
The cultural and linguistic impact was pervasive, especially on sub-Saharan Africa. 
Embedded in the institutions of the new States was the deep imprint of the mentalities 
and routines of their colonial predecessors. 
 
In the above discussion, Young reveals the uniqueness, the pervasiveness, and the 
extent of colonisation in Africa. The above author asserts that the far-reaching 
consequences of colonialism were so deep and intense that “the depth and intensity of 
alien penetration of subordinated societies continues to cast a long shadow”. Blanton, 
Mason and Athow (2001: 478) concur with the above assessment; they also argue that 
“European colonialism [has] had profound, lasting, and wide-ranging effects on the 
development of contemporary African States”. An honest analysis of the state of post-
colonial Africa would reveal the ever-present footprints of the former coloniser. A 
number of African institutions, for example, still bear the characteristics of their 
colonising nations. To cite a few examples; a number of post-colonial African States 
chose to adopt the same judicial, political and parliamentary institutions and processes 
that were a creation of the colonial government. Francophone countries still follow 
the traditions of France. The same can be said for other African States that were 
colonised by Britain. 
 
Instead of reforming their institutions and systems of governance, former British 
colonies, for example, decided to adopt the British Westminster system. In the 
African context this failed dismally. A publication by the Guardian newspaper (2010) 
documents that, “when Britain granted independence to the majority of its African 
colonies in the 1950s and 1960s, it attempted to hand down Westminster's 
parliamentary system as an institutional legacy. Today, the Westminster model in 
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most of these colonies has all but disappeared”. It is interesting that to note that in 
1994, South Africa decided to adopt its own electoral system, by implementing the 
proportional-representation system, which afforded smaller parties a chance to gain 
some seats in parliament.  
 
It is, however, interesting that African States opted to continue with the institutions 
and practices of the European nations, rather than to transform these and other facets 
of their societies. The News Rescue website (2012) notes that “although Kenya has a 
strong economy, the botched elections that recently took place put this beautiful 
country on the “failed state” list, together with other African nations using western-
style democracy to elect their leaders. This list of considered failed States includes: 
Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, and 
the Cote D’Ivoire”. Although this author does not believe in or subscribe to a notion 
of a ‘failed State’, the above sentiments do reveal the problems associated with 
transferring colonial forms of governance, and electoral processes to an African 
nation-State, without modifying them in any way. 
 
Oddly, political activists campaigned aggressively against the institutions that were 
created by the colonising nations; but when they took over the reins of power, they 
did not attempt replace or modify these institutions. This is puzzling for many 
reasons; chief amongst these, is that these institutions were created with the purpose 
of advancing the goals of the European superpowers, and not of the indigenous 
African people. Secondly, they were also created to benefit certain sections of society, 
usually to the detriment of the majority of the people. This, however, should not be 
seen as a criticism of institutions that were created by the Western nations, or their 
forms of governments. Societies are different, the institutions and electoral systems of 
government that have been put in place should, therefore, reflect the needs of that 
society.  
 
The far-reaching hand of colonialism can also be seen in institutions, such as the 
African Union. On many occasions, African countries have been unable to agree on 
matters of strategic importance. Progress has been hindered by different blocs 
assuming various positions. Francophone countries would band together and resolve 
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to adopt certain positions, which were not necessarily in the best interests of the sub-
Saharan countries that had largely been colonised by Britain.       
 
2.1.5. The Kenyan Electoral System 
 
Past elections in Kenya have always been marked by some degree of tension between 
the various ethnic groups. Violence has also tended to punctuate the electoral process 
in Kenya. The 2007 elections in Kenya showed how the nation can be pulled apart 
during elections. It is, therefore, necessary to discuss the character of the electoral 
process implemented in Kenya. Kenya has ratified several international laws that 
guarantee the right of citizens to choose their own representatives: 
 
Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ratified by 
Kenya in 1976, provides for the right of citizens to take part in the conduct of 
public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives. Further, the 
Article endorses the right of citizens to have the opportunity to participate, on 
general terms of equality, in public service. Citizens provide their voices through 
participation ,and thus gain a sense of ownership in the resulting policies (source: 
International Foundation for Electoral Systems, Final Report: 2008; 9). 
 
Like many other former British colonies, Kenya adopted the first-past-the-post 
electoral system. In other words, the party that had won the majority of the votes 
would win the elections. Prior to the constitutional reforms that were introduced in 
1997, Kenya could be described as a flawed democracy. The only semblance of 
democratic principles is the elections. Brown (2001: 732) argues that, “the 
government neither made nor allowed any steps in the pursuit of democratisation, 
other than holding by-elections as required. The government also backslid on some 
aspects of the political liberalisation”. Before 1991, Kenya was effectively a one-
party state. Opposition parties were banned, supposedly to foster unity in Kenyan 
society. The logic behind this argument was that Kenya would be more united under a 
one-party State.   
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2.1.6. Multiparty politics in Kenya 
 
With the opening up of political space to opposition parties, Kenya took tentative 
steps towards becoming a mature democracy.  In many ways, the new era in Kenyan 
politics revealed the centrality of ethnicity politics and electoral contests. In his study 
on how the re-introduction of multiparty politics has changed the structure of African 
politics, Posner (2007: 1302) observed that the “shift to multiparty rule has caused 
more ethnic conflict to occur”. He also maintains that “it has caused ethnic conflict to 
be carried out in the name of different kinds of identities”. The likelihood of ethnic 
violence is sometimes attributed to multiparty politics, which lends itself to increased 
ethnic competition. In a one-party State, these rivalries are contained. Posner further 
argues that under a multiparty system, African States shift the: 
 
…locus of political conflict from the local constituency level (in one-party 
contests) to the level of the country as a whole (in multiparty elections). 
This shift in the scope of the effective arena of political competition 
generates incentives for voters to identify themselves in terms of – and for 
politicians to emphasize – different dimensions of ethnic identity.7 It, 
thereby, alters the kinds of cleavage around which political competition 
revolves.  
 
Like Posner, Ake (1993: 5) also expressed concern on the impact that multiparty 
democracy can have in ethnically divided African countries. He noted that, “as Africa 
democratizes, there is concern that the liberties of democracy will unleash ethnic 
rivalries, whose embers are forever smouldering in Africa, and destroy the fragile 
unity of African countries”. Instead of creating an environment that would allow for 
quality opposition, the introduction of multiparty politics instead gave rise to political 
parties that were aligned to a specific group, which polarised the ethnic groups in 
Kenya even further. The reality in Kenyan politics is that any political party that 
attempts to win elections on the basis of ethnic support needs to carry a campaign that 
appeals to a number of different ethnic groups, rather than just one.  
Politics in Kenya is a combination of the politics of ethnicity and simple political 
arithmetic. This means that a party, which finds a message that is attractive enough to 
appeal to most ethnic groups, is most likely to win the elections. The reason is that 
there is no single ethnic group that forms a big enough majority to carry a political 
19 
 
party to an election victory. This is why coalitions between political parties 
representing different ethnic groups are not uncommon in Kenya. As stated above, the 
Kikuyu being the biggest ethnic group in Kenya constitutes only 22% of the 
population.   
 
2.1.7. Civil society in Kenya 
 
According to Okoku (2002: 82), “civil society comprises various interest groups, such 
as human-rights groups, co-operatives, trade unions, and the church, through which 
individuals collectively carry out their social enterprises”.  The activism of a civil 
society is critical for any democracy, especially nations who have not yet completed 
the democratisation process. Civil society hold governments accountable for the 
actions they take; it fulfils an oversight role over executive decisions. Civil society 
also challenges the arbitrary decisions taken by governments. Citing Chazan (1992), 
Okoku argues that “the nurturing of civil society is widely perceived as the most 
effective means of controlling repeated abuses of State power, holding rulers 
accountable to their citizens, and establishing the foundations of durable democracy”.  
 
Civic organisations operating in the African continent have faced many challenges in 
the past. Authoritarian governments in Africa have in the past viewed civil society 
with suspicion. Wanyande (1996: 8) emphasised “the role played by social 
movements, in protesting against authoritarian rule, especially in some West African 
countries, such as Mali. In some instances, these movements forced the authoritarian 
leaders to convene national conferences, which resulted in the writing of new 
constitutions that paved the way for democratic elections”.The critical function of 
civil society has been demonstrated in many ways in South Africa – during apartheid, 
and even at the present. The church and trade unions have helped to sensitise the 
world to the various iniquities of the apartheid government. The fact that South Africa 
was shunned by the world was due in no small part to the efforts of South African 
civil society. Civil society was undermining the apartheid government to such an 
extent that it decided to ban the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) 
in 1985. Constant pressure from South African trade unions forced the government’s 
hand; it instituted the Wiehahn Commission to examine the labour laws. This resulted 
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in the major labour law reforms. The introduction of labour laws did not end the 
discrimination in the workplace; but it formalised and institutionalised the relationship 
between the employer and employee. The religious formations were also agents of 
change. Through the South African Council of Churches (SACC), the South African 
religious community also contributed to the anti-apartheid struggle. The critical role 
played by civil society did not end in 1994. It continued to occupy a position between 
society and the State. COSATU, civic organisations, and religious leaders have been 
critical of the ANC government’s policies. This author uses the South African context 
to illustrate the fact that civil society is a critical part of any society. It helps to create 
an accountable and a responsible government. The political environment in Kenya has 
provided certain challenges for civic organisations. Firstly, when Kenya retreated 
from multiparty politics, civil society was persuaded to fulfil the role that would 
normally have been served by the opposition parties. Okuku (2002: 86) explains the 
role of the church in Kenyan politics, “opportunity for the church arose, as a result of 
the rise of an oppressive one-party system in Kenya. When civil society is repressed 
by the State, churches remain 'zones of freedom' and tend to take up the political 
functions of the repressed organisations”. 
 
As explained by Okuku, the first role of the church is to provide a place of refuge to 
individuals whom the state considers to be enemies. Bratton (1994:10) shared the 
same view; he explains that the “authoritarian governments routinely emasculate 
political society by banning political parties and controlling elections. In response, 
political non-conformists, who can no longer operate openly, take refuge in the 
occupational associations and in the religious and educational organizations of civil 
society”. However, the responsibilities of the church do not stop there. As illustrated 
in the case of South Africa, the church had to elevate its role to one of confronting the 
excesses of the State.  
 
As an institution that provides moral guidance in society, the church is critical as an 
institution – especially when it comes to political oversight. Bratton argues that “by 
insisting on non-partisan oversight of government performance and electoral contests, 
civic associations have helped to keep governments honest and to educate people 
about citizenship”. The churches, however, have not always been non-partisan, some 
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of the churches that served the Afrikaner community, for example, had tended to 
support the apartheid government’s views on racialism, discrimination and apartheid.  
For example, the “Dutch Reformed Church in South Africa provided a theological 
justification for apartheid” (source: 
http://overcomingapartheid.msu.edu/unit.php?id=65-24E-5). With the re-introduction 
of multiparty politics, Kenya’s civil society was presented with a new set of 
challenges. The era of one-party politics provided an opportunity for the suppression 
of ethnic conflicts. However, the re-emergence of multiparty politics allowed these 
ethnic cleavages to reappear. This was due to political parties aligning themselves 
with different ethnic groups. Multiparty politics presented the Kenyan political parties 
with an opportunity to become political entities that tackled issues that had had an 
effect on the broader community of Kenya, rather than certain sections of the society.  
 
Despite this opportunity, Kenya’s political parties continued to favour ethnic politics 
by promoting the interests of certain ethnic groups (Wanyande, 2009: 16). Nyinguro 
and Otenyo (2007: 5) point out that, “Conventional wisdom holds that democratic 
movements respond to windows of opportunity engendered by both domestic and 
international environments”. One could also argue that the same is true for 
undemocratic movements. Undemocratic movements also respond to internal and 
external forces of influence. This was certainly the case with the apartheid 
government in South Africa. Facing pressure within its borders, and from outside 
forces, in the form of sanctions and trade embargoes, the apartheid government was 
forced to make compromises it would not ordinarily have made. These compromises 
came in the form of the unbanning of political parties, the release of political 
prisoners, and then negotiating the introduction of constitutional reforms.  
  
The situation in Kenya followed a similar model. Multi-partyism was re-introduced in 
Kenya, following a series of domestic and international events, which put pressure on 
Arap Moi’s government. This led to the “legalization of opposition parties in 
December 1991, through the repeal of the enabling Section 2A of the country’s 
Constitution” (Nyinguro and Otenyo, 2007: 10). This particular section of the 
Constitution “had hitherto criminalized multiparty politics in the country” 
(Wanyande, 2009: 10). Civic organisations in Kenya have been accused by some 
observers of taking sides, often not that of the people. Mwaura and Martinon (2010: 
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39), for example, state that “many felt that the churches, which prior to the 
referendum on the draft constitution of 2005 were regarded as voices of reason and 
moral authority, had failed in the 2007 elections to provide visionary and unbiased 
leadership”.  Apart from taking sides, the Kenyan civic organisations were also 
accused of not responding to issues that were critical for the functioning of democracy 
in Kenya. “The lack of civil society responsiveness in Kenya follows a pattern of 
quiescence on the part of mainstream civil-society actors”.  
 
To further render the civic society ineffectual, the government of Mwai Kibaki co-
opted several members of the civil society – especially those who were very critical of 
its excesses. As examples, Wanyande cites the case of “Njoki Ndungu who was 
nominated to parliament, and John Githongo of Transparency International – Kenya 
Chapter – who was appointed Permanent Secretary and Presidential advisor on 
matters of governance and corruption. Others, such as Kivutha Kibwana, chose to join 
national electoral politics and become members of parliament. The effect of this [was] 
that it robbed civil society of [effective] leadership”. Chemengich (2009: 27) 
summarises the role of civil society in Kenya, especially after the coalition 
government that was formed subsequent to the 2007 ethnic conflicts. He observes 
that: “Civil society is yet to develop its niche and place in this new political 
arrangement. They have, however, added their voices in the push for transparency and 
accountability in the coalition government”.   
  
2.2. Zambia  
Zambia has, in some ways, followed a similar developmental pattern as Kenya. It had 
also been colonised by the British government. Just as Jomo Kenyatta played a crucial 
part in the struggle for independence, Kenneth Kaunda was an integral part in 
Zambia’s own fight to rid itself of the colonial superpower. Just as Kenya was a de 
facto one-party state, Zambia also outlawed opposition politics. Continuing to mirror 
Kenyan politics, Zambia also embraced multiparty politics in the early 1990s.  
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2.2.1. Zambia – Geographical Profile 
 
The Zambia Tourism website (date of publication unknown) states that Zambia is a 
fairly large country; “it boasts 752, 000 square kilometres about the size of France, the 
Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland combined. It consists, for the most part, of a 
high plateau, with an average height of between 1060 and 1363 metres above sea 
level (3500 and 4500 ft., respectively). Isolated mountain ridges rise to more than 
6000 ft., with an occasional peak above 7000 ft. on the Eastern border, called Nyika 
Plateau”.  
 
Map of Zambia:  
 
 
 
(Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Za-map.png) 
 
Considering the number of ethnic groups that call Zambia home, it is important that it 
is able to physically accommodate these different ethnic groups. Zambia has about 72 
ethnic groups, which is twice the number of ethnic groups found in Kenya. According 
to the ‘Info Please’ Zambia is a landlocked country in South-central Africa. Zambia 
shares borders with the following countries: Angola, Botswana, Zimbabwe, 
Mozambique and Malawi. The Democratic Republic of the Congo and Tanzania lie 
on the Northern border of Zambia. Zambia has about 10 provinces. These provinces 
differ in their level of development.  
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2.2.2. Population 
 
The population in Zambia has been growing rapidly over the past few years. “The 
population grew from only about 2.3 million persons in 1950 to 9.9 million at the time 
of the 2000 census. By 2009, the population had grown further to nearly 13 million 
persons” (Ministry of Finance and National Planning, January 2010: 1). This can be 
attributed to the fact Zambia has the highest fertility rate in Southern Africa. 
“Zambian women have 6.2 children each, on average – one of the higher levels of 
fertility in Africa. Because fertility has been high for a long time, Zambia has a very 
young population” (Ministry of Finance and National Planning, January 2010: 1).  
 
Zambia is largely an urbanised country; and a large number of Zambians reside in the 
urban areas. According to the Zambian Central Statistical Office (2003: 1), “Zambia 
is one of the most urbanized countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, with about 36 per cent 
of the population living in urban areas.[The] Copperbelt provinces had the highest 
percentage of urban population at 82 and 81 per cent, respectively.[The] Eastern 
Province had the lowest at 9 per cent”. The urbanisation process is a recent 
phenomenon in Zambia; it began shortly before Zambia became officially liberated. 
Kwaku Osei-Hwedie and Bertha Osei-Hwedie (1992: 88) assert that:  
 
Most of the towns and cities were established during the present century, and 
served, initially, as colonial administrative centres. Rapid and large-scale 
urbanisation began occurring in 1963, on the eve of political independence, when 
many of the travel restrictions on Africans were removed.  
 
English is the official language in Zambia. According to the Central Statistical Office, 
most inhabitants in the urban areas can communicate fluently in English. It also states 
that the main vernacular languages are used in the rural areas. These are Bemba, 
Nyanja, Tonga, Lozi, Kaonde, Luvale, and Lunda; while Bemba is spoken in 
Northern Province, Luapula and the Copperbelt provinces.  
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2.2.3. Zambia under colonial rule 
 
Like many other African nations, Zambia has its own fair share of colonial history. 
Zambia is a former British colony, formerly known as Northern Rhodesia. The 
Zambia Architecture (date of publication unknown) website states that “Zambia 
became a British colony officially in 1924. The history of colonization in Zambia 
begins with the town of Livingstone. Livingstone – on the border of Zimbabwe and 
Zambia – was established by British South Africa Corporation. The process of 
colonisation of Zambia was partly triggered by Portugal wanting to extend its reach 
into the African continent. The Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy website 
(2006) in Africa “Portuguese ambitions to link Angola in the West to Mozambique in 
the East” is cited as the reason for Portugal’s ambitions. To curtail these ambitions of 
the Portuguese in Southern Africa, Britain – through the British South Africa 
Corporation – occupied Zimbabwe and Zambia. This was achieved through a 
combination of land seizures, ‘pacts’ and trade agreements with various chiefs, which 
were either obtained through force or deceit. Motivated by his grand vision of creating 
a railway line that traversed many borders from Cape to Cairo, Cecil John Rhodes 
became a prominent figure in the colonisation of Zambia. However, the 
administration of Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia was eventually taken 
over by the British government from the British South Africa Company.    
 
The motivation for the occupation of Zambia was the provision of support to the 
British manufacturing industry. The supply of raw materials extracted from the 
African continent would have transformed the British manufacturing industry into a 
competitive industry in Europe. Of course, the natural resources that existed under 
Zambian soil were necessary for continued growth of the British economy. As 
indicated above, Zambia is rich in copper. The characteristics of Zambian 
colonisation were consistent with the manner in which other African countries were 
colonised. Central to the colonisation of land in Africa was the utilisation of the 
citizenry for cheap labour, forcing citizens off their land to make way for commercial 
activities. As Britain loosened its grip on its colonies, Zambia became one of the first 
countries to gain independence from Britain. Zambia became independent from 
Britain on 24 October 1964.  
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2.2.4. Zambia – The post-colonial politics 
 
 
Like many African nations that have just gained independence, the new leaders had a 
daunting task of providing guidance and leadership to its citizens who were looking to 
them to overturn the injustices of colonialism. The challenge that most African 
leaders face is that their communities were not homogeneous, but were comprised of 
different ethnic groups that had competing interests and expectations. Colonialism 
helped to mask or subdue the differences that existed between the ethnic groups 
within the different nations. Ethnic groups were motivated more to fight against the 
colonial government than they were against each other. This did not mean that there 
was no resentment between the different ethnic groups. They were united by the 
common purpose of fighting the British government. However, with the end of 
colonialism, the common enemy was not there anymore. Independence brought with 
it expectations and needs between the different ethnic groups. These expectations 
were not always shared between these groups. 
 
 The challenge for the new crop of leaders was to address these expectations in a 
manner that was seen to be unbiased. One could argue that this is the part where post- 
colonial leaders in Kenya stumbled. From the Kenyatta, the Moi through to the Kibaki 
Administration, the Kenyans have had the sense to realise that these administrations 
did not serve the interests of all Kenyans. Many ethnic groups had harboured 
resentment against the Kikuyu ethnic group. Lonsdale (2008: 308) supports this 
statement by stating that other ethnic groups in Kenya were infuriated by the 
Kikuyu’s “bumptious sense of entitlement”. The cause of this resentment is what is 
perceived to be the dominance of the Kikuyu tribe in government structures and 
public institutions. Government was also perceived to be responsive only to the needs 
of the Kikuyu, while ignoring those of other ethnic groups.  The ’41 against 1’ 
election campaign that was run by Rael Odinga during the 2007 presidential elections 
underscored the depth of hatred other ethnic groups had for the Kikuyu. 
 
The Kenyan situation, as described above, reflects one of the challenges with which 
the many post-colonial governments had to deal. These challenges were not unique to 
Kenya. Having diverse communities did not make things easier for African 
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governments. Inadequate and inconsistent responses to the problems of different 
communities by governments, led to perceptions of bias towards certain ethnic 
groups. Many disputes and conflicts emerged between the different communities 
because of this.  These challenges could explain some of the responses and actions of 
post-colonial governments. One such response from some African governments was 
the doing away with multiparty politics. This was an attempt to curtail confrontation 
between various groups. One-party politics were seen as the panacea for ethnic 
conflicts. The theory behind this logic was that all citizens of the country would unite 
behind one political party and government, thereby putting an end to internecine 
conflicts.  
 
In an attempt to put a lid on conflicts within their borders, the post-colonial 
governments took decisions that undermined the progress in the democratisation 
process. Zambia and Kenya, for example, introduced clauses in their Constitutions 
that effectively put an end to multiparty politics. As indicated above, the post-colonial 
leaders in Kenya saw it fit to insert ‘clause 2A’ into their Constitution, which 
outlawed opposition parties. This seemed to be an attractive option for Zambia, as 
well. In some African states that had just gained independence, it was the prevailing 
view that one-party politics was a crucial element for the stability of their new 
democracies. “Leaders of Africa’s new nations saw the one-party States, which they 
installed in their countries, as embodiments of African democracy”, (Meyns, 2005: 
31). Some African leaders, such as Kenneth Kaunda, even viewed single-party 
political systems as being ‘African’. Meyns observes that Kaunda’s description of 
Zambia’s political system in the 2nd Republic as ‘one-party participatory democracy’ 
is a reflection of this understanding”.   
 
In Zambia, the United National Independence Party, led by Kenneth Kaunda (UNIP), was the 
only political party allowed by the Constitution to contest elections. However, the logic 
which informs the view that a one-party State is more stable and ‘African’, has been 
proven to be misguided. For one reason, one-party States have ensured this artificial 
image of stability through unjust means. Lack of political choice has in many cases 
been accompanied by dictatorships and government clampdowns on dissent. The 
semblance of stability has, therefore, in many occasions been the result of violent 
suppression of any dissenting views.  
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2.2.5. Zambian civil society 
 
 
The peaceful transference of power from Kaunda to Chiluba was seen as a step in the 
right direction for the Zambian society. Political theorists have pointed out that the 
political transition in Zambia was further proof of Huntington’s ‘Third Wave’ of 
democratisation. One should hasten to add that political change in Zambia was helped 
along by different forces. These forces brought about these changes through either 
direct or indirect opposition to government laws. Civil society organisations are an 
example of these critical agents of change. Civil society played no lesser role in the 
transformation of Zambian politics. More prominent in the transition process were the 
trade unions, church groups and various other groupings. According to Bartlett (2000: 
430), there is “evidence of a civil society demanding the observance of democratic 
procedures. Prominent among those pressing for reform were the trade unions, the 
churches and the various associations representing women, students, lawyers and 
business entrepreneurs”. Portraying the important role played by the trade unions in 
ending the one-party system in Zambia, Bartlett notes that in December 1989, the 
trade unions spoke out openly against the political system. He further states that the 
“Zambian Confederation of Trade Unions (ZCTU) denounced the political system, 
and in the New Year, it called for the introduction of multiparty democracy. In May, 
the ZCTU announced its intention of campaigning for a ‘yes’ vote in the recently 
announced referendum on a return to multiparty democracy”. 
The activism of civil groups did not cease after the transference of power from 
Kaunda to Chiluba. In fact, these organisations did carry on with their task of 
scrutinising government actions and decisions – even after the most testing time in 
Zambian politics was over.  One of the prominent civil groups in Zambia is the Oasis 
Forum. It was “originally formed to oppose president Chiluba’s attempt to go for a 
third term”. After Chiluba’s attempt was stopped in 2001, the Oasis Forum focused its 
attention on the constitutional process. After a long public debate, president 
Mwanawasa’s government finally agreed to form a Zambian Centre for Interparty 
Dialogue” (Haapanen & Waller, 2007: 12). 
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2.2.6. Zambia – Multiparty politics 
 
Through defiance campaigns, protests and other anti-government expressions, the 
citizens of these African States have demonstrated quite clearly that they would prefer 
to live under a multiparty democracy; there was nothing ‘African’ about autocratic 
regimes and dictatorship, as was implied by Kenneth Kaunda. It was on this basis that 
countries, such as Zambia and Kenya, decided to open up political space to other 
political parties – by removing offending clauses in their constitutions – and thereby, 
becoming fully fledged democracies. 
 
Phiri (2010: 62) is of the view that Zambia’s post-colonial politics can be divided into 
three phases. He notes that “after 17 years of one-party rule, in December 1990 
Zambia re-established the legality of multiparty politics, thereby ending the second 
republic, and a de jure one-party state. In October 1991, the first democratic 
presidential and parliamentary elections were held to usher in the third republic”. 
Despite the paternalistic view held by some prominent African leaders that one-party 
systems were good for the African communities, the citizens in the former one-party 
responded positively to the return to democratic politics. In confirming this view, 
Phiri asserts that “the elections were celebrated not only as a return to democracy, but 
also as a victory for the people of Zambia in their struggle against an oppressive and 
autocratic regime. The reintroduction of plural politics was equally acknowledged as a 
step towards “good or democratic governance”.   
 
Zambia’s first multiparty elections were held in 1991. Frederick Chiluba and his 
Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) defeated his political foe, Kenneth 
Kaunda, and his UNIP party in the presidential and parliamentary elections. Perhaps 
as a strong indication that the Zambian polity was tired and weary of the one-party 
system, Chiluba and his party got the support in the polls from the majority of ethnic 
groups. According to Phiri, most Zambians supported Chiluba with the strong 
intention of removing Kaunda from power. One should remember that Kaunda and 
his political party were the architects of the authoritarian regime that introduced one-
party politics. To demonstrate that the voting patterns of various ethnic groups were 
motivated by removing Kaunda from power, the ethnic rivalries resumed after 
Chiluba was installed in the public office.   
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2.2.7. Ethnicity in Zambia 
 
As indicated earlier in this chapter, Zambia is home to about 73 ethnic groups or 
tribes. This is twice the number of ethnic groups living in Kenya. With this in mind, 
one would expect that Zambia would experience more ethnic conflicts than Kenya. It 
is, however, safe to say that even with this number of ethnic groups, Zambia has seen 
far less incidents of ethnic conflict than Kenya. Even though ethnic rivalries do exist 
in Zambia, they rarely progress into full-blown conflict, as seen in Kenya. This author 
strongly believes that this discrepancy needs to be interrogated even further. This task 
will be carried out in the chapter dealing with analysis. 
 
Obviously, it would be difficult to discuss all 73 ethnic groups individually. For the 
purposes of this research project, these ethnic groups will be discussed as a collective 
of tribes. The easiest way to identify the Zambian tribes is through the languages 
spoken in Zambia. The tribes in Zambia can be divided into five categories, based on 
their languages. Osei-Hwedie (1998: 231) shares some light on the different tribes in 
Zambia; she states that tribes, such as the Bembas, Bisas, Ushis, Lalas, Lambas and 
the Ngumbos constitute the Bemba-speaking ethnic group. The Bemba-speaking 
tribes are the largest ethnic group in Zambia. The Bemba-speaking tribes are 
predominantly found in the Northern, Luapula, and the Copperbelt provinces. 
 
The second largest ethnic group in Zambia is the Tonga-speaking group. The tribes 
that are Tonga-speaking are the Tongas, Ilas, and the Lenjes. The Chewas, Ngonis, 
Sengas, Nsengas and the Tumbukas form the Bantu Botatwe and the Nyanja ethnic 
groups. Amongst the Lozi-speakers, one would find the following tribes: the Lozis, 
Nkoyas, Makololos, Subiyas, Nyengos, and Namashis. Osei-Hwedie argues that the 
remaining tribes are not easy to categorise. Historically, the Bemba-speaking tribes 
have been more prominent in the struggle for independence. It is a role that the 
Bemba-speaking tribes wanted recognised in post-colonial politics. These tribes 
viewed their dominance of government posts to be a legitimate reward for their 
contribution in ending colonialism. This, of course, did not sit well with other tribes, 
and was also a source of tension. This was seen as an attempt by the Bemba-speaking 
tribes to lay claim to government positions.   
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Osei-Hwedie notes, however, that the main political and ethnic rivalries that exist in 
Zambia are between the Bemba-speakers, on the one hand, and the Lozi and Tonga 
speakers, on the other hand. Provinces where there is active copper mining are strong 
economically. The voting patterns in Zambia reflect a degree of ethnic allegiances. 
However, it would be rather simplistic to claim that ethnicity play a significant role in 
political mobilisation in Zambia. Larmer and Fraser (2007: 632) emphasize that 
“politics in Zambia is, as it has always been, about much more than narrow ethnic 
mobilization”. In Kenya, however, ethnicity plays a bigger role in political 
mobilization.          
 
2.3. Ethnicity and social science 
 
Ethnicity and identity have been researched quite extensively by scholars. Both these 
concepts cut across various disciplines. Sociologists, psychologists, and 
anthropologists have tried to untangle the complexity of ethnicity and identity. These 
scholars have, as a result, built various theories, which make an effort to explain 
ethnicity. Ethnicity has also fascinated those in the field of political science – for a 
number of reasons. Chief amongst them is the undisputed reality that ethnicity and 
identity have been at the centre of conflicts around the world. Conflicts based on 
ethnicity are not a new phenomenon in our societies. They have been part of our 
world for a long time. Modern societies have also not found an effective mechanism 
through which they can deal with ethnic conflicts. It is critical for this study that the 
author first interrogates the concept of ethnicity. This is motivated not only by the fact 
that ethnicity was central to the 2007 conflict in Kenya; but it is also owing to the 
inescapable reality that ‘ethnicity’ and ‘identity’ both permeate Kenyan politics.  In 
this chapter, this author will review the literature on ethnicity and identity. This 
chapter will also visit a discussion on how ethnic identity relates to nationhood. It will 
attempt to examine the question of whether ethnic identity takes precedence over 
national identity; or whether the reverse is true. In situations where one’s identity 
forms a core part of decision-making, does national identity prevail over ethnic 
identities? These are some of the question this author will attempt to grapple with in 
this chapter.  
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Following a general discussion on ethnic identity, this author will examine the 
different theories of ethnicity. Some authors (Nagel, 1994; Berman, 1998) argue that 
ethnicity is nothing more than an effective tool used by those who seek to gain an 
advantage. In other words, there is no basis for ethnic identities. This would 
necessitate a discussion on the Social construction theory. Conflict Theory is 
premised on the view that there is inequality in societies. Inequality is brought about 
by unequal access to resources and power.  
 
2.3.1. Ethnicity, Culture and Race 
 
Human beings have always had an obsession with arranging, organising, and 
categorising: items, objects, or even themselves, into groups. Perhaps the reason for 
this is to make sense of the complex world in which we live. For example, human 
beings describe their societies and communities as either rich or poor. Nation States 
are placed in categories of either the First World, or the Third World. Human beings 
even go as far as putting themselves into categories. We tend either to refer to others 
as black or white (races), or Xhosa, Zulu, Kikuyu, or Luhya (ethnicity). Depending on 
one’s economic status in society, one might be placed in LSM 1 or 5, or one could be 
said to belong to a middle class or the lower class (social standing). All these social 
labels, categories, groups and identities are a human creation. One could always argue 
whether these racial and ethnic categories are essential – or not. From a government 
perspective, one could argue that these social categories are crucial when deciding on 
how to allocate resources, or when drafting legislation. Perhaps human beings could 
argue that organising societies into groups and categories facilitates the process of 
making sense of the world in which they live. In some instances, social categories 
help human beings ascribe meaning to human conditions. They can even be helpful. 
For example, governments may use these labels to channel resources towards ‘poor’ 
communities to alleviate their plight. Social labels have, however, not been without 
controversy. In countries, such as South Africa, racial classification has been used to 
discriminate against certain sections of society. Similarly, in many countries around 
the world, including Africa, political elites have used ethnic identities to sow divisions 
in societies, and to further their own interests.  
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Although human beings have fashioned a variety of social labels, this research will 
focus mainly on ethnic identity.  Chandra (2006: 4) makes the following observation 
about ethnic identity: he asserts that “the set of identity categories in which 
membership is determined by descent-based attributes is large. Ethnic identity 
categories are a subset of this larger set, [and are] defined by the following 
restrictions: They are impersonal. They constitute a section of a country’s population, 
rather than the whole”. As indicated by Chandra, ethnic identity is not shared by the 
whole population. According to Anderson (2001: 210), “ethnicity was viewed as 
essentially a cultural phenomenon, whereas race was biological”. This implies that 
there is no biological basis for ethnicity. Ethnic identities are, therefore, borne by the 
fact that we share similar cultural practices and customs.  As cited in Azarya (2003: 
3), Anthony Smith deems ethnicity to include components, such as “a collective 
name, a common myth of descent, a belief in shared history, a distinctive shared 
culture, an association with a specific territory, and a sense of solidarity that derives 
from the other components”.   
 
Umana-Taylor (2006: 309) approaches ethnic identity from a different angle; she 
asserts that “ethnic identity refers to the degree to which individuals have explored 
their ethnicity, are clear about what their ethnic group membership means to them, 
and identify with their ethnic group”. This definition of ethnic identity implies that for 
members to understand the significance or the value of their ethnic identity, they have 
to first explore the meaning of their membership. Attaching a meaning to one’s ethnic 
identity is, therefore, a subjective process. Although the Xhosa and the Zulu ethnic 
group belong to the same Nguni tribe, their customs are not necessarily the same. The 
cultural practices of the Xhosa ethnic group are different from those of the Zulu – 
especially when it comes to rites of passage.  While the custom of ukwaluka (male 
circumcision) is a rite of passage that every Xhosa man has to observe when they 
reach a certain stage in their lives, it is not a custom that is shared by the Zulu people. 
Similarly, the Zulu custom of ukuhlolwa (virginity testing) is not practised by the 
Xhosa women. As stated above, one of the common components of ethnicity is that 
members of the same ethnic group are usually concentrated in the same territory. In 
Kenya, for example, the Kikuyu ethnic group is mostly found in the central high 
lands. The Luhya are the second largest group in Kenya; and they are found in the 
western regions. Clearly, ethnicity, as seen in the previous discussion, has an element 
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of territoriality connected to it. There are no biological bonds that bind people that 
belong to the same ethnic group. The only characteristics that set these different 
groups apart are their customs and their cultural practices. This gives credence to the 
argument made by Anderson that ethnicity is more a cultural phenomenon than a 
biological trait. Ethnic groups can, therefore, be defined as groups that “range, in 
various usages, from small, relatively isolated, nearly primordial kin and culture 
groups, within which much of life proceeds, all the way to large categories of people 
defined as alike, on the basis of one or two share characteristics (e.g. Hispanics or 
Asian Americans)” (Yinger, 1985: 187).  
 
2.3.2. The value of ethnic identity 
 
 
If ethnicity does not have a biological component, does ethnic identity have any social 
significance for members of the different ethnic groups? Jelen (1999: 209) asserts that 
“for many citizens, group identifications provide cognitive structures through which 
the political world can be viewed. Group-related attitudes seem to be important means 
by which political beliefs can be organized and evaluated”. Jelen implies that 
belonging to an ethnic group provides the means whereby one can make political 
decisions. Umana-Taylor (2006: 390) concurs: “Ethnic identity has proven to be an 
important aspect of adolescents’ developmental experiences, as it has been related to 
their psychological wellbeing, academic achievement, and ability to cope with 
discrimination and racism”. While the value of belonging to an ethnic group might be 
realizable in rural areas, it is doubtful whether ethnicity plays any significant role in 
decision-making for those living in the urban areas.  
 
Rural areas have close-knit communities where belonging to a group might be more 
beneficial in terms of decision-making and to provide support to vulnerable members. 
The lack of resources limits the ability of those living in rural communities to make 
informed decisions. These relate to the lack of access to information. Ethnic groups, 
therefore, become relevant in this environment. Individuals rely on relatives, and 
those that are in the same ethnic group, to make personal and political decisions. This 
often leads to what sociologists call ‘group-think’. This is a phenomenon where 
individual members of a group tend to conform to the decisions taken by the group. 
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This author does not imply that individuals in rural communities defer to their ethnic 
groups when it comes to decision-making. This only means that ethnic groups are 
likely to play a significant role in rural communities. However, in urban communities, 
ethnic groups are unlikely to occupy a prominent space in those communities. This is 
due to a number of reasons. Firstly, individuals in these societies do not rely on ethnic 
groups to make their decisions. They have access to information and resources that 
make it possible for them to make informed decisions without having to rely on their 
ethnic groups. In other words, the social reality of those living in the urban areas is 
influenced and shaped by a myriad of factors.   
2.3.4. What is ethnic conflict? 
 
 
The ultimate goal of this research project is to answer the question: Why is ethnicity 
at the core of Kenyan politics? Montalvo and Reynal-Querol affirm that “the 
increasing incidents of ethnic conflicts, and the much-publicized consequences of 
these conflicts, have attracted the interest of many researchers in the social sciences. 
Many studies have addressed directly the issue of ethnic diversity and its effects on 
social conflicts and civil wars. The interest of this research further extends to the 
reasons for the escalation of ethnic conflicts during elections in Kenya. This author is 
also of the view that some aspects of the Kenyan elections might be partly responsible 
for the ethnic confrontation. However, before any attempt is made at interrogating the 
phenomenon of ethnic conflict, the starting point should be to explain what ethnic 
conflict is. Conflicts are part of everyday life in any social environment where human 
beings are found. The creation of various institutions dedicated to conflict resolution 
is an acknowledgement of the inevitability of conflict. Ethnic conflicts, however, have 
a different dimension to those of other conflicts. As the name suggests, ethnic 
conflicts involve confrontations between different ethnic groups.  
 
Tarimo (2010: 299) defines ethnic conflict as, a “deliberate political strategy by 
desperate groups intended to effect change in the political system that marginalises 
them”. Tarimo’s definition implies that ethnic conflict begins with one ethnic group 
feeling aggrieved. Using the Kenyan context to illustrate Tarimo’s contention, most 
Kenyan ethnic groups have held a feeling of resentment against the Kikuyu ethnic 
group. This resentment stems from the fact that the Kikuyu have used their political 
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and economic power to suppress other ethnic groups, or have prevented other groups 
from gaining access to any form of power. Whether this is real, or merely imagined, it 
will be probed further in this research project. Surely, a few squabbles or differences 
of opinion between ethnic groups are not enough to result in a full-blown war? It 
would take a matter of mutual interest, or an issue that ethnic groups feel strongly 
about, that could upgrade their disagreements into violence.     
2.4. Perspectives on Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict 
 
Ethnicity has been an area of interest for many scholars in various disciplines. These 
disciplines have concentrated on different aspects of ethnicity. Anthropologists and 
sociologists would, for instance, focus on the importance of ethnic identity in society. 
Political scientists are largely concerned with the role played by ethnicity in political 
conflicts and mobilization. The following section will focus on some of the different 
theories of ethnicity, and various perspectives on ethnic conflict focus – on how 
ethnicity relates to conflict. This author hastens to add that ethnicity is a multi-
disciplinary concept; some of the theories that will be presented below are, therefore, 
borrowed from other disciplines. Some authors express the view that some of 
‘theories’ are “best seen as descriptions of particular ethnic constellations, rather than 
as general theories of ethnicity” (Wimmer, 2008: 1011).  
 
2.4.1. Ethnic Rivalry 
 
 
Ethnic conflicts often involve a level of rivalry between various groups. In a number 
of situations, ethnic competition only goes as far distrust and animosity between 
ethnic groups. The subtle competition between Xhosa and the Zulu ethnic groups in 
South Africa is an example of non-violent expressions of ethnic rivalry. However, in 
some situations, ethnic conflicts progress into full-blown ethnic conflict, which is 
accompanied by violence. The 2007 ethnic conflict in Kenya reflects the violent 
expression of ethnic rivalry. Caselli and Coleman’s (2010: 1) developed a theory of 
ethnic conflict, based on the relationship between economic opportunities and ethnic 
conflicts. These authors argue that “each society is endowed with a set of wealth-
creating assets, such as land and mineral resources. There is, therefore, an incentive 
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for a subset of agents to form a group, [in order] to wrest control of these assets from 
the rest of the population. Once a group has won control over the country's riches, 
however, it faces the task of enforcing the exclusion of non-members”. As stated 
above, the dominant ethnic group goes to great lengths to secure what Caselli and 
Coleman refer to as ‘wealth-creating’ assets. However, the critical challenge for the 
dominant ethnic group is then to exclude all other individuals that do not belong to it, 
from benefiting from the wealth of the State. There are a number of ways that ethnic 
groups achieve this end. One form of excluding other ethnic groups is to limit their 
access to State resources by preventing them from getting government jobs. The 
unofficial policy of exclusion has been practised quite extensively in Kenya. Under 
different administrations, the Kikuyu have dominated the public sector posts. Other 
ethnic groups have been under-represented in public office. The Kikuyu had been the 
major beneficiaries of land distribution in Kenya. The Kikuyu had been the 
beneficiaries of commercially viable land. It is, therefore, not just coincidental that in 
Kenya the most successful ethnic group economically, are the Kikuyu.  
 
Caselli and Coleman’s theory is premised on the idea that ethnicity is a social 
construction. The social construction theory will be discussed in detail later in this 
section. The basic principle of the Social Construction Theory is that ethnicity is not a 
biological quality; and, as such, it is not an integral part of human existence. Ethnicity 
is, therefore, an artificial component of society. The only purpose served by ethnicity 
is to provide social and economic advantages. Caselli and Coleman further expand 
their theory by asserting that ethnic conflicts thrive in societies that have limited 
degree of economic development. They strongly believe that: 
 
Economic development alone will reduce the incentives for ethnic conflict, 
which explains why ethnic conflict is more prevalent in developing countries 
than [in] developed ones. It is, thus, not necessary to resort to drastic measures 
of creating nation-states along ethnic lines, [in order] to avoid ethnic conflict. 
Indeed, our results suggest that the creation of such a State may even lead to 
the endogenous creation of new ethnic groups that compete for the economy's 
resources. 
 
The economic models of ethnic conflict view ethnic conflict as the result of 
competing ethnic interests. Osborne (2010: 369) states that “ethnic conflict is 
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certainly a human conflict in the economic sense; but it is unique in one way. The 
canonical conflict models depict various social groups, as dividing their resources 
between fighting, or jointly producing with other groups as dividing their resources, 
with the division of resources by each group among the two activities”. As much as 
the ethnic conflict in Kenya was a result of a number of sociological and political 
factors, it was to some degree a ‘war’ in economic terms.  
 
Scholars who advance economic models to explain ethnic conflicts often point to the 
absence of ethnic conflicts in developed countries to support their theory. They 
observe that ethnic violence occurs mostly in developing nations. This is advanced as 
confirmation that ethnic conflicts are about economic resources. While this may be 
partly true, it does not begin to explain all ethnic conflicts. The theoretical basis of 
economic models offers an inadequate explanation for certain ethnic conflicts, such as 
the conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda. This was not uniquely the result 
of economic imperatives.      
2.4.2 The Horowitz theory of ethnic conflict        
         
Quoting Sadowski, Fearon (2004: 10) states that: 
 
Ethnic conflict seems to have supplanted nuclear war, as the most pressing issue on the 
minds of policy-makers. But, if yesterday's high priests of mutually assured destruction 
were guilty of hyper-rationality, today's prophets of anarchy suffer from a collective 
hysteria triggered by simplistic notions of ethnicity. Debates about intervention in 
Rwanda, or stability in Bosnia, demand a more sober perspective. 
 
To illuminate the debate on ethnic conflict, Horowitz proposed his own theory of 
ethnic conflict. The first point made by Horowitz is that politics and political 
competition in an ethnically diverse State follow a different trajectory to that of a 
society with a homogeneous society. The second aspect of Donald Horowitz’s theory 
follows a primordial thinking, in that he argues that “conflicts along ethnic lines are 
more likely to turn violent than are conflicts along ideological and other political 
cleavages. He suggests that because ethnic brethren are understood as metaphorical 
family members, ethnic conflicts engage intense emotions and a sense of existential 
threat. Killing may then appear a more reasonable and justified reaction” (Fearon, 
2004: 10).    
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In an ethnically homogeneous society, the political party that wins elections is 
normally a party that is able to successfully communicate its message to the 
electorate. It is also a party whose electoral campaign resonates with the voters. If one 
took the recent elections in the United States as an example: The issues that were 
germane in the elections comprised the economy, and the immigration policy. The 
Democrats won the elections because they were able to secure votes from the 
Hispanic community and other minorities. The way in which the Democrats 
communicated their immigration policy to the Hispanic community was more 
appealing than that of the Republicans (e.g. about self-deportation). The example 
presented above reflects the argument made by Horowitz, and one which is that 
political competition in ethnically homogeneous states is ‘issue’ based; political 
parties, therefore, tend to come closer to each other ideologically. In other words, 
political parties avoid taking extreme views. However, in ethnically based States, such 
as Kenya, political support is given to a political party that is seen to be representing 
the views of a particular ethnic group. McLoughlin (2008: 550) provides more detail 
on the Horowitz theory. He states that political parties in the in the ethnically divided 
countries tend to adopt extreme political views to secure ethnic support.  In these 
ethnic-based politics, “there is little chance of a voter crossing the communal divide – 
that is of voting for a party that does not represent the interests of their particular 
ethnic group – and so there are few of the floating voters that are found in a normal 
political society”. Political parties that adopt moderate views are uncommon in these 
ethnically divided States. Moderate views are seen as a sign of weakness. Horowitz 
sees “broad multi-ethnic parties or coalitions as a key factor in managing ethnic 
conflict”. 
2.4.3. Modernisation 
 
The proponents of the modernisation theory view ethnicity as a primitive concept. As 
far as modernists are concerned, ethnicity is a concept and a phenomenon that is only 
prevalent in societies that have failed to evolve and modernise. Essentially, the 
proponents of modernists argue that for societies to be progressive, they should not be 
organised along ethnic lines. In other words, ethnicity should not be an integral part of 
modern societies. Green (2002: 204) highlights the point that modernism derives its 
“intellectual foundations in the study of literature and the visual arts. There, it usually 
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refers to a broad cultural movement characterized by a spirit of constant challenge to 
receive forms. The process of modernization involves the 'shedding of tradition”. 
According to the advocates of the modernist perspective, human beings need to be 
receptive to change if they wish to improve their societies. Collins (1992: 171) traces 
the origins of modernism to:  
 
The 18th century, as both religion and politics became arrayed along a binary 
dimension of traditionalist/conservatives against progressive/liberals. 
Analytically, however, the structural bases of conflict are triangular: in 
politics, moving among the poles of centralization, mass participation, and a 
decentralized balance of powers; in religion, the corresponding poles are 
church hierarchy, sect enthusiasm, and spiritual elites. Rebellion against 
authority and tradition can take place from any pole toward any other. 
 
The above analysis by Collins illustrates the ideological divide between conservative 
thought and progressive thinking, which represents modernist views. Smith (1996: 
446) contends that modernism’s approach to ethnicity is inadequate.  The main 
criticism that Smith finds against modernism is that although it sees no value in ethnic 
identities, it has failed to explain why ethnicity still matters in modern society. He 
notes: “The fact that so many modern nations have been built on the foundations of 
pre-existing ethnicities, and so many ethnic nationalisms can draw on ethnic 
sentiments and shared memories, myths, symbols and values, is omitted from the 
modernist accounts”. 
2.4.4. The Social Construction Theory 
 
As the name suggests, the proponents of The Social Construction Theory believe that 
ethnicity is just a creation of man. They further argue that, those who construct theory 
are those who have something to gain from allocating legitimacy to ethnicity. Azarya 
(2003: 2) states that constructionists view ethnicity as “contrived or imagined”. Those 
who run for public office in multi-ethnic communities often appeal to ethnic 
sentiments. So just how is ethnicity constructed? Azarya provides insight below: 
 
Ethnic identities and boundaries are constructed in the course of long-range social 
processes, and are subject to negotiation and reconfiguration as part of conflict 
management. As they attempt to improve their positions over opponents, groups in 
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conflict may try to enlarge ethnic boundaries, in order to build a broader basis of 
support, or contract them, if they wish to stress distinction and superiority. They 
may try to stress ethnic components versus other (say professional) components of 
collective identity, or [to] shift the attributes of ethnicity, basing it, variably, on 
religion, language, geographical region, perceived common history or customs, 
etc. 
 
Ambitious politicians in the African continent have utilised ethnic cleavages to 
improve their chances of gaining access to State resources. What lends vigour to the 
Social Constructionist Theory is the fact that, more often than not, the politics of 
ethnicity tends to rear its head during elections. However, do all the factors mentioned 
above translate to the fact that ethnicity is not real? Azarya does not think so; he states 
that if ethnicity is a contrived meaning not attached to our biological make-up, how 
then is ethnicity still prevalent today? Azarya proceeds to pose another relevant 
question: If ethnicity could be associated with ethnic conflicts – then on what basis 
could constructionists conclude that ethnicity is not real? Adida (2011: 1373) 
observes that within the constructivist approach, there are differences of opinion, as 
far as the creation of identity is concerned. “Institutionalism, for example, stresses the 
institutional origins of identity, such as colonial or electoral institutions”. Proponents 
of the institutional approach believe that institutions play a much bigger role in the 
‘construction’ of identities. The creation of identity cards by the Belgian government 
is just one example, which portrays the manner in which colonial institutions have 
manipulated ethnic identities. The citizens of Rwanda were forced by Belgians to 
wear identity cards. 
 
The curious feature of the identity cards was the fact that they identified to which 
ethnic group the person belonged. Such emphasis on ethnic identity has had serious 
consequences in Rwandan politics. Consistent with the institutionalisation of ethnic 
identity, the Belgian government utilised a classic case of ‘divide-and-rule’ – by 
favouring the Tutsi minority. They ‘sold’ the myth that the Tutsi were vastly superior 
to the Hutu majority. This claim was justified through a strange mixture of politics 
and pseudo-science. Scientists arrived to measure skulls; and thus, they believed, 
brain size indicated a level of mental development. Apart from the institutional 
approach, “the political-entrepreneurship approach emphasizes the role of political 
entrepreneurs, as agents of identity construction”   (Adida, 2011: 1374). The political-
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entrepreneurship approach advances an argument that politicians are an integral part 
of the process of identity-construction. In attempting to promote their political 
ambitions, political figures manipulated the ethnic cleavages. The political 
environment in Kenya is replete with incidents of political entrepreneurship. 
Campaigning on the basis of ethnic identities is a common political strategy in Kenya 
– especially for those that are running for positions in the public sector. Politics and 
ethnic identity in Kenya have been intertwined since being declared a British colony. 
The practice of manipulating ethnic identities during elections sadly did not end after 
independence. Ethnic identity was not only entangled with politics, but also with 
access to State resources and State wealth. Conflicts inevitably arise as different 
ethnic groups battle for control of these resources. Aspinall (2007: 951) claims that 
“natural-resource exploitation gives rise to conflict, when it becomes entangled in 
[the] wider processes of identity construction, and is reinterpreted back to the 
population by political entrepreneurs in ways that legitimate violence”.   
 
2.4.5. Primordialism  
 
Primordialism takes a different approach to social construction, as far as ethnicity is 
concerned. As highlighted in the above discussion, constructionists argue that 
ethnicity is nothing more than a constructed concept. Constructionists further state 
that in society there are those who have vested interests in the creation of ethnic 
identities: for example, those that are running for public office. Institutions, according 
to the proponents of the Social Construction Theory, these institutions also construct 
identities. Constructionists often cite the case of the Yoruba in Nigeria, in order to 
support their arguments on the construction of ethnic identity. The Yoruba people 
make up 21% of the Nigerian population. They are also found in other countries in the 
western parts of Africa. They are, therefore, one of the largest groups in that region. 
However, the argument made by social constructionists is that before the 19th century, 
the Yoruba community did not even exist. Berman (1998: 310) attests to this fact; he 
states that:  
Important twentieth-century ethnic communities and identities, such as the Shona 
and Yoruba, had no conscious or institutional pre-colonial existence, although 
there were large numbers of linguistically and culturally related people, who 
would later become Shona or Yoruba. There is also evidence that the notion of the 
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individual person with the fixed, unique and bounded identity of Western 
modernity simply did not exist until introduced under colonial rule.   
 
Constructionists state that the main reason these ethnic identities developed quite 
recently is that colonial institutions created them. Advocates of the primordial 
approach, however, emphasize the ‘realness’ of ethnic identity. Primordialists believe 
that human beings are born with a set of ‘markers’ that cannot be changed and cannot 
be wished away. They set us apart from other ethnic groups; these include our 
physical characteristics, language and culture. We learn cultural practices and 
language, as we grow up. Growing up within a particular community, we also learn a 
set of values, which are different from other groups. Through this process, the ethnic 
identity is formed. Primordialists, therefore, contend that there is nothing constructed 
about ethnic identity. The critics of primordialism point out that there is a whole range 
of traits that give a sense of similarity – even amongst people that are from different 
ethnic groups. “There is nothing inevitable in the process of group construction; and 
‘a strong sense of similarity’ can be formed around many highly arbitrary and 
mutually exclusive ‘cultural traits’” (Malesevic, 2011: 76). Malesevic also observes 
that our allegiances are constantly change. This is in contrast with the primordial view 
that human beings are loyal to their ethnic groups. He cites the shifting of allegiances 
during the Bosnian war:     
 
The Bosnian war of 1992–5 initially saw a sharp polarization between the 
collectivities on the basis of distinct religious tradition, pitting predominantly 
Muslim Bosniaks, Christian Orthodox Serbs and Roman Catholic Croats 
against each other; but as the war progressed, the alliances were shifting – 
whereby some cultural markers were downplayed at the expense of others.  
The later stages of war demonstrated the clear malleability of ‘ethnic loyalty’, 
as Bosniaks from north-western Bosnia fought ‘fellow’ Bosniaks from the rest 
of the country. 
 
Levine (1999: 166) also shares the above sentiments; he posits that “ethnic formations 
change continually, despite ideological pronouncements [on] their essential nature and 
great antiquity”. Proponents of the primordial approach also see conflicts between 
ethnic groups as inevitable, because of the fundamental differences between the ethnic 
groups, which breeds tension between these ethnic groups. “The primordial approach 
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situates ethnicity in the psyche, so deeply that society and culture are bent to its will. 
“Ethnic identities and hatreds naturally draw people into persistent identities and 
antagonisms” (Levine, 1999:66). The fundamental weakness of the above primordial 
view is that it has failed to explain why other ethnic groups co-exist relatively 
peacefully in other nation-states. In countries like Zambia, the ethnic groups have 
lived quite peacefully – despite the fact that it is home to about 71 ethnic groups. 
There are actually many other ethnic groups that share the same social environment – 
without any incidents of ethnic violence.  In some communities, individuals even 
marry across ethnic lines. Primordialism fails to account for this reality.  
 
2.4.6. Instrumentalism 
 
 
The instrumentalist approach presents similar arguments to those of the 
constructionists. The instrumentalists maintain that ethnicity is not ‘real’; it is instead, 
constructed. Ethnic identity is often used by individuals to create opportunities for 
themselves; ethnic identity is, therefore, ‘instrumental’ in providing economic and 
other opportunities. The scholars who advocate the instrumentalist approach state that 
ethnicity is not a ‘given’, as primordialism proposes. Depending on what an 
individual could gain from adopting a particular ethnic identity, human beings are 
more than willing to shift ethnic allegiances. According to the instrumentalists, ethnic 
identities are not ‘static’, or ‘immutable’; and we are not ‘bounded’ by them. Wimmer 
(2008: 971) notes that instrumentalism maintains that “individuals choose between 
various identities according to [their] self-interest”. Anderson (2001: 211) concurs; he 
asserts that ethnic identity “survives because it is fluid, superficial, and changeable: a 
product of the circumstances of the moment and, therefore, useful”.  
 
Gil-White (1999: 805) makes the following observation, “If ethnic actors are 
instrumentalists, then new ethnic groups should follow shifting interests, arising and 
disappearing as suddenly as do purely political or territorial alliances; people should 
spontaneously switch [their] ethnic identity when it becomes convenient; and it 
should be more common for new ethnicities to spring forth around changing material 
interests and concerns, than for ethnicities to persist in spite of costs to their members’ 
interests”. As indicated above, ethnic identities during the war in Bosnia war changed 
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variably, as the war progressed. This, according to instrumentalism, is an indication 
that ethnic identities are fluid. In Kenya, ethnic identities can determine the chances 
of political success. Identities are mostly invoked during elections. Candidates vying 
for public office in Kenya are known to manipulate ethnic identities. In an attempt to 
counter the dominance of the Kikuyu in the last elections, Raila Odinga who is a Luo, 
appealed for electoral support from the other ethnic groups. This was highlighted by 
his ‘41 against 1’ electoral catchphrase. 
 
2.4.7. The Conflict Theory 
 
 
Although the Conflict Theory is associated with Roy Bhaskar, it has its roots in 
Marxist theory. The theoretical basis of conflict realism is that society is characterised 
by inequalities on the bases of race and class. Ethnic conflict is, therefore, a reflection 
of such inequalities. It is always necessary to interrogate the Marxist view of ethnic 
conflicts, when discussing the Conflict Realist Theory. Karl Marx once pronounced 
the twentieth century as a “period of revolutionary class struggles” (Wimmer, 
Cederman, & Min, 2009: 316). Although Marx’s predictions came true to some 
extent; the above authors point out that “ethnic demands and grievances play a 
prominent role in most conflicts reported in the daily news — from Iraq to Darfur, 
Kenya to Tibet, Israel and Palestine to Burma”. In the section relating to Zambia, it 
was indicated that ethnic groups that were located along the Copperbelt were 
relatively more successful economically than other ethnic groups. This has 
contributed partly to the tensions that have existed between ethnic groups in Zambia. 
Economic disparities between ethnic groups in Kenya have also been listed as one of 
the causes of ethnic conflict in Kenya. This lends weight to the Marxist argument that 
ethnic conflicts reflect a class struggle between the ethnic groups. Using Guyana as a 
case study, Mars (1990: 65) claimed that “close inter-connection between ethnic 
conflict and class relations is discerned”. Mars more specifically observed that there is 
a “close inter-connection between ethnic patterns of interaction (specifically the levels 
of ethnic conflict) and the nature of class relations or class struggle”.  
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2.5. Ethnic identity and national identity 
 
 
There has been many a debate about ethnic identity and national identity – especially 
on which identity is more important in relation to the other. Is an individual a Xhosa 
first, and only secondly a South African? Or should national identity be elevated 
above ethnic identity? Calhoun (1999: 211) contends that national identity and 
ethnicity are intertwined. He asserts that, “While it is impossible to dissociate 
nationalism entirely from ethnicity, it is equally impossible to explain it simply as a 
continuation of ethnicity, or a simple reflection of common history or language”.  
 
Some leaders have taken steps to minimise the dominance of ethnic groups. Yoweri 
Museveni, for example, maintains that great efforts have been made to “de-legitimize 
ethnicity as a basis for collective demands and political participation. This anti-ethnic 
stand rests on the idea that the public sphere in Africa, and specifically in Uganda, is 
not solid enough to withstand fragmentation into primary group identities”. One could 
reasonably assume that the State would encourage the dominance of national identity. 
At State level, different ethnic identities are not healthy for the nation-state. Eriksen 
(1999: 263) concurs; he contends that “ethnic ideologies are at odds with dominant 
nationalist ideologies, since the latter tend to promote cultural similarity and wide-
ranging integration of all the inhabitants of the nation-state, regardless of their ethnic 
membership”. Different ethnic groups usually present the State with different and 
often conflicting interests. This raises the potential for conflict, when these are not 
met. Alonso (1994: 391) was, however, of the view that ethnic identity cannot be 
subordinate to national identity. He claims that ethnic identity that does so serves its 
purpose in a nation-state. “Along with class, gender, age, and sexual orientation, 
ethnicity is one of the key dimensions of identity for the construction and negotiation 
of status; and hence, of power in State societies”.   
 
2.6. Categorising the data 
  
Due to the nature of the study, numerous data have been generated. In order to make 
sense, and to make it easier to work with the data, this author deems it necessary to 
categorise the data. The researcher categorised and classified the data, with the 
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research question in mind. The nature of the research question requires that various 
sets of different data be used. The author has based the research project on the 
assumption that there is no single cause or explanation for the 2007 ethnic violence in 
Kenya. The ethnic violence that erupted was a combination of a number of issues. 
The above view has also informed the method used in analysing the data collected by 
this researcher. 
 
The complexity of the ethnic problem in Kenya is reflected by the wide range of 
scholarly opinions on this issue. Subsequent to the process of studying the data 
collected, it became patently clear to this author that, in order to manage the huge 
amounts of data collected, it is critical to categorise the data. In order to address the 
research question thoroughly, it is imperative to adopt a multifaceted approach to 
ethnic conflict in Kenya. However, this approach can yield huge amounts of data, 
which can be overwhelming. For this purpose, the data collected have been grouped 
into the following categories: 
 
 Ethnic composition in Kenya. 
 Colonial legacy in Kenya.  
 Ethnic identity. 
 Political structure. 
 Social transformation. 
 Access to resources. 
 Electoral system. 
 Institutional integrity  
 
Ethnic Composition – Some of the data collected were meant to explore the ethnic 
composition in Kenya. These data are crucial, because they provide an important 
perspective on the ethnic environment in Kenya. Exploring the ethnic composition in 
Kenya also facilitates in understanding which groups dominate politically, and which 
have been weakened. These data have also shown the political dynamics and 
relationships between the various ethnic groups. 
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Colonial Legacy – The data collection process could not be complete without the 
examining the impact of colonialism in the future politics of Kenya. The researcher 
has, however, decided not to focus at great length on colonialism. The reason is that 
even though colonialism has had a negative role on how the ethnic groups relate to 
each other, the reality is that the current politics have had as much damaging impact 
on ethnic relations in Kenya, as did the colonial governments before them. The 
pertinent example on how the political elite have shaped the course of politics in 
Kenya is the indictment of the president of Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta, and other 
politicians by the International Crimes Court. Although no convictions have been 
secured yet, the fact that senior members of different political parties have been 
accused reflects how those in office have created the environment of ethnic hostility 
in Kenyan politics. 
 
Ethnic Identity – This researcher also featured literature that explored the concept of 
identity, which included ethnic identity. One could not ignore the issue of identity 
when examining ethnic conflict in Kenya. Ethnic conflicts, such as the one between 
the Hutus and the Tutsis in Rwanda have shown that identity is sometimes 
interwoven with some forms of political conflict and political expression. Identity 
can, therefore, not be discounted in political competition.     
 
Political Structure – The nature of the study also requires that the political structure 
of Kenya be subjected to scrutiny. The following question should also be asked about 
the political structure of Kenya: To what extent does the political structure of Kenya 
allow an opportunity for ethnic violence? At this point, one should perhaps explain 
what the political structure is. Barle and Uys (2002: 140) emphasise that “political 
structure has a bearing on intergovernmental relations, namely, responsiveness and 
accountability, policy diversity, political participation and countervailing power”. The 
data relating to Kenyan political structure was also collected. Scholars and other 
ethnic groups have for years claimed that the Kenyan political structure has 
deliberately been designed to benefit the Kikuyu ethnic group. Another curious aspect 
of the Kenyan political structure is how political parties consciously align themselves 
with certain ethnic groups. Seeking political support on the basis of ethnicity and 
coalitions, based on ethnic identity, has become the normal pattern in Kenyan politics. 
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To what extent did the racialisation of politics contribute to the 2007 ethnic violence? 
These issues will be explored in greater detail in the next chapter.  
 
Social Transformation – After independence, Kenya like many other African 
nations, had a huge task of initiating social transformation – after many years under 
colonial rule. It was the responsibility of post-independence governments and 
institutions to initiate such a process and other developmental issues. Castles (2010: 
1576) defines social transformation: 
 
As a fundamental shift in the way society is organised that goes beyond the 
continual processes of incremental social change that are always at work. This 
implies a ‘step-change’, in which all existing social patterns are questioned and 
many are reconfigured. Social transformations are closely linked to major shifts 
in dominant economic, political and strategic relationships.  
 
Before independence swept through African States, the colonial governments were 
responsible for changing the social strata and the economies of the African States.  
The efforts made by post-independent African governments should be seen in the 
context of reversing the social and economic ruins left by colonial governments. 
However, as elsewhere in this study, not all transformative attempts were made with 
the intention of benefiting the whole of society. The transformation of society may 
have a greater impact on how citizens relate to each other. The efforts made by 
Kenyan governments post-independence will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4 of 
this treatise.  
 
Access to resources – The skewed economic development in Kenya could partly be 
blamed for the centrality of ethnicity in Kenyan politics. The dominance of the 
Kikuyu ethnic group in public office, and other institutions of influence, has provided 
the Kikuyu with the opportunity to gain access to resources that are available in 
Kenya – to the exclusion of all the other ethnic groups.  
 
This has also contributed to the tensions that exist in Kenya. However, this study will 
examine to what extent unequal access to resources has affected the relationship 
between the different ethnic groups. The interrogation of the relationship between 
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identity and access to resources is relevant. Carter and Fenton (2009: 13) observe 
that:        
 
Identity-sensitive mechanisms, on the other hand, rest upon the identification of 
relevant identity attributes, excluding those who do not possess them. Most forms 
of racist and sexist discrimination are, in Sayer’s (2005) term, identity-sensitive 
mechanisms, where some people are able to use gender or colour categories (or 
categories derived from language, religion, place of origin and so on) to either 
facilitate or disqualify other people’s participation in certain types of social 
relations, or access to resources. 
 
According to these authors, ethnicity is sometimes used to disqualify, or to provide 
access to resources. Identity is, therefore, relevant when examining the politics of 
ethnicity. 
 
Institutional Integrity – Institutions are critical in determining the direction that a 
society takes. In the South African context, institutions played a central role, in either 
ending or aiding the existence of apartheid. In post-apartheid South Africa, 
institutions continued to fulfil an oversight role. Institutional integrity is, therefore, 
important for any society. Institutional integrity refers to the role played by 
institutions in ensuring that the State accounts for its actions, and advances the 
interests of its citizens.     
 
It should be mentioned that the institutions referred to above cut across the political 
spectrum. These refer to church groups, non-governmental institutions, electoral 
institutions and even government institutions. The immature declaration of Mwai 
Kibaki, as the winner of the 2007 elections by the Electoral Commission of Kenya 
underscores the sometimes destructive role institutions can play in societies. The 
announcement by the Electoral Commission precipitated the events that unfolded in 
Kenya. Therefore, this warrants a scrutiny on the integrity of these Kenyan 
institutions. Orvis (2006: 99) believes that “institutions can be both [the] cause and 
[the] effect of individual action. Understanding this interplay requires a historical 
examination across time”. 
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The Electoral Process – As already mentioned elsewhere in this treatise, ethnic 
conflict in Kenya normally arises during and after elections. A study of the Kenyan 
electoral process is, therefore, necessary. This of course does not imply that there is 
anything wrong with the current electoral process; it simply means that a proper 
scrutiny of the process is warranted.  
 
According to Murithi (2007: 3): 
 
With a disproportionate amount of emphasis being placed on the conflict 
resolution process up to and including the peace settlement; there is a strong 
case for paying as much attention to the consequences of electoral systems. 
The unquestioned juxtaposition of liberal democratic models of electoral 
competition onto the African continent has, in some cases, gone on to 
undermine the consolidation of democratic peace.  
 
Murithi argues that rarely do we look at electoral systems as one of the causes of 
conflict when we study ethnic conflicts. He also argues that during the conflict 
resolution process, mediators often place greater emphasis on ‘peace settlement’, 
rather than attempting to understand the fundamental causes of ethnic conflicts. In 
2008, after Kofi Annan intervened in the Kenyan crisis, the outcome was the 
formation of the coalition government, and the re-installation of Mwai Kibaki, as the 
president, together with the appointment of Raila Odinga as the prime minister. As 
observed by Murithi, the intervention by Kofi Annan addressed only the immediate 
problems, leaving the central causes of ethnic conflict still needing to be addressed.  
 
The fact that Mwai Kibaki still remained the President of Kenya, after the 
intervention by Annan, meant that the status quo still remained. One should 
remember that Kibaki was declared the winner – amidst indications to the contrary. If 
anything, the intervention was to the advantage of Mwai Kibaki; it helped to 
legitimize his presidency. Some authors argue that electoral systems adopted in 
homogeneous societies do not necessarily work well in multi-ethnic societies. South 
Africa, for example, has adopted a proportional representation (PR) system. PR 
allows for smaller political parties, whose political fortunes might be based on ethnic 
support. This could partly explain the why South Africa has experienced only a few 
limited episodes of ethnic violence – especially after the first democratic elections in 
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1994. Of course, there could be a number of reasons why South Africa has avoided 
experiencing ethnic conflicts to the degree that Kenya and other African States have 
suffered from them. Observing the manner in which ethnicity is being perceived by 
the ruling party, the African National Congress, it is easy to see why ethnicity is not a 
dominant feature in South African politics. Ndletyana (2005: 135) notes that “the 
ANC has historically followed a moderate route – embracing tradition, whilst 
denouncing tribalism”. However, most importantly, Ndletyana observes that “the 
ANC has continued to view ethnicity as an artificial creation”. This, of course, 
reflects a constructionist view of ethnicity. In his study of the relationship between 
electoral systems and ethnicity, Torres (2007: 5) makes several observations. Citing 
Lijphart, Torres notes that:       
 
Those democracies with PL (majoritarian) are overwhelmingly characterized by (i) 
two-party systems; (ii) one-party governments; and (iii) an executive branch that is 
dominant in relation to the legislature; while those democracies with PR (proportional 
representation) are characterized by (i) multi-party systems; (ii) coalition governments; 
and (iii) a general equality of distributed power between the executive branch and the 
legislative branch. The indications are that these electoral systems have made sense, 
given the way these voting systems are set up.  
 
After the 2007 ethnic violence, Kenya carried out an overhaul of its electoral system. 
Kenya has largely adopted the First-past-the-Post system. However, given the fact 
that Kenya is a multi-ethnic society, the system of proportional representation was 
also introduced. As mentioned above, the PR system has the ability to accommodate 
various ethnic groups in a plural society.  An analysis, therefore, of the Kenyan 
electoral process and systems is necessary, as well as its effect on ethnic conflicts. 
This will be carried out in the next chapter of the treatise.  
 
2.7. A Comparative analysis: Zambia  
 
The political, social and economic structures that exist in Kenya should not be studied 
in isolation. These structures should be seen in the broader context of African politics.   
To gain a better perspective on why ethnicity is at the core of Kenyan politics, it 
would be necessary to do a comparative analysis between Kenya and another African 
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State. It would not be useful to compare Kenya with just any other African State, 
without knowing what to evaluate; such an exercise would defeat the purpose of this 
study. A country should not be chosen randomly; there should be grounds on which to 
compare the two different States. Ideally, the country with which one should compare 
Kenya should not only have experienced similar political conditions, but should also 
have had different political, social, and economic outcomes. The purpose of utilising 
the comparative method is to explore the differences and similarities between the two 
nations. The main reason, however, is to determine how the other country has dealt 
with its challenges, as compared with Kenya, especially relating to ethnic diversity. 
The comparative analysis will, therefore, provide the main structure of this study. 
Taking all the above into consideration, this author believes that Zambia would be the 
most suitable country whereby one could evaluate Kenya. Kenya and Zambia, in 
many respects, share certain similarities, and have gone through similar challenges. 
Like many other African States, these countries’ societies have the same 
characteristics. In Chapter 2 of this treatise, the common characteristics of these two 
nations were explored. The following section will highlight a few similarities between 
Kenya and Zambia. These will not be discussed at any great length, as they were 
explored in detail in the second chapter, and will also be examined further in the next 
chapter. 
 
2.7.1 Under British rule  
 
 
Both Kenya and Zambia were for several years colonised by the British government, 
following the expression of ambitions by various European countries during the 
Berlin Conference. As indicated elsewhere in this treatise, the Berlin Conference was 
held with the purpose of dividing up Africa into colonies of European nations. Of 
course, the people that would have been affected the most by the outcome of this 
conference, the Africans, were never part of the process. Rich in natural resources, 
Africa provided Europe with an opportunity to exploit these resources for their 
benefit. The ‘Countries Quest’ (date of publication) unknown: 
 
“The Imperial British East Africa Company was chartered in 1888 to administer 
Kenya; but the company soon found itself losing large amounts of money through its 
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vain attempts to extend control over the interior. In 1895, the British government 
formally took over the territory, which was renamed the East Africa Protectorate. Its 
western neighbour was Britain’s Uganda Protectorate; and the border between the 
two lay just West of the site that would become, in the late 1890s, the new city of 
Nairobi”.  
 
The manner in which Britain got to colonise Zambia mirrored the colonisation of 
Kenya. Britain gained access to Kenya through the exploits of a private company, the 
Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC). The IBEAC had been operating in 
Kenya for a while, before the British government took over. Similarly, the British 
South African Company (BSAC) enabled Britain to gain control of the Zambian 
resources. 
 
2.7.2. Political transition 
 
 
A number of African States gained their independence in the early 1990s; this 
mirrored the changes that were occurring in Eastern Europe. These developments 
were taken as further evidence of what Samuel Huntington famously referred to as a 
‘Third Wave’ of democracy. Bartlett (2000: 429) observes that:  
 
The transfer of power from President Kenneth Kaunda and the United National 
Independence Party (UNIP) to Frederick Chiluba and the Movement for Multi-
Party Democracy (MMD) in 1991 was the first occasion in post-independence 
Sub-Saharan Africa in which power was peacefully transferred through the 
electoral process. 
 
Zambia has also gone through a phase of single-party politics. Curiously, post-
colonial governments in Africa saw the introduction of multi-party democracy as a 
threat to their societies. The post-colonial democracy in Zambia gradually eroded, and 
was replaced by the single-party state in 1973 – under the pretext that it was the best 
antidote for divisive tribalism. The result was disastrous; the people lost a political 
voice; human rights were violated; there was a lack of accountability; and this was 
followed by the economic ruin of the nation, (Milimo, 1993: 35). Just as Kenya 
returned to an era of multi-party democracy in the early 1990s, so did Zambia. 
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According to Burnell (2001: 95), the return to competitive politics brought with it the 
birth of a new political party, which was led by Frederick Chiluba. 
 
2.7.3 Ethnic diversity  
 
Both Kenya and Zambia are home to a number of different ethnic groups.  There are 
about 21 ethnic groups found in Kenya, the most dominant group being the Kikuyu.  
Zambia has managed to contain ethnic rivalries. If there are ethnic tensions, they 
rarely ever transcend into a full-blown ethnic conflict.  How is it that Zambia has 
managed to contain the ethnic rivalries? And what are they doing differently from 
Kenya? It is for this reason that this author felt it not only critical, but necessary, to do 
a comparative analysis between Kenya and Zambia.  The lack of ethnic conflicts in 
Zambia does not necessarily equate to a lack of ethnic ambitions in Zambian politics. 
Just as in Kenya, ethnicity is very much a part of the competitive politics in Zambia, 
especially since the introduction of multi-party politics. Block (2009: 92) confirms the 
view that ethnicity still plays a role in Zambian politics. He observes that:  
 
Tribal allegiances continue to impact Zambian politics. While there is 
disagreement on the degree to which tribal affinities impact voting decisions, they 
are doubtless a part of the political conversation. Zambians know their tribal 
affiliations, and speak their tribe’s native language. Observers conclude that a 
candidate is more likely to receive support from fellow members of his tribe or a 
closely related tribe. 
 
Appointments made to government posts were often called into question, because 
most of the candidates were members of the dominant group. Bartlett (2000: 411) 
states that “in the wake of the MMD’s election victory, Chiluba’s cabinet 
appointments brought renewed criticism of the already-established dominance within 
the party of businessmen and ex-members of UNIP. At least thirteen of the 24-
member cabinet were businessmen, and almost half of the government were Bemba-
speaking”. Because of the prominent role the Bemba community played in the fight 
against colonial rule, they felt justified to dominate the political landscape in Zambia 
in the post-colonial politics.    
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2.7.4 The Zambian electoral system 
 
Unlike Kenya, Zambia makes use of the ‘first-past-the-post’ electoral system. The 
Electoral Commission of Zambia is tasked with the responsibility of presiding over 
the elections. According to its website, it is an “independent and autonomous 
Electoral Management Body (EMB) that is responsible for spearheading, facilitating 
and supervising of the electoral process of Zambia, in line with the country’s electoral 
system. According to the Electoral Commission of Zambia website a credible 
electoral process is achieved through: 
 
 The delimitation of constituency, ward and polling district boundaries; 
 The registration of eligible citizens as voters; 
 The conduct and the supervision of the  country’s Presidential, National 
Assembly (parliamentary) and Local Government elections; 
 The provision of electoral information and voter education  to members of the 
public and the  electorate on the various phases/stages of the  electoral process 
and elections, in particular; 
 The establishment of alternative dispute-resolution mechanisms for the 
management of electoral disputes; and 
 The continuous review and update of electoral laws”. 
 
The independence of the electoral body is critical in any modern democracy. An 
electoral commission that takes sides, or takes decisions that are seen to be in conflict 
with its constitutional mandate, can plunge any nation into a state of chaos. This was 
the exact outcome after the 2007 elections in Kenya, after the Electoral Commission 
of Kenya (ECK) had hastily announced the dubious results.  
 
2.7.5 Identity and politics in Zambia 
 
 
In her review of Posner’s book, Leslie Gray (2006: 1283) argues that: “In Africa, as 
elsewhere in the world, ethnicity matters in politics”. Gray, however, observes that it 
is not always clear “how and why people make political choices based on ethnicity; 
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[this] is less clear”. As discussed in previous chapters, ethnic identity influences the 
political decisions that many Kenyans make. This is reflected in the frequency of 
ethnic tensions in Kenya during the period of elections. The question, therefore, that 
arises from the above is how strong is ethnicity in Zambia. Gray notes that: 
 
In Zambia, two ethnic cleavage structures emerged. One was based on ethnic 
groups. An example of how ethnicity was influenced by colonialism is that ethnic 
identity tended to emerge around those groups that had been designated as Native 
Authorities, which gave ethnic groups access to the financial resources of the 
colonial State. Another example is that the tribal identities emerged in urban 
Zambia, where labourers were attracted to mining areas. 
 
In the following chapter, this author will interrogate the question that has been posed 
above. That is: Why is ethnic identity in some societies, such as Zambia, not as 
intense as ethnic identity is in Kenya?   
 
2.8. Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter started off by looking at the profiles of both Kenya and Zambia. The 
intention was to provide a context for the rest of the chapter. This section analysed the 
various aspects relating to the population, economy, and ethnic politics. It also traced 
the political trajectory of these different nations – from being British colonies to 
independence. It has also explored the character of post-colonial politics in both these 
countries. Through this process, it emerged that Kenya and Zambia had gone through 
more or less a similar pattern of politics since their independence.  
 
For example, both nations embraced one-party politics after independence. The 
overriding reason for closing political space was to attempt to get citizens to unite 
under one political party, and thereby to prevent conflicting interests. At least, this 
was the reason advanced by the politicians. Unfortunately, under one-party politics, 
basic human rights were sometimes put on the back-burner. Also, in these countries, 
the single party contesting the elections had the tendency of giving prominence to the 
needs of a specific ethnic group.  As a result of pressure – both at home and abroad, 
both these countries opened up the political space and adopted multi-party politics.  
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Constitutional reforms were undertaken to institutionalise these democratic reforms.  
The second section of this chapter examined the various concepts related to ethnicity, 
such as culture and race. Within this section, this author also visited a discussion on 
the value of ethnicity. The various definitions of ethnic conflict, and the reasons for 
these differences, were also explored. Subsequent to this discussion, the various 
perspectives and theories on ethnicity and ethnic conflict were identified and 
discussed. The author then concluded this chapter by visiting a discussion on national 
identity and ethnic identity. The inclusion of this topic was necessary, because various 
questions arise when it comes to these forms of identities. For example, which 
identity takes precedence, if any? Also what are the implications for the nation-state, 
should an individual give prominence to one identity over the other?  
 
The following chapter will present the research methodology. It will provide the 
details on how this research will be conducted. The research methodology is essential, 
as it guides the author in the research process. 
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Chapter 3 
The Research Methodology and Design 
3.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter of the treatise provides detail on how the author has conducted the 
research project. The research methodology is an integral and a critical part of the 
research process. It is equivalent to a statement of purpose, in that it stipulates the 
steps to be taken by the researcher, in order to ensure that the research process has 
been credible. Toure (2004: 141) highlights some of the many weaknesses with the 
way scholars interpret many of the problems that exist in Africa.  He argues that “If 
the problems of Africa are to be understood, analyzed and solved, we must take into 
consideration the historical, economic, social, moral and cultural conditions, which 
shape Africa's particular identity in the world — elements of the African evolution, in 
which total emancipation of the African peoples remains the main objective”. Toure’s 
observation is not far off the mark. There has been a tendency to highlight certain 
interpretations that did not acknowledge the relevance of the past history of the 
continent when analysing African problems. Toure also asserts that the solutions to 
various societal problems are not universally applicable. This author, therefore, does 
not intend to assume that the interpretations allocated to other ethnic conflicts that 
exist elsewhere in the world can be used to explain the problems in Kenya. The ethnic 
conflicts in Northern Ireland, for example, do not have the same causes as those in 
Kenya. Toure makes a significant point, which relates to the importance of ‘context’ 
in social research. Toure declares that: 
 
An attempt to solve specific African problems out of context, according to some 
half-understood universal concept, neglects the especially important social factors. 
Such an approach assumes that science has reached its limits, that mankind's 
present knowledge is absolute and immutable, and that in these matters there is 
nothing further to be expected, attempted or desired. 
 
The significant part of this research study is guided by the comparative analysis, 
which the researcher aims to employ in this study. The use of comparative analysis 
was motivated by the belief that Kenya should not be studied in isolation. In order to 
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gain better insight as to why ethnicity is at the core of Kenyan politics, it would be 
necessary to evaluate Kenya against another African State. This would ideally be a 
nation that has that has ethnic diversity, and has experienced similar political and 
social patterns as Kenya. Bearing this in mind, this researcher strongly believes that 
Zambia would be a suitable African State, which one could use to evaluate Kenya.  
 
3.2. Qualitative Research 
 
Having set out the aims and the objectives this study, it is therefore critical that this 
part of the discussion explains how this research project has been designed. The first 
point of departure, however, is to point out that this author is of the view that 
qualitative research is not only suitable, but appropriate, for this study. The 
confidence shown by this author on the use of a qualitative study is based on the fact 
that it is more likely to address the issues mentioned above, or at least to come closer 
to addressing them – compared with quantitative research methods. Denscombe 
(2003: 267) notes that “qualitative research is an umbrella term that covers a variety 
of styles of social research, drawing on a variety of disciplines, such as sociology, and 
social anthropology”. The weakness of quantitative research lies in the fact that the 
world is presented in the form of numbers, and statistics. Even though statistics are 
important; they do not present the full picture of social reality, but only scratch the 
surface. Della Porta and Keating (2008: 322) note the following approaches as 
explanations for using qualitative and quantitative research. According to these 
authors “qualitative research searches for [an] explanation of certain outcomes in 
individual cases (a ‘causes-of-effects approach), and the quantitative one, looking for 
the general effects of various causes (an ‘effects-of-causes approach to explanation)”.   
 
These authors emphasise that a “social scientist should choose an approach, a 
methodology and specific methods appropriate to the questions they are 
asking”. The following section explores the question this project wishes to 
answer.  
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3.3. The Central Research Question 
 
Why is ethnicity a core component of Kenyan politics?  
 
Sub-foci questions: 
 
1. Why does ethnic confrontation escalate after elections in Kenya? 
2. What aspects within Kenyan politics exacerbate ethnic confrontations? 
 
The ethnic violence in Kenya, which followed the 2007 elections underscores and 
reflects the centrality of ethnicity in the electoral process. Although the 2007 
elections were marked by intense violence, the episodes of ethnic violence during 
these elections were not the first. Previous elections were not peaceful either; for 
example, “land-related clashes have always occurred during election time, in the first 
multiparty elections in 1992/93, the second in 1997, the third in 2001/02 and again in 
2007. Land-holding has always been a contentious issue, because it is highly unequal, 
and has tremendously increased income inequality” (Vasudevan, 2008:25). 
 
The central research question requires a research design that examines not only the 
structure of Kenyan politics, but also the value systems of the Kenyan polity. To 
carry out this exercise successfully, this author believes that the Kenyan political 
system and society should be evaluated on various items. These can be categorised 
into the following: 
 
 Social transformation. 
 Ethnic composition. 
 Ethnic identity. 
 Access to resources. 
 Institutional integrity.  
 Political structure. 
 Electoral system. 
The reason for utilising these categories is based on the belief that the central research 
question calls for a multifaceted approach to this study. The challenge posed by the 
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research question is that, in order to uncover the reasons relating to the centrality of 
ethnicity in Kenyan politics, one needs to visit all the aspects that have been 
mentioned above.   
3.4 Type of Research  
 
The approach to this study is informed by the idea that a researcher should ideally, 
always attempt to illuminate a subject that s/he studies. It is therefore, with this aim in 
mind that this author thought that it would be prudent to adopt a dual approach. The 
dual approach taken in this study relates to the fact that this study will both be 
descriptive and explanatory. This author is of the view that before one even attempts 
to explain social phenomena, it is crucial that an effort be first made to describe it. 
This author acknowledges that the act of describing a social phenomenon is a 
subjective exercise. Kratochwil (2008: 88) contends that, “according to the standards 
of scientific method, we first have to describe our objects, clearly separating 
accidental properties from those that determine what the thing is. Subsequently, we 
have to classify them, according to the usual taxonomic requirements”.   
 
As mentioned above, this study is not purely descriptive, it is explanatory as well. 
Explaining an event is also very subjective; we all interpret social realities differently.  
Citing a 1950’s movie, Roth and Mehta (2002: 131) show the complexity and the 
subjectivity of what we see as truth: 
 
Akira Kurosawa’s 1950 film, Rashomon, presents four different accounts of a 
contested event—the murder of a Japanese nobleman and the rape of his wife. As 
the events are retold from four different points of view, the viewer is left 
wondering, which of the four witnesses was telling the truth, and whether a single 
“truth” really exists. The film makes [it] clear that there are different truths for 
these characters; for they are not simply lying to protect themselves (in fact, the 
version of each main party to the crime implicates the teller for the murder); rather, 
they have deceived themselves into believing the version they have told. These 
same questions about truth might be asked about contested events in social 
research. When multiple sources relate different, and sometimes conflicting 
accounts of an episode, how do we decide who is “right”. Is it possible that they all 
are right? 
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The example cited above shows the challenge presented by the explanatory approach. 
By their very nature, human beings view their social environments differently; and we 
develop our own social realities. The fact that we have different meta-theories in 
social research is testament to the complexity inherent in evaluating social reality.   
 
3.5. The critical perspective 
 
As mentioned in the previous discussion, it is the view of this author that ethnic 
violence is a manifestation of a deeper problem. This researcher does not subscribe to 
the primordialists’ view that there exists a natural inclination between ethnic groups 
to cause harm to each other. There is no scientific basis for this argument. The fact 
that there have been political coalitions and co-operation across ethnic groups in 
Kenya serves to disprove the unfounded belief that ethnic groups are, naturally, out to 
harm each other. If there was any truth in this primordial view that ethnic groups have 
an inclination to hurt each other, it would then be reasonable to expect more civil 
wars in our societies than we have seen. The primordial view does not explain the 
relatively peaceful nature of interaction between the different ethnic groups in other 
multi-ethnic societies.  
 
The various ethnic groups in South Africa have been sharing political and social 
space for decades. Apart from a few skirmishes between the Xhosa and the Zulu 
ethnic groups, South Africa has managed to avoid ethnic conflict. The same can be 
said for Zambia, which is home to even more ethnic groups than South Africa and 
Kenya. Zambian ethnic groups have peacefully co-existed – even with limited 
resources. The Zambian case is even more interesting, owing to the fact that it has to 
accommodate twice the number of ethnic groups than does Kenya. The question then 
arises: How is it that ethnic groups in Zambia can peacefully co-exist, while those in 
Kenya seek to harm each other at times? Also, how is it that ethnic groups in Kenya 
tolerate each other between elections? These are the discrepancies that also indicate 
that ethnic violence in Kenya cannot be explained though primordial thinking. As 
explained above, the interpretive and the positivist approach have weaknesses that 
fundamentally affect their usefulness in examining the Kenyan situation. As opposed 
to the other approaches, the critical perspective lends itself as a suitable analytical 
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tool. Kenya’s existing political and economic structures do not accommodate all the 
ethnic groups. It has been mentioned in the previous chapters of this study that of all 
the ethnic groups in Kenya, the Kikuyu seem to be better off socially and 
economically.  
 
The current state of affairs has a lot to do with how politicians have sought to 
intervene and change the natural trajectory of Kenya’s social, political, and economic 
structure. The Frankfurt theorists, who developed the Critical Theory were very 
critical of the positivist tradition. Echoing the weaknesses highlighted above, these 
theorists dismiss positivism as a “worldview of adjustment” (Agger, 1991: 109). 
Cited by Agger, the founders of the Critical Theory also reject positivism, because: 
 
It suggests that one can perceive the world without making assumptions about 
the nature of the phenomena under investigation. Its notion that knowledge 
can simply reflect the world leads to the uncritical identification of reality and 
rationality. One experiences the world as rational and necessary, thus deflating 
attempts to change it.  
  
Critical theorists are of the view that citizens should challenge and evaluate the social 
and economic structures that are created by governments. World history has provided 
perfect examples that governments do not always create social structures, which 
benefit the whole of their society. The world is littered with examples of States and 
their institutions that create structures that benefit one section of society, while 
suppressing the ambitions of the other. Apartheid South Africa is a perfect example of 
this. The apartheid government created social and economic systems that benefited 
the minority white population, but impacted negatively on the lives of non-white 
citizens. In order to maintain these structures, the apartheid government brutally 
suppressed any form of resistance and opposition to its laws; and it created 
institutions that facilitated this role. The ANC (African National Congress) has also 
been taken to task in some quarters for what has been seen as social engineering. In 
an attempt to reverse the damage caused by the apartheid government and its laws, 
the ANC government introduced its own laws and structures. The policies, such as 
Black Economic Empowerment and Affirmative Action, were created with the aim of 
creating an environment for Africans to benefit from the mainstream economy. 
Whether intended or not, this shows how some policies are distorted by governments 
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– to benefit only those close to the ruling party. When Kenya became independent, it 
also sought to right the wrongs of the previous government. The State intervened in 
many respects of society, in order to achieve this end. Being a new government, it 
meant that the government had to experiment in certain respects. Critical theory 
requires that we always challenge the status quo – and do not accept structures as a 
given – to the point of being uncritical and disengaged citizens. Given the 
imperfections of many State-created structures, as demonstrated in a previous 
discussion, the call by critical theorists to be engaged and observant citizens, is not 
without some merit. 
3.6. Data-Gathering  
 
The process of gathering data is an integral part of any research study. It is imperative 
that the researcher gets this part of the research right, as accurately as possible. The 
manner in which the researcher executes this stage has huge implications for the rest 
of the study. Data-gathering refers to the process of “collecting [the] data for your 
study” (Babbie, 1989: 100). Topp and Pawloski (2002: 173) note that “data-collection 
methods for researchers have included oral interviews, hard-copy surveys, and 
electronically scanned bubble sheets, to name but a few”.  
 
3.6.1 Secondary Data 
 
The subject of ethnic politics in Kenya has been researched quite extensively. The 
data on this topic are, therefore, readily available. It was with this view in mind that 
this researcher decided to make use of secondary data. Using secondary data was 
partly motivated by the fact that the cost of travelling to Kenya to gather information 
and conduct interviews would have been prohibitively high. This exercise would not 
make sense – given the fact that the relevant information and data are readily 
available from various sources. Using secondary data does not necessarily mean the 
researcher would reach the same conclusions as the author who collected the primary 
data. The interpretation of the same data would differ from one researcher to the next. 
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Library books and research articles: This researcher has utilised the relevant books 
that were sourced from four different libraries. The main libraries, from which the 
textbooks were sourced, are the NMMU libraries in the Nelson Mandela Bay 
campuses. These are the South Campus library, the North Campus library, the Second 
Avenue, and the library in the Missionvale campus (former Vista University). 
Research articles also provided the backbone of this treatise.  
 
Apart from the books that were sourced from various Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
University (NMMU) libraries, the author to a large extent made use of a variety of 
online resources. These will be discussed below.   
 
3.6.2 Online Resources 
 
A) Databases: The researcher has used various resources that are available online to 
gather the data. The most useful sources of data were the online academic databases. 
The author used the following academic databases: EBSCOhost, GALE Infotrac, 
JSTOR, SAGE, Taylor and Francis online. Aluka provided access to excellent 
African scholarship.  
 
B) Internet: The internet (i.e. World Wide Web) also provided much data that could 
be used for the study. These data were mainly gleaned from the popular search 
engine, Google. Naturally, the author did not use the first available resource on the 
internet. The researcher used carefully selected data. Google Scholar is the sister 
search engine of Google; it provides access to scholarly articles. The websites that 
were used will be referenced in the last part of this treatise, the bibliography.   
 
3.6.3 Reports on the 2007/08 elections 
 
Following the 2007/08 ethnic violence in Kenya in 2007/08, several studies and 
thorough investigations were carried out. The purpose was to find answers to what 
had triggered the violence following the elections, and whether anyone was to blame. 
Some of these official enquiries were initiated by the government of Kenya. Pressure 
from within its borders and from the international community forced the government 
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to open a commission of enquiry on the cause of the violence. Perhaps these 
investigations also allowed the different parties in the unity government an 
opportunity to clear their names. There were accusations that the violence was State 
sponsored; accusations were also levelled against the opposition party for fanning the 
violence. The involvement of the International Criminal Court indicated the 
involvement of those in power. This is further given weight by the reluctance of 
government to assist the ICC in attempting to prosecute those individuals who were 
involved.  
In March 2010, the ICC began its investigations into Kenya’s PEV; and in 
December 2010, the ICC’s Chief Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, requested 
summons for six suspects. The Kenyan Government had previously agreed to 
assist the ICC with its investigations. However, it later revoked this decision, 
and instead devised means on how to prevent the prosecutions 
entirely (Akuru, 2012: 1). 
 
Apart from the investigations that were carried out by the government, several non-
governmental and international institutions also initiated their own investigations. 
Some of the institutions that investigated the causes of the ethnic violence in Kenya 
include: the Human Rights Watch, the United Nations, Amnesty International, and 
the Minority Rights Group. Following the title of each report, a brief introduction and 
summary of the report will be presented. The introduction is directly lifted from the 
reports themselves. The following reports will play a significant role in the study: 
 
3.6.3.1 Ballots to Bullets 
 
 
Human Rights Watch, published in March 2008. According to the authors of this 
report, the report is based: 
 
On two research missions to Kenya during January and February 2008, 
researchers conducted over 200 interviews with victims, witnesses, 
perpetrators, police, magistrates, diplomats, Kenyan and international NGO 
staff, journalists, lawyers, businessmen, local councillors, and members of 
parliament across the country, from all [the] major ethnic groups, by phone 
and in person; the vast majority [of these were conducted] in person. 
Interviews were conducted in English and Swahili without translators. Human 
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Rights Watch also examined [the] court records in Naivasha. Researchers 
visited the following areas: Nairobi, Kisumu, Kitale, Eldoret, Naivasha, 
Nakuru, and Molo.  
 
3.6.3.2 On the Brink of a precipice:  
 
 
A human rights account of Kenya’s post-2007 election violence. Kenya Commission 
on Human Rights – the Report was published in August 2008. This report is based on 
the investigations that were carried out by the Kenya Commission on Human Rights 
after the 2007 elections. “The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights 
(KNCHR), pursuant to Section 16 of the Kenya National Commission on Human 
Rights Act, 2002, investigated the human rights violations that took place in Kenya 
following the disputed December 2007 presidential election results”. After the 
investigations were completed, the report was presented to the president of Kenya, the 
National Assembly, the Minister of Justice, and the various other relevant 
stakeholders in Kenya. 
 
3.6.3.3 Report from the OHCHR: Fact-finding mission to 
Kenya 
 
The report was compiled by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights. It was published in February 2008.  
 
The purpose of the OHCHR Mission was to visit “the districts and localities that 
were most affected by the electoral violence, including Nairobi, Burnt Forest, 
Eldoret, Endebess, Kericho, Kitale, Kikuyu, Kisii, Limuru, Naivasha Nakuru, 
Nyamira, Mau Summit, Molo, and Tigoni, It interviewed 188 victims and witnesses 
of post-electoral violence. Additionally, the OHCHR Mission met with members of 
the Government, law-enforcement authorities, the Attorney General, the Orange 
Democratic Movement (ODM) opposition leaders, the Panel of Eminent African 
personalities, the UN Country Team, the diplomatic community, national and 
international NGOs, the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, church 
representatives and others. In view of the short timeframe, the OHCHR Mission 
could not carry out in-depth investigations, but conducted a preliminary fact-finding 
mission”. 
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3.6.3.4 The post-election violence in Kenya: seeking 
justice for the victims  
 
The report is compiled by Kenyans for Peace, Truth and Justice (KPTJ). The special 
report was published in July 2010. 
 
This report aimed “to explore the avenues of justice available to PEV survivors, 
Kenyans for Peace, Truth and Justice (KPTJ) and its members, the International 
Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) and the Kenya Human Rights Commission 
(KHRC). [They] convened a meeting on October 15-16, 2009. This meeting brought 
together a diverse group of 30 human rights and governance experts to survey and 
critique different options for justice. It generated new understanding on how to use 
existing local, regional and international legal mechanisms to achieve this end”. 
 
3.6.3.5 Kenya: Concerns about the Truth, Justice, and 
Reconciliation Bill  
 
The report was published by Amnesty International on the 21 May 2008. 
 
Following the violence that accompanied the 2007/08 elections, the Kenyan 
government sought different mechanisms whereby to heal the country. It is important 
to examine the role played by these institutions after the conflict. The creation of the 
Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission can be viewed as one of the 
institutions that were created to initiate the healing process. Some institutions, 
however, voiced concerns with some aspects of this commission. One of these 
institutions was Amnesty International. 
 
Amnesty International has a number of serious concerns about the Truth, Justice 
and Reconciliation Commission Bill of Kenya (the Bill), published on 9 May 2008 
and due to be submitted for debate in Parliament. Amnesty International 
recognizes the decision to establish the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
Commission in Kenya as an important first step towards ensuring accountability 
for past human rights violations, and guaranteeing that [the] victims of those 
violations know the truth, obtain justice and are provided with full reparation. The 
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organization welcomes the provisions in the Bill intended to ensure that the 
establishment and functioning of the future Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
Commission (the Commission) complies with international law and standards. 
Such provisions are discussed below.  
 
3.6.3.5 Turning Pebbles: Evading accountability for 
post-election violence in Kenya 
 
The report was compiled by the Human Rights Watch, and published in 2011. “This 
report, based on interviews with victims of the post-election violence, police officers, 
defense and prosecution lawyers, judges, local officials, civil society organizations 
and others, and the analysis of 76 court files, documents the difficulties faced by 
election-violence victims in obtaining access to justice in Kenya. It identifies the 
principal weaknesses within the criminal justice system that have contributed to the 
paltry number of convictions, including police officers’ unwillingness to investigate 
and prosecute their colleagues; the poor quality of investigations in general; 
incompetence, on the part of some police prosecutors; political influence and 
corruption, to subvert the judicial process; and the absence of an operative witness-
protection system”. 
 
3.6.3.6 Kenya: Minorities, indigenous peoples, and 
ethnic diversity 
 
A report by the Minority Rights Group International. This report is not necessarily 
based on the ethnic violence that occurred in Kenya; it explores the difficulties 
experienced by minority groups in Kenya. It is critical to include this in this study, 
because unequal access to resources is said to create an atmosphere of resentment 
between the various ethnic groups in Kenya.  
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Below is a summary of the report: 
 
This report documents the plight of minorities and indigenous peoples in Kenya 
today. Minorities and indigenous peoples are poorer than other communities, their 
rights are not being respected, and they are not included in development or other 
participatory planning processes. Members of minority and indigenous communities 
feel excluded. They are aware of, and resent, being treated differently, and having 
fewer opportunities. 
 
The report discusses the use and abuse of ethnicity in Kenyan politics, also raising 
the problem of the defensiveness of many in politics on ethnic issues. Claims by 
particular communities are often seen as threats to the unity of the Kenyan nation, 
instead of opportunities to make all groups feel included, and to ensure that their 
needs are recognized. 
 
3.7. Data Analysis 
 
According to Denscombe (2003: 119), “analysis of [the] data involves the separation 
of things into their component parts. More specifically, it involves the study of 
complex things, in order to identify their basic elements. It calls on the researcher to 
discover [the] key components or [the] general principles underlying a particular 
phenomenon, so that these can be used to provide a clearer understanding of that 
thing”. The definition presented above does imply that it is not sufficient to just 
collect data for a research project. Social science requires that we go beyond 
collecting the data; we need to make sense of the data, and to derive meaning from 
them. In social science, there are multiple methods and techniques that are used to 
conduct data analysis. Baker (1988: 322) asserts that “data analysis in the social 
sciences has become a complex affair, now that computers and social-science 
computer-packaged programs are in wide use”.  This section will spell out how the 
data analysis will be carried out in this treatise.  
 
3.7.1. Thematic and Content Analysis 
 
 
This researcher uses thematic analysis as a data-analysis method. The data that were 
collected for this study have revealed that ethnic conflicts in Kenya have multiple 
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causes. “Thematic analysis is a method for identifying, analysing, and reporting 
patterns (themes) within data. It minimally organises and describes your dataset in 
(rich) detail. However, it also often goes further than this, and interprets various 
aspects of the research topic” (Clarke & Braun, 2006: 6).  
 
Clarke and Braun state that that even though thematic analysis is a popular analysis 
technique, there is no consensus on “how to go about doing it”. This author believes 
that organising the data into different categories and themes makes is much easier to 
analyse the data. The following discussion will offer more details in terms of what 
themes or categories will be used in this study. Content analysis is also a method used 
in this study; it is “is a research method that allows replicable and valid inferences 
from data to contexts, providing knowledge, a broad description of the data, new 
insights, and a practical guide for action. It is a widely used research method in 
various fields, offering researchers a number of benefits, such as content sensitivity 
and flexibility in research design” (Woo & Heo, 2013: 14).  
 
Content analysis has been utilised to examine selective political speeches made by 
Kenyan politicians, as well as social commentary. The intention is to examine to what 
extent public officials have contributed to the ethnic tensions in Kenya – especially 
during the 2007 elections, and in particular, as a result of their careless use of public 
platforms. To give an example, the (41 against 1) speech made by Rael Odinga 
referring to the 2007 elections as a battle between the Kikuyu people and the rest of 
other ethnic groups went a long way in stoking up the emotions of Kenyans. Content 
analysis lends itself as a good data-analysis method when analysing texts and 
speeches. The only challenge with using content analysis to analyse speeches is that 
only a limited number of political speeches can be used in this study.   
 
3.8. Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter has spelled out how this author will go about conducting the study. This 
researcher started off this chapter by revisiting the various aims and objectives of this 
study. This exercise is necessary because the methodology and the design of this 
research project should be tied and linked to the aims and objectives. Subsequent to 
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this, the research question was also explored. In this chapter, this researcher has also 
explained what type of research this study will adopt. The author felt that because of 
the nature of the study, it would be prudent for this study to assume both a descriptive 
and an explanatory approach. A decision had to be made whether this study would be 
a qualitative or a quantitative study.  
 
Fortunately, this was an easy decision to make, because qualitative research is more 
suitable for this study, the reasons were stipulated above. After this section, the 
discussion was centred on the different philosophies of social science. These meta-
theories provide a framework for any social study. The various weaknesses of the 
positivist and the interpretivist traditions were pointed out. Because of the fact that 
Kenya is not an equal society, this author felt the critical theory lends itself as an 
excellent analytical tool for this research project. The critical theory challenges human 
beings to actively engage and evaluate the structures and policies that are created by 
governments and their institutions.  
 
The various forms of data collection that would be utilised for this study were 
highlighted. Various investigations were carried out, following the 2007 ethnic 
violence in Kenya. These investigations were carried out by State institutions and 
civil society; and they deal with different aspects of the 2007 ethnic violence. These 
reports carry important data. This author, therefore, felt that these reports would be 
useful for this study.  
 
The following chapter will present the research findings. Ethnic politics are about 
identity. Chapter 4 will, therefore, start off with an interrogation of identity in colonial 
Africa. Ethnic identity will also be discussed in relation to national identity. The 
discussion will then probe deeper into the relationship between the Kikuyu ethnic 
group and other ethnic groups. To provide a context for this study, the author felt it 
necessary to explore how Zambia has dealt with the issue of ethnicity.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Research Findings and Analysis 
 
Introduction  
 
 
This chapter will present the research findings. The aim of this chapter is to answer 
the question that was posed in Chapter 1 of this study. Chapter 1 indicated that the 
aim of this study is to uncover the reasons for the centrality of ethnicity in Kenyan 
politics. A significant step in answering the research question is to make sense of all 
the data that have been collected. The first section of this chapter will revisit the key 
discussions on identity. This researcher will then look at the various realities of 
Kenyan politics – and what role, if any, identity has played in this reality. The author 
will then broaden the discussion by exploring other multi-ethnic societies. As stated in 
the previous chapters of this study, Kenya cannot be studied in isolation. For its 
politics to be understood, it has to be evaluated against its ‘peers’. This chapter will 
also feature a component that examines the political speeches of political figures in 
the lead-up to the 2007 elections, and during the start of the conflict. Content analysis 
will play a critical role in this discussion.  
  
4.1 Identity in colonial Africa 
 
The significance of identity in our society cannot be ignored in this study. From an 
early age, human beings become aware of their environment. Our socialisation 
process also creates an awareness of who we are in relation to other human beings. To 
some extent, our identity impacts on the choices that we make, as we become adults. 
Our immediate families play a greater role on how our identity develops. Society also 
influences our identity; and cultural practices, customs and the rites of passage also 
help to enforce human identity. Even though the ethnic violence that broke out after 
the 2007 elections in Kenya was instigated by a number of factors, identity was also 
very much at play. There are many other wars that have been fought in Africa and 
abroad – not only as a result of the differences of opinion between different groups – 
but also as a result of different identities.  
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Citing the work of Simon and Klandermans (2001), Duncan and Stewart (2007: 146) 
argue that members that belong to a group are sometimes willing go to great lengths 
to defend their groups. These authors define the term “politicized collective identity 
as the extent to which group members (self) consciously engage in a power struggle 
on behalf of their group”. The concept of ‘politicised collective identity’ could well 
explain the willingness of some individuals to become the so-called ‘suicide 
bombers’. Only an intense feeling of attachment to the group could drive an 
individual to sacrifice his life in its name. The internecine war between the Sunni and 
Shiite Muslims demonstrates the extent to which identity can influence the likelihood 
of ethnic wars. One cannot deny the fact that the boundaries (ethnic or racial) that 
have been created by humans have been powerful enough to lead to human conflicts 
and the subsequent loss of life. Politicians have long realised that if manipulated 
skilfully, identity can be used to further their political cause. During the 2008 ethnic 
violence in Kenya, identity became a powerful tool for mobilising ethnic groups. The 
indictment of several Kenyan politicians by the International Crimes Court gives 
credence to the claims made in certain quarters that politicians helped to sponsor the 
ethnic violence that broke out in Kenya. Whether the ICC will be able to prove the 
case against the accused remains to be seen. If identity is such a powerful factor in 
society that it can influence wars, it is necessary to discuss politics and identity.   
 
“The term identity politics is widely used throughout the social sciences and the 
humanities to describe phenomena as diverse as multiculturalism, the women's 
movement, civil rights, lesbian and gay movements, separatist movements in Canada 
and Spain, and violent ethnic and nationalist conflicts in postcolonial Africa and Asia, 
as well as in the formerly communist countries of Eastern Europe” (Bernstein, 2005: 
47). Identity is a multi-disciplinary concept; it has stirred the interest of many scholars 
across various disciplines. Identity has been the subject of research in many fields, 
such as social psychology, sociology, and political studies. Obviously, identity is 
approached in these disciplines from different perspectives. It is crucial, therefore, 
that anyone studying identity should be receptive to the contribution of other 
disciplines in the understanding of the concept of identity. The main interest of this 
study, as far as identity is concerned, is how it affects political decisions, and to what 
extent it can influence ethnic wars. Kaya (2007: 707) is of the view that the recent 
increase in identity politics has come with a shift from general politics, based on ideal 
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universal progress, to the politics of identity, based on gender, local, religious, or 
ethnic identities. Thus, ‘identity-based movements’ have been assumed to replace 
‘interest-based movements’. Citing Cohen (1985), Melucci (1985, 1996), and 
Touraine (1985), Kaya observes that interest-based movements have increasingly 
been replaced by what these authors referred to as New Social Movements. The social 
movements, such as the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured 
People (NAACP) in the United States, which represents the interests of African 
Americans, are examples of identity-based organisations. These new movements have 
also been present in the African political environment.  
 
The activism of political groupings that represent the needs of the San people in 
Southern Africa (e.g. Botswana) is one example. The San people in Botswana, for 
example, have for many years sought to convince the government of Botswana to 
recognise them as indigenous people, and to accord them their rights, as required by 
international law. These attempts have been unsuccessful, owing to the position held 
by government, which insists that “all citizens of the country are indigenous” 
(Hitchcock, 2002: 797). Some African States have been less accommodating towards 
indigenous communities. These communities have been viewed with suspicion by 
post-colonial governments. Chebanne (2010: 89) asserts that “politically, aboriginal 
communities, because they do not respect colonial borders, pose problems for African 
governments. Tribal territorial interests and colonial borders, [as well as] the 
governance of indigenous and ethnic issues, are still a real challenge in many African 
counties”.  
 
Colonialism has undeniably occupied a significant part in African history. As 
indicated elsewhere in this study, even though colonialism has impacted quite 
extensively on African societies, this author has deliberately chosen not to discuss it at 
great length. The basis for excluding a detailed discussion in this study is that 
colonialism has been researched comprehensively by many other scholars. These 
scholars have competently demonstrated the impact of colonialism on this continent. 
However, the relationship between colonialism and the identities of African citizens 
deserves more than just a passing acknowledgement. African identities have been 
affected by colonial rule in many ways. Firstly, in an attempt to ‘divide and rule’ 
African communities, the colonial masters elevated some elements of ethnic identities 
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above others.  This was achieved by attaching certain artificial labels or values to 
certain ethnic identities. For instance, those looking after the interests of colonial 
governments went to great lengths to describe some ethnic groups as ‘superior’, and 
other groups as ‘inferior’. This has served to polarise ethnic groups in many African 
communities who had co-existed peacefully for many years in pre-colonial Africa. 
Europeans often made use of dubious science to advance certain theories that suit 
their political ambitions. Ethnic groups, such as the Tutsis were, for example, 
described by the Europeans as superior to the Tutsis.  
 
In keeping with this notion of the superiority of the Tutsis, “the best jobs in all sectors 
of the country under the hegemony of European colonialism were given to the Tutsis. 
Thus, the prevailing notion of being Tutsi was synonymous with privileges of wealth 
and power” (White, 2009: 474). The description of certain ethnic groups as superior 
helped to justify their political ambitions. It also helped to justify the use of any 
means to subdue other groups. Europeans also impacted on African identities by 
providing and extending particular privileges to certain groups, while denying other 
groups the same privileges. Europeans took these steps to make sure that identity (us 
and them) served to polarise African communities.  
 
African identity is quite complex, because of the many factors that come into play. 
Analysing African identity is even more of a daunting task for some scholars. African 
identity bears its complexity to the many historical processes that have influenced and 
shaped it. Ndlovu-Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2010: 284) addresses this issue: 
 
Despite the complexities involved in defining African identities, there are, 
however, some identifiable historical processes that contributed to the current 
identity complexion of Africa. Michael Neocosmos (2008a, p. 2) argued that the 
slave trade was perhaps one of the greatest forced migrations in history, that had 
and continues to have, profound effects on the development of the African 
continent’s identity complexion and meaning of Africanness. The slave trade not 
only led to the formation of a Diaspora in the Americas, but also to the formation 
of whole States composed of Africans transposed to other parts of the world, such 
as Haiti and Jamaica.  
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The creation of artificial boundaries by Europeans also created distinctive boundaries 
between the different ethnic groups in Africa. This has led to a situation where certain 
ethnic groups were associated with specific regions. The Kikuyu, for example, are 
found along the Rift Valley province of Kenya. In Zambia, one would find the Bemba 
ethnic group in the Copperbelt. Some ethnic groups, however, have settled where they 
are – not because they were forced by colonial forces to do so – but they settled in 
their current locations, because of their migrating in search of resources. Different 
splinter groups broke away from the main group to form their own kingdoms. The 
concentration of ethnic groups in different areas further resulted in the intensification 
of social identity. Dobler (2010: 22) explains how big a role borders and places play 
in shaping identities: 
 
Borders are places where, in everyday interaction, collective identities are shaped 
by comparison and contrast. Slight differences in practice are often used to 
construct huge differences in identity, especially if they can be linked to the 
legitimacy of political domination. Today’s border between Namibia and Angola 
has been the frontier of Portuguese and British/South African colonialism since 
1915. The South African colonial administration has always constructed 
Portuguese rule in Angola as the contrast, which let South African rule appear as 
benign, just and ordered, thus justifying South African colonial domination. 
 
Dobler notes that borders also facilitate the creation of ethnic identities. Citing 
Frederik Barth, he contends that borders “are defined at their limits, at the places 
where one set of rules can no longer be seen as natural and all-encompassing (Barth 
1969). When we draw the line, both sides of the line become entities defined by 
contrast, and a continuity of different social norms and practices is partitioned into 
areas defined by inner homogeneity and difference to each other. This is, of course, 
not only true for ethnicities. It is as important for more institutionalized political 
entities, not the least for modern States”. And the formation of boundaries helped to 
institutionalise such ethnic identities. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2010: 282) argues that “social 
identities feature at the centre and across pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial 
African terrain, as a tool open to mobilisation or rallying the different groups around 
their socio-economic and political grievances. Colonialists and African nationalists 
have [had] a fair share in [the] manipulation of social differences for their hegemonic 
projects”. As shown by Ndlovu-Gatsheni the power of identity cannot be undermined.  
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4.2. Ethnicity and identity in post-colonial Africa 
 
 
The wars waged by African leaders against colonial forces were not only about the 
pursuit of freedom and independence, but also about reclaiming the ‘identity’ of the 
indigenous people. As stated elsewhere in this research, the colonial forces had, on a 
number of occasions, used the identities of indigenous people to further their policy of 
‘divide and rule’. The situation between the Hutus and the Tutsis in Rwanda may be 
cited as an example.   
 
Ethnicity forms a central part of this treatise; it is therefore necessary that the concept 
of ethnicity be adequately explained. Osei-Hwedie (1998: 229) defines an ethnic 
group as a group with “shared perceptions, common origins, historical memories, 
values and expectations, which makes efforts to press collectively for the political and 
socio-economic interests”. Osei-Hwedie also notes that ethnicity is often linked to 
regionalism, because ethnic groups are associated with particular regions. For 
example, the Bemba people of Zambia are predominantly found in the Copper Belt; in 
Kenya, the Kikuyu are largely to be found in the Central Province; and in South 
Africa, the Xhosa would be found in the Eastern Province. Ethnicity, according to this 
author “becomes politically significant when common culture, as in language, is 
cultivated to foster a common stance among a group. A common culture enables a 
group relatively easily to develop common perceptions of politics and political 
identity”.    
4.3. National identity in Kenya 
 
The construction and expression of identity can either fortify or undermine 
national solidarity if the leadership function is not played out with vision and 
tact. National identity-based solidarities are built up in social struggles for 
emancipation, solidarities that have often been abused and wasted away. 
Alternative identities have been cobbled out, which tend to weaken national 
solidarity by playing out an ominous politics of exclusion, thereby 
undermining the prospect of social cohesion and generating multiple terrains 
of conflict (Aseka, 2007: 2). 
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Identity has been a complex concept, as far as Kenya is concerned. There is no 
indication that collective identity exists in Kenya. If however, national identity does 
exist, it has certainly between drowned out by the cacophony of ethnic politics. 
Identity in Kenya is complex, in the sense that for many years colonial and post-
colonial administrations have put more emphasis on ethnicity, rather than on a 
collective identity. Bond (2006: 610) claims that “identities fundamental to the 
politics of difference frequently need to reconcile themselves with dominant 
conceptions of national identity.” 
 
Bond also asserts that “it is true that national identification runs parallel [with] (and 
sometimes subordinate to) other forms of social identification. Yet, an important 
feature of the ‘imagining’ of the national community is that it entails the setting aside 
of other (non-national) dimensions of inequality”. One cannot blame Kenyan citizens 
for moving away from one another, as Kenyan politics have created an environment 
for the construction of identity rather than any collective identity. Political elites have 
through certain policies also introduced regionalism in their politics. Osamba (2001: 
90) makes as interesting observation; he claims that: 
 
The colonial government adopted a policy of 'divide and rule', which seems to 
have institutionalized ethnic consciousness in Kenya. The colonial State made very 
little attempt to create a Kenyan nation from the myriad ethnic societies; instead 
each ethnic group was encouraged to become inward-looking. To achieve this 
objective, for example, the State discouraged and prohibited the formation of 
nation-wide political parties; but rather, it permitted the mushrooming of rival 
district or ethnic-based political associations. 
 
The policy of divide-and-rule, as devised by the British, robbed the Kenyan citizens 
of an opportunity to formulate a shared national identity. A shared national identity 
has the potential to bind and override all the different ethnic identities. Colonial 
politics have created an environment, where Kenyans first identify with their ethnic 
identity, rather than their national identity. The political formations that have 
managed to secure electoral victory have also failed dismally to construct a common 
national identity. Instead, they have widened ethnic divisions by further amplifying 
the ethnic differences. The closest that ethnic groups can get to fostering ethnic 
identity is an attempt to project a form of unified identity or solidarity. It is only 
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through episodes of ethnic conflict that Kenya’s façade of national identity is 
exposed. Anderson (2005: 547) notes that “over the past 30 years or more, the history 
of Kenyan politics has been enveloped in the grand meta-narrative of the rise of 
nationalism. This has been the history made by the victors in Kenya’s independence 
elections of 1963, the Kenya African National Union (KANU)”. Anderson further 
claims that KANU’s version of national identity chose to ignore some aspects of 
Kenyan history, especially those aspects that undermine the KANU version of 
Kenyan identity. Anderson argues that this “version of Kenya’s past has consciously 
obscured the uncomfortable ambiguities of the Mau-Mau years (1952–60), and neatly 
avoided any acknowledgment of those who then held alternative visions of Kenya’s 
post-colonial political future.  
 
“Among those alternatives, was the policy of majimboism”. Majimboism refers to the 
KANU policy, which ostensibly sought to decentralise political power. The KANU 
government introduced this policy with the aim of transferring certain powers to the 
provinces. Ogude (2002: 205) is of the view that those in public office often attempt 
to project an image of fostering unity in Kenya. However, the actions of politicians 
have done little to foster a common national identity, but have instead, created 
divisions amongst the various ethnic groups. Ogude states that the “post-Kenyatta 
State has also witnessed an increase in what may be called an ethnocratic State, whose 
basic political rhetoric is nation-building; while in practice, it has undermined any real 
desire for nationhood. The Moi regime, like the preceding colonial system, continued 
to invent new ethnic groups, as the basis of administrative unity, and as a vehicle for 
securing political loyalty”. A relevant question that one may ask is: What creates an 
environment that makes it so difficult for Kenyans to have a collective identity?  
 
The answer to this question lies in the problem that one could describe as being 
embedded in Kenyan politics. Despite the rhetoric, the political parties in Kenya have 
not shown any interest in promoting a common national identity in Kenya. The 
Kenyan political parties have failed to educate their constituencies to look beyond the 
ethnic boundaries, and to embrace any common identity. Kenyan politics are also 
arranged around ethnic identity. The prospects of political parties are always linked to 
the ability to sell their political agenda to various ethnic groups. Political parties that 
are voted into power on the basis of support received from certain ethnic groups, 
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become beholden to these groups. It has been stated elsewhere in this study that the 
Kikuyu dominate the political landscape in Kenya. It, therefore, comes as no surprise 
that the most developed areas in Kenya are the areas that are dominated by the 
Kikuyu. The refusal by Mwai Kibaki to surrender the presidency to Raila Odinga – 
even amidst evidence that he lost the 2007 elections – was seen by other ethnic groups 
as a further indication that the Kikuyu were not ready to relinquish power to other 
ethnic groups. The statements attributed to Raila Odinga during his election campaign 
in 2007 provide the context for the Kenyan politics. Odinga characterised the 2007 
elections as a battle between the Kikuyu and the other ethnic groups. Raila Odinga’s 
sentiments reflected the level of distrust between the various ethnic groups in Kenya 
and the Kikuyu.  
 
As much as distrust exists between the various ethnic groups in Kenya, it does prevent 
these groups from aligning themselves politically with the Kikuyu. Concerned about 
their own survival, these groups align themselves with the dominant group. This 
constant re-alignment of allegiances between these ethnic groups, lends weight to the 
view that ethnic identities are fluid, and not primordial. Kenyans, as in any other part 
of world, are willing to quite readily move their allegiances – depending on the 
expected outcomes. This reality goes a long way in explaining why Kenyans find it 
difficult to unite themselves on the basis of a common identity. The reality for 
Kenyans is not informed by a collective identity, but by the disparate ethnic identities 
and regionalism. The reality is that “political manipulation of ethnicity is almost a 
tradition in Kenyan politics” (Human Rights Watch, 2008: 17). Through 
constitutional tinkering, Jomo Kenyatta tried to ‘enforce’ a national identity by 
banning opposition parties, and then effectively making Kenya a one-party State. 
This, however, proved fruitless, because ethnic divisions still remained apparent. 
Yieke (2011: 13) contends that: 
 
Immediately after independence, efforts were made to subordinate ethnicity to 
nationhood. Nationhood was cultivated, in the hope that it would undermine and 
ultimately replace ethnic attachments. This is because ethnic attachments were 
perceived as divisive and contrary to the nation and national building project. 
Jomo Kenyatta, the first president of the republic of Kenya, publicly condemned 
ethnicity; and yet it was in his era that ethnicity took root in Kenya. 
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The fact that the efforts made by Kenyatta failed to yield any form of national identity 
revealed one fact; and that is that national identity cannot be created with any form of 
legal instrument. Tinkering with the constitution does not yield a national identity; it 
may create a semblance of collective identity. As long as ethnicity still plays a central 
role in determining political outcomes, a national identity will remain a pipe-dream 
for most Kenyans.    
 
4.4. Critical realism on the colonial structure 
 
 
The social and economic structures that were created by pre-colonial communities in 
Africa were uprooted by the colonial forces. The African communities created these 
structures to enable order in their communities, and to formalise the relations between 
various ethnic groups. However, with the arrival of the Europeans, these structures 
were interfered with. Communities were, for example, forced off their ancestral land 
to accommodate European interests. The existing chiefs at the time were duped or 
forced into signing documents, which effectively dispossessed their communities of 
their land. The leadership structures that existed (e.g. chiefs) in these communities 
were dissolved or became irrelevant. 
 
The critical-realist theory emphasises that the structures that are created by 
governments produce certain social outcomes. Critical theorists insist that these 
structures and the outcomes that they create need to be examined. This researcher 
firmly believes that colonial structures can best be understood and interpreted through 
a critical-realist theory. Social scientists and feminist theorists have found critical 
theory to be a useful approach when studying issues of power and social structures. 
Perhaps the first political structure set up by the Europeans that had long-term effects 
on African societies was the creation of physical boundaries. Driven by a notion of 
superiority and economic interests, the Europeans created these boundaries, without 
any regard for the pre-existing structures. The boundaries were also created with 
haste, in order to prevent other European States from claiming a stake in the land. The 
reconfiguration of the African societies did not end with the redesigning of new 
physical boundaries. The economic and social structures created during the colonial 
era have proven difficult to dismantle – years after the end of colonialism. The 
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continued existence of colonial structures in Africa is puzzling, especially when 
considering that these structures were based on the idea of inequality.      
Neither exploitative economic structures, nor hierarchical and Eurocentric 
educational and cultural institutions were easily remoulded to more beneficial 
ends. Nor was it to be wondered at that tribal and religious divisions, encouraged, 
indeed the idea of “colonial legacy” and the historiography of empire virtually 
“invented,” under colonialism’s policies of “divide and rule,” now flared up; nor 
that as soon as the first generation of leaders faced such predictable difficulties 
they fell back on the authoritarian and militarist ways of their former rulers, or the 
repressive laws still in many cases in operation (Wiener, 2013: 6). 
 
Wiener correctly observes that the social and economic structures that were the legacy 
of colonialism were difficult to ‘remould’, in order to benefit post-colonial African 
societies. Former British colonies in Africa have created or adopted institutions that 
bear some resemblance to their colonial institutions. Countries, such as South Africa, 
have, for example, maintained the legal and parliamentary systems similar to those of 
Britain. For a while, the British Westminster system effectively became an enduring 
parliamentary system in most sub-Saharan parliaments. One needs to mention that the 
countries that came to colonise Africa created these institutions in response to their 
individual social, political and economic realities. They were meant to address and 
deal with certain challenges that were found in these individual countries. Africa had 
its own set of challenges that were not necessarily similar to those of Europe. This 
should have been a major consideration, as Africa attempted chart the way forward 
after the dismantling of colonial Africa. Gennaioli and Rainer (2005: 2) contend that: 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa is populated by several hundred ethnic groups. Before the 
large-scale colonization undertaken by European powers towards the end of the 
19th century, those groups varied tremendously in their political institutions. 
Colonial powers, and later the international community, superimposed on top of 
these pre-colonial institutions new State organizations, borrowed from the 
Western historical experience that are identified with today’s African countries. 
 
As Wiener noted above, on many occasions post-colonial governments have reverted 
back to colonial laws, in attempting to deal with social and political challenges. 
Whenever faced with political dissent, post-colonial governments have conveniently 
brought back colonial laws to stifle any political activism. According to the advocates 
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of critical realism, the adjustment of State laws to suit the governments of the day is 
reason in enough to always challenge the status quo. Critical realism will form the 
theoretical basis of this study. 
 
4.5. Ethnicity – A Social Constructionist view 
 
 
Human beings do not operate within a specific set of ethnic boundaries. We also do 
not carry on with our day-to-day lives, while being conscious of what ethnic groups 
we belong to. Carotenuto (2006: 55) asserts that “many contemporary African 
ethnicities are socially constructed phenomena that were drastically shaped by the 
colonial encounter”. Earlier work has highlighted how foreign impositions radically 
altered African identities from the top down, by imposing foreign borders, altering 
local authority, and codifying and reworking cultural traditions. 
 
Akyeampong (2006: 3) states that: “Studies of pre-colonial Africa underscore the 
multiple identities Africans adhered to, and how membership of a kin group or clan, 
political allegiance to a chief, membership of religious cults, and initiation into 
professional guilds overlapped fluidly, and were not confined within any defined 
territory. Insisting that ethnic, cultural and political boundaries should be coterminous 
within the native State was a distinct creation of colonial rule”. As stated elsewhere in 
this study, different ethnic groups have interacted with each other for centuries. These 
inter-ethnic relationships were often based on trade and other social relationships. 
When ethnic conflicts occurred, they were often instigated by a struggle over scarce 
resources, like grazing land or other resources; they were not caused by the mere 
aspect of ethnicity. A few examples have been cited in this research study on multi-
ethnic societies that live in relative peace. The phrase ‘ethnic construction’ has been 
referred to quite extensively in this section. However, a question that has not been 
interrogated is how ethnicity is actually constructed. Family largely plays a bigger 
role in the construction of our identities. The family sets boundaries and creates 
structures, within which family members need to operate. Forces outside family 
structures also have an impact on our individual identities. Jaspal and Cinnirella 
(2012: 6) state that, “social construction of ethnicity, constitutes a presumed identity 
and a belief in common descent. Although socially constructed, ethnic demarcation 
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lines ‘are real’ – in the sense that they form an important part of people’s 
psychological realities”. If human beings were born with a natural inclination to hate 
other ethnic groups, one would reasonably expect that ethnic conflicts would be 
occurring more frequently. Ethnicity becomes a factor when it is intertwined with the 
political process. Kenya provides an excellent example of a deadly mixture between 
ethnicity and politics. In the absence of political rivalry/elections, Kenya becomes an 
oasis of peace in an otherwise volatile region in East Africa. The opposite is true, 
however, when the electoral process starts. Suddenly, ethnic tensions begin to rise and 
violent episodes are reported. The fact that ethnic rivalries in Kenya predominantly 
emerge during elections speaks to the argument that ethnicity is a mere creation of 
human beings. One could go as far as to suggest that ethnic identity becomes less 
prominent in Kenyan society once elections are over. In the South African context, 
different ethnic groups formed political coalitions – with the common aim of ending 
the apartheid regime. Even though ethnic rivalries existed between these ethnic 
groups (especially between Xhosa and the Zulu ethnic groups), these were not strong 
enough to preclude these groups from co-operating with one another. This reflects the 
fluidity of ethnic identities, previously referred to.  The primordialists often argue that 
our ethnic identities are deep-rooted; and therefore we find it difficult to detach 
ourselves from them. As far as primordialists are concerned, our identities, therefore, 
weigh heavily in the decisions that human beings make.  
 
The evidence supporting the view that ethnic identity is fluid undermines the position 
held by the primordialists. Korieh (2006: 91) is of the view that “identities are multi-
layered, self-imposed, as well as ascribed by others”. The argument about the fluidity 
of ethnic identity is quite strong. Since the advent of democracy, South Africa has 
seen a steady stream of foreign nationals, especially within the African continent, into 
its communities. In many cases these nationals have been successfully assimilated 
into South African societies. These individuals have made the move to South Africa 
mainly for political and economic reasons. This is an indication that our personal 
circumstances and the situations, in which we find ourselves, influence the decisions 
that we make.  
 
Our ethnic identities have little, if any, impact on the day-to-day decisions that we 
make. The successful integration of foreign nationals within the South African society 
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and other societies, strongly suggests the fact our identities are mere constructions. In 
the African context, colonial structure played a significant part in the way African 
identities were constructed. This was, of course, done with the aim of fulfilling a 
political role. Colonial forces were eager to divide African societies by constructing 
African identities. The construction of Hutu and Tutsi identities is a good example of 
the manipulation of identities. One was led to believe that one was superior to the 
other. Differences in physical characteristics were presented as conclusive proof of 
these unscientific claims. A similar practice of playing ethnic groups off against each 
other was carried out in Kenya by the British. The Kikuyu were given the ‘status’ of 
being superior to the other Kenyan groups. This conferred status was accompanied by 
certain economic privileges. These ranks resulted in the creation of artificial 
boundaries by people from the same land. Although caused by different factors, the 
ethnic war in Rwanda was to some degree the result of these ethnic boundaries. The 
ethnic boundaries made it difficult for ethnic groups to create social relationships 
amongst themselves. Through the actions of colonial and post-colonial governments, 
Kenyans have been constantly reminded of their ethnic identity. The provision of 
fertile land to the Kikuyu, while ignoring the pleas of the rightful owners, is just one 
of the examples where the colonial administration has used ethnicity to effect social 
changes in Kenya. The colonial role in the construction of Kenyan identity can, 
therefore, not be ignored. Aseka (2007: 2) contends that “the intersection of 
consciousness and historical experience is the basis of such identity construction. It is 
a product of [the] complex processes of historical interaction between people, 
institutions and their social practices in expressing selfhood”.     
 
With independence sweeping through the African continent in the 1960s, one would 
have thought that the new political dispensation would offer political space to all the 
domestic ethnic groups. Unfortunately, post-colonial governments in Africa failed 
dismally in terms of creating a political environment that was accommodating to all 
the different ethnic groups. Dominant ethnic groups have benefited from government 
positions, to the detriment of other ethnic groups; Kenya followed the same pattern. 
“The Kikuyu are the most numerous ethnic group in Kenya, constituting almost a 
quarter of the population” (Brown, 2004: 334). Being the dominant group in Kenya – 
both numerically and politically – the Kikuyu have used their status to gain access to 
government resources. This is not a recent phenomenon in Kenyan politics. The 
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alignment of State resources with the needs of the Kikuyu ethnic groups was 
introduced during the administration of Kenya’s founding president, Jomo Kenyatta.  
The report published by Human Rights Watch in 2008 makes the following 
observation:  
 
After independence, the new government under Jomo Kenyatta did not 
recognize customary land use in law or practice; but instead sold the land it 
[had] acquired from British settlers under the principle of ‘willing seller, 
willing buyer.’ But much of the land ended up in the hands of members of 
Kenyatta’s Kikuyu ethnic group, rather than with the communities from which 
it had been taken. Kenyatta also used the land for patronage purposes, and to 
build alliances: a pattern that continued and increased under his successor, 
President Daniel Arap Moi. Colonial “trust” land remained in place with 
respect to the historic land of certain groups, including many pastoralist 
groups, who were still deemed, in effect, incapable of holding direct land titles 
(source: Ballots to bullets, 2008: 13). 
 
Belonging to a certain ethnic group may provide political and economic benefits. 
Yieke (2011: 9) contends that every regime in Kenya sought to look after the interests 
of a certain community, “from self-rule in 1963, until the death of the first president, 
Jomo Kenyatta, in 1978, political and economic power was increasingly vested in his 
trusted circle of fellow Kikuyus. During the second presidential regime, political 
power became concentrated in the hands of [the] Kalenjin élite. In all the different 
regimes then and thereafter, the ruling group sought to use the resources of the State 
for the special benefits of its own ethnic community and its allies”.  
 
The fact that some ethnic identities did not exist before, provides sufficient proof that 
ethnicity can be constructed. Some ethnic groups did not exist in the African continent 
until colonial forces formed boundaries. The Igbo tribe of Nigeria, for example, did 
not exist before. However, the colonial governments and post-colonial administrations 
created these identities. Citing Wolpe (1974), Posner (2003: 127) maintains that the 
Igbo of Nigeria were a product of colonial-era boundary-drawing. Ranger (1989) 
explained how the Manyika of Zimbabwe were ‘created’ by missionaries. Young 
(1976) traced the origins of the Ngala of Congo to Henry Stanley’s misinformed 
labelling of the people he encountered on the upper Congo River. And Gourevitch 
(1998) showed how the distinction between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda was a 
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product of a Belgian administrative fiat”. In Kenya, as well, certain ethnic identities 
were constructed, as they did not exist before. Yieke points out that: 
 
In the 1979 population census in Kenya, an ethnic category called the 
Kalenjin, which was made up of smaller ethnic communities was introduced 
for the first time, and from then, henceforth, these small groups have 
identified themselves as Kalenjin. Likewise, an ethnic category called the 
Abasuba was hived off the big Luo community; but so far, this ethnic category 
has failed to attract a significant number of subjects who are able to identify 
with it as belonging to that ethnic category, and still craft their identity as Luo 
speakers. Identity is thus defined as a dialogic relationship to the “Other”, 
which is outside as well as inside the “Self”; because [one] can identify 
oneself only through an understanding of who the “Other” is. 
 
The fact that some ethnic identities that did not exist before have now suddenly 
emerged is testament to the construction of these ethnic identities. Some smaller 
ethnic groups that were an offshoot of the main ethnic groups, as noted above, also 
demonstrate the same point. The time at which some of these ethnic groups emerged, 
corresponds with the era in which African States were under colonial administrations. 
Governments (both colonial and post-colonial) have been responsible for the 
construction of certain African identities.  
 
4.6. Inter-ethnic relations in Kenya  
 
 
In Chapter 3 of this study, the author expressed the view that individuals do not carry 
an inborn desire to harm those that belong to a different ethnic group or race. The 
world is teeming with stories of humanity that ignore artificial ethnic or racial 
boundaries that have been created by mankind. Even while the civil war was raging 
outside their homes, certain Tutsis and Hutus were able to help each other. Risking 
personal injury, and possible detainment by police, some white South Africans 
provided refuge to black political activists in the era of apartheid. These events are 
cited to illustrate a point made earlier: Human beings are able to break down the 
boundaries they create, and interact with each other on the basis of being humans, and 
not as its components. Smedley (1999: 690) made the following observation: 
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That interethnic interaction has a long history. We humans are not new to the 
challenge of trying to get along with "alien" others. What strategies were used in 
ancient times to accommodate or transcend differences? How did ancestral 
societies perceive and deal with humans who differed from themselves, both 
culturally and/or physically? In contemporary times, many areas of the world are 
reeling with "ethnic" conflicts; and "ethnicity" seems to be a relatively new notion 
about human identities encumbered with elements of exclusivity, opposition, 
competition, and antagonism. Some groups define themselves in terms that appear 
rigid and unyielding, and in opposition always to "the others."   
 
As elsewhere in pre-colonial Africa, relations between different Kenyan ethnic groups 
in Africa were determined by economic needs. Ethnic groups traded items amongst 
each other; and in some cases, families became bound by marriage. Interaction 
between ethnic groups was not necessarily characterised by violence. This does not, 
however, imply that tensions did not develop between these groups. Odenge (2009: 2) 
notes that:  
 
The ethnic boundaries among pre-colonial Kenyan communities were fluid. Inter-
ethnic interactions were characterized by trade, intermarriages and limited and 
intermittent warfare. The histories of migrations and settlement were about 
continuous waning and waxing of the various ethnicities. Society was anything but 
static. Colonialism only gave new shape, meaning and direction to the 
communities’ inherent dynamism. 
 
In many other multi-ethnic societies, ethnic groups co-exist peacefully with each 
other. If anything, the pre-colonial interaction between ethnic groups as described by 
Odenge suggests that ethnic identities are situational and constructed. This author 
holds the view that ethnic identities are constructed; and so are the resultant ethnic 
boundaries. The author will discuss in detail the process of constructing identities 
later in this chapter. What has changed the way ethnic groups relate to each other? 
The following discussion will interrogate this question. 
 
4.7. Political patterns that contribute ethnic tensions 
 
One of the objectives of this study is to explain the social and political patterns that 
contribute to the nature of relationships between Kenyan people. The 2007 ethnic 
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conflict and previous conflicts are not random occurrences. The ethnic tensions arose 
due to the social and political conditions that were introduced in the Kenyan society 
by the post-colonial leaders. The first condition allowed to seep into Kenya’s political 
system has been the introduction of ethnicity into the Kenyan politics. The manner in 
which this has been achieved has been discussed quite extensively in this study. The 
political figures that played a critical role in the liberation movement introduced 
‘negative’ politics when they took over power. Post-colonial leaders such as Jomo 
Kenyatta had the opportunity to introduce ‘issue’ based politics, instead of politics 
that were heavily reliant on ethnicity. However this was not the case, as leaders of 
liberation movements realised that it would be in their best interests to play ethnic 
politics. This laid the seed for the ethnic conflicts that had been witnessed by Kenyan 
society. The nature of politics in Kenya would be discussed in more detail in the 
following discussion. 
 
4.7.1. Issue-based vs ethnic-based campaign strategies 
 
As noted above, the political figures in Kenya often adopt ethnic-based politics as a 
strategy to improve their chances in the polls. Although important, issues such as 
poverty, the economy, and foreign policy are not attractive campaign topics for 
Kenyan politicians – at least not before one wins elections. The reason for this is that 
Kenyan politicians understand ethnic identity as an integral part of the Kenyan polity 
and the electorate. The winning of elections in Kenya largely depends on how well 
one’s campaign appeals to the majority of the ethnic groups.  
 
As cited elsewhere in this study, the comments made by Raila Odinga in the run-up to 
the 2007 elections are a perfect example of how Kenya’s political figures campaign – 
on the basis of ethnicity. He attempted to project the 2007 elections as a ‘war’ 
between the Kikuyu and the other ethnic groups in Kenya. Odinga is from the Luo 
ethnic group; he was acutely aware that if he stood any chance of winning the 
elections, he would need to drive a campaign that did not only appeal to his own 
ethnic group, but to other ethnic groups also. The easiest way to achieve this end was 
to play on the frustrations or hatred that other ethnic groups had for the Kikuyu-led 
administration. For example, Klopp (2009: 145) asserts that: 
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In the months leading up to the December 2007 election, opposition leader, Raila 
Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), capitalized on the anger and 
disillusionment of many Kenyans. He campaigned on a reformist, populist, anti-
corruption platform that promised radical change, including the devolution of 
power. However, the unofficial ODM campaign strategy appeared to be in part an 
ethnic one. At rallies, ODM politicians often insinuated that Kibaki's ethnic 
community—the Kikuyu—were responsible for the corruption and exclusionary 
politics that [had] characterized much of Kibaki's first administration. 
 
Ethnicity-based politics is not a habit practised only during electioneering; once in 
public office, politicians still focus on issues of ethnicity during their terms. Many 
examples have been cited in this study to demonstrate the fact that political elites in 
Kenya do not cease to use ethnic politics, once they win elections. The development 
of certain communities, while limiting services to other ethnic groups on the basis of 
ethnicity, is but one example, of ethnic-based politics in Kenya.   
 
4.7.2. The Kikuyu vs ‘others’ dynamic 
 
Stevenson (2008: 12) points out that the Kikuyu tribe are “Kenya’s largest and 
traditionally most powerful” tribe.  This status is largely due to the role played by the 
Kikuyu tribe in Kenyan politics. At the same time, however, this status has not 
endeared the Kikuyu to other domestic ethnic groups. Kenyan ethnic groups have 
always had a lingering perception that the Kikuyu are unwilling to relinquish power to 
other ethnic groups. As far as other ethnic groups were concerned, the events that 
followed general elections served to confirm this view. The 2007/08 violence did little 
to help relations between the Kikuyu and other ethnic groups.  
 
The unwillingness shown by Mwai Kibaki to concede defeat during these elections 
was interpreted by many domestic ethnic groups as further proof that the Kikuyu are 
quite happy to maintain power within them. The 2007/08 electoral violence should 
also be seen within the context of distrust and animosity between the various ethnic 
groups in Kenya and the politically powerful ethnic group – the Kikuyu. The hostility 
of ethnic groups towards other ethnic groups became even more apparent in the 
elections campaigns leading up to the 2007/08 elections. The politicians from the 
Orange Democratic Movement did not pull any punches in their criticism of the 
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Kikuyu tribe. Klopp (2009: 145) observes that, “at rallies, ODM politicians often 
insinuated that Kibaki's ethnic community—the Kikuyu—were responsible for the 
corruption and exclusionary politics that characterized much of Kibaki's first 
administration. They also suggested that the Kikuyu were collectively responsible for 
[the] historical injustices from the beginning of independence, when Jomo Kenyatta, a 
Kikuyu, became president”.  
 
The dim view that Kenyan groups held of the Kikuyu could be informed by a myriad 
of factors. For example, the majority of ethnic groups do not take kindly to the fact 
that the “Kikuyu enjoyed economic prosperity and political influence, and repressed 
any resistance against it. As a result, other ethnic groups, as well as many non-
conforming members of the Kikuyu tribe, were alienated from government affairs. 
Participation in government was somehow a preserve for those who, either belonged 
to the president’s tribe, or were his pledged loyalists” (Mbondenyi, 2011: 49). On 
their part, the Kikuyu feel that that their political and economic dominance is 
justified, given the role they played in the struggle leading up to the independence of 
Kenya. The Kikuyu community strongly believe that they contributed significantly to 
the political history of Kenya, more than did any other ethnic group. The Mau Mau 
revolt against the British is often cited as an example of Kikuyu’s radicalism during 
the fight for independence. This claim is, however, disingenuous – especially given 
the fact that recent evidence clearly shows that other ethnic groups were also part of 
the Mau-Mau war. Admittedly, the Mau forces largely came from the Kikuyu 
community. Perhaps the lack of research in this part of Kenyan history has 
contributed to its distortion. Osborne (2010: 65) laments the lack of scholarship, as far 
the Mau war is concerned: 
 
The dearth of scholarship seriously limits our understanding of the conflict itself: 
the relationship between the Kikuyu and the Kamba, and particularly the 
association between the Kamba and the British, the otherwise voluminous 
literature [the] on Mau Mau has rarely strayed from Kikuyu aspects of the episode, 
and has ignored [the] roles played by Kenya's other ethnic groups. We read little of 
Mau Mau general, Kirita ole Kisio (a Masai), or Luo or Luhya fighters, and 
virtually nothing about the Kamba, who—as demonstrated here—occupied a 
central role in the conflict. 
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These crucial elements that have been left out of the Kenyan history; and they have 
been one of the contributing factors to the animosity between the various ethnic 
groups in Kenya and the Kikuyu. The role played by other ethnic groups in the 
struggle for independence has not been acknowledged or widely documented in 
Kenyan history, this has created an unhealthy situation. Although the Kikuyu are the 
largest ethnic group in Kenya, they are not big enough to win the elections on their 
own; there is a need to garner support from areas that are occupied by other ethnic 
groups. In fact, any ethnic group in Kenya that has designs on winning the elections 
can only do so by forming coalitions with some of the other groups.  
 
The Kikuyu can only win elections if they have managed to garner support from other 
ethnic groups. Given the animosity towards the Kikuyu by other ethnic groups, one 
would have thought that these ethnic groups could provide a united front in the 
elections, by forming political coalitions that exclude the Kikuyu – and thereby giving 
the Kikuyu no chance of winning the elections. The Kenyan politics, however, are not 
so black and white; there are too many shades of grey in between – especially when it 
comes to the dynamics between the various ethnic groups. The peculiar aspect of 
Kenyan politics is that even though various ethnic groups have one thing in common, 
and that is hostility towards the Kikuyu, this is not enough to unite them. Some of 
these groups have even given Kikuyu candidates their support in the polls. 
 
There is a complex relationship between the various ethnic groups in Kenya. The 
smaller ethnic groups have tended to attach themselves (politically) to the bigger or 
main ethnic groups. So even though ethnic groups might share a loathing for the 
Kikuyu, this is not translated into a lack of support for the Kikuyu during the electoral 
process. According to Throup (1993: 372), smaller ethnic groups have tended to give 
support to the bigger ethnic groups – due to the fear of “domination by the larger 
ethnic groups”.  If one looks at the past presidents of Kenya, one would notice a 
common thread. The majority of these presidents came from one tribe – the Kikuyu. 
In fact, Daniel Arap Moi was the only non-Kikuyu to ever occupy the highest office 
in Kenya. Moi was a member of the Kalenjin community. In an attempt to address the 
neglect of non-Kikuyu societies by previous Kikuyu administrations, Moi channelled 
government resources mostly to Kalenjin communities and other communities. Moi 
continued the same ‘tradition’ that was practised by the Kikuyu; and that is ‘taking 
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care of your own’. According to Barkan (2004: 88), Moi sought to redress this 
imbalance, pursuing a set of redistributive policies that favoured his own ethnic group 
– the Kalenjin – and other disadvantaged tribes in the Rift valley. This served as 
further proof that the political environment in Kenya is heavily ethnicised, and a 
collective identity is almost non-existent. In order to understand the complex problem 
encountered by Kenya one needs to interrogate the complex concept of identity. 
 
4.7.3. Ethnic identity vs national identity 
  
As stated in Chapter 2, identity is a fluid concept; we change our identities – based on 
the benefits that we expect to derive from them. Ethnic identity, however, is not the 
only identity that human beings possess. Our national identity also plays a significant 
part in our lives. However, the most critical question one needs to pose in this study 
is: Does ethnic identity override national identity; or do we consider national identity 
to be more important than our ethnic identity?   
 
During international sporting events, citizens often take pride in their national identity 
and in displaying it. During the 2010 FIFA World Cup tournament, South Africans 
from all hues and ethnic backgrounds let go of their different identities and showed 
pride in being South African. This shows that certain events and situations evoke our 
national and collective identity. According to Fuh-sheng Hsieh (2005: 15), 
“undoubtedly, national identity and ethnicity are interrelated”. This suggests that one 
does not operate independently from the other. The above author also argues that even 
though ethnic and national identities are related “they are not the same”.  Our national 
identity has to compete with other forms of identity. Bond (2006: 610) states that 
“identities fundamental to the politics of difference frequently need to reconcile 
themselves with dominant conceptions of national identity. It is true that national 
identification is paralleled by (and sometimes subordinate to) other forms of social 
identification”. Bond provides more insight on the ethnic identity and national identity 
discussion. He is of the view that citizens may choose not to adopt their national 
identity. Several factors may motivate individuals not to identify with the national 
identity. To illustrate this point, Bond notes that: 
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Members of minority groups may choose to exclude themselves from the 
identity associated with the majority. It may be that such self-imposed limits 
arise simply from individual sentiment, in that people will feel no motivation 
to lay claim to membership of a group to which they feel they do not belong. 
Nevertheless, it is also important to see self-imposed limitations as being 
socially influenced. People may feel that they cannot claim to belong because 
they anticipate the negative responses of others to such identity claims; or, 
they may feel that, even though they would appear to have a strong prima 
facie claim to a national identity, the way in which this identity is socially 
constructed serves to exclude them from belonging to it.  
 
Bond’s argument that individuals occasionally reject national identity holds water if 
one looks at the identity adopted by many black South Africans in the context of 
apartheid South Africa. Owing to the fact that the apartheid government delegitimised 
African identities, black South Africans found it rather difficult to relate to the 
national identity, especially in the form presented by the apartheid government. The 
support offered to touring rugby teams, such as New Zealand by Africans, rather than 
their national team, confirms the assertion made by Bond that citizens can reject their 
national identity and choose other forms of identity. Obviously, the reason for black 
South Africans rejecting their national identity was influenced by the political 
climate, which prevailed at the time. Race became the predominant identity for many 
black South Africans.   
 
The major challenge for post-colonial Africa was to create mechanisms by which 
disparate ethnic communities with different identities became united through a 
common identity. This was critical in ensuring the stability of African societies. 
Different strategies were employed by African governments to foster unity and 
solidarity within the different ethnic groups. Larsen (2011: 266) contends that, 
countries such as Kenya “drew on the moment of independence to visually affirm its 
notion of a nation in the forging of a new national identity. Those African States 
which sought a postcolonial heritage in the achievement of independence rather than 
in pre-colonial histories often visually remembered their liberation wars of 
independence”.   
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4.8. The politicization of ethnicity in Kenya 
 
 
According to Oyugi (2000: 3), the politicization of ethnicity “has become the single 
most intractable problem in Kenya, especially since independence”. He further 
observes that even though the ethnic problem in Kenya emerged during the colonial 
period, it also gained ascendance after independence. The argument made by Oyugi 
points to two things, and that is, when the liberation leaders took over the reins from 
the colonial powers, they did little to address the ethnic problem. Secondly, Oyugi’s 
assertion also suggests that political leaders found the ethnic cleavages to be useful in 
dividing the polity along ethnic lines. Fearon (2004: 2) captures the essence of 
politicized ethnicity. He states that “ethnicity is socially relevant when people notice, 
and condition their actions on ethnic distinctions in everyday life. Ethnicity becomes 
politicized when political coalitions are organized along ethnic lines, or when access 
to political or economic benefits depends on ethnicity alone. 
 
“Ethnicity can be socially relevant in a country, without it being much politicized; and 
the degree to which ethnicity is politicized can vary across countries and over time” 
(Fearon, 2004: 4). Fearon implies that politicized ethnicity involves a conscious 
attempt by political leaders to conveniently distribute power and resources along 
ethnic lines. Tarimo (2010: 299) concurs; he explains the relationship between 
ethnicity, politics and State resources, by stating that “Ethno-political violence is a 
deliberate political strategy by desperate groups intended to effect change in the 
political system that marginalizes them. The situation has emerged because of [the] 
unequal distribution of land and other resources, unabated corruption at the national 
level, extreme poverty in urban slums and among squatters, unemployment, and 
irresponsible leadership”. This author has commented on the fact that the national 
resources of Kenya have not been accessed equally by all the ethnic groups in Kenya. 
This is partly due to the highly politicised nature of politics in Kenya. As explained 
above, there is a lack of collective identity in Kenya. Government administrations 
channel various resources to their communities. “The common denominator among 
Kenya’s excluded communities is poor access to resources and opportunities, 
insecurity of tenure, and alienation from the State administration. Their weak voice in 
governance restricts their ability to address most of these issues; and [it] increases 
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their vulnerability in the face of environmental, economic and political problems” 
(Minority Rights Group International Report, 2005: 14). 
 
The Kikuyu have been accused by other ethnic groups of using State resources to 
develop their own communities, and to actively deny other ethnic groups access to 
these resources. As stated above, minority ethnic groups have an even lesser chance 
of accessing these resources, due to their lack of political clout. Kwatemba (2008: 86) 
maintains that “ethnicity becomes a defining criterion when groups are competing for 
scarce resources and values”. It should, therefore, not come as a surprise that during 
his term as the president of Kenya, Moi and his administration channelled state 
resources to the Kalenjin community. Of course, his predecessor (Jomo Kenyatta) had 
also extended the same courtesy to his Kikuyu community. Even though other ethnic 
groups have accused Kikuyu politicians of using State resources for the benefit of the 
Kikuyu community, they would do just the same – given the opportunity. Yieke 
(2011: 9) makes the same observation; he argues that “during the second presidential 
regime, political power became concentrated in the hands of the Kalenjin élite. In all 
the different regimes then and thereafter, the ruling group sought to use the resources 
of the State for the special benefit of its own ethnic community and its allies”. 
 
Amongst the many challenges that were faced by South Africa following the first 
democratic elections, one of them was to accommodate equally all the various ethnic 
groups. This could only be achieved by first creating a political system that offered 
political space to these groups to participate in the political and economic activity. 
Also the provision of access to the nation’s wealth and the sharing of economic 
resources are critical for the stability of any multi-ethnic State. To some extent, South 
Africa has managed to partly achieve this aim. There is no ethnic group in South 
Africa that has overwhelmed the other ethnic groups politically, as is the case with the 
Kikuyu in Kenya. Candidates from many ethnic groups in South Africa have got an 
almost equal chance of occupying the highest office in the land. Being a new 
democracy, the government of the African National Congress (ANC) has had to tread 
carefully, in order to avoid some of the ethnic clashes, as seen in other parts of the 
world. The weakness in the Kenyan political system is that, unlike in South African 
politics where political power is spread out to all ethnic groups, Kenya’s government 
positions tend to be occupied by the ruling ethnic group.  When one looks at the South 
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African cabinet, one would observe a fair representation of all the ethnic groups. In 
Kenya, the resources have also been used to secure votes during an election period 
and to buy patronage. “The distribution of such resources demonstrated the benefits of 
colonialism, and secured the loyalty of those who shared them. This both reinforced 
the role of the State as the principal source of the benefits of modernity and 
development, and gave a partisan cast to its involvement in the contradiction between 
accumulation and control” (Berman: 1998: 316). As indicated by Berman, the culture 
of patronage and targeted resource allocation was introduced during the colonial rule. 
This, of course, was done with the purpose of creating tensions within the other ethnic 
groups. A divided African society served the European agenda well, because it meant 
that there was very little possibility of African ethnic groups launching a united 
challenge against European administrations. There were various methods used by 
colonial administrations to create divisions between the different ethnic groups.  
 
These include the following: 
 
 The allocation of land to certain ethnic groups without extending such benefits 
to other tribes.    
 Creating kingdoms that did not exist before, and refusing to recognise other 
long-existing kingdoms, thus creating tensions between tribes. 
 Appointing members of a certain group to certain government positions.  
 
The involvement of the State in dispensing resources with the view of gaining 
political mileage continued during the era of post-colonial politics. In terms of 
resource allocation, the Kikuyu community benefited more from post-colonial Kenya. 
The report produced by the United Nations Commissioner of Human Right (2008: 5) 
points out that, despite the fact that the 2007/08 violence in Kenya was “triggered by 
the flawed electoral process” it should be seen “in its context of long-standing conflict 
over land rights, prevailing impunity for human rights violations, and [the] highly 
unsatisfactory fulfilment of economic and social rights”.   
The UN report further states that the Kenyan land allocation/distribution process is 
highly centralised, in the sense that the president has the Government Lands Act, and 
this “gives considerable power to the President”, (source: UN report). The Act also 
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gives the president the power to appoint the Commissioner of Lands. The acquisition 
of land by the Kikuyu has been to a large extent attributed the vast powers granted by 
the Act to the president. “In essence, the Majimbo crusaders attributed the Kikuyu 
economic edge over other Kenyan groups to the political patronage they had enjoyed 
under Kenyatta’s presidency, accusing Kenya’s first president of ‘pouring’ the 
Kikuyu from Central Province into the pristine homelands of the pastoral Kalenjin 
and Masai in the Rift Valley” (Kagwanja & Southall, 2009: 268) .    
 
As shown above, post-colonial politics in many parts of Africa, including Kenya, got 
off to a poor start. When African States became independent some of them started a 
process of returning land to their rightful owners. However, this process was heavily 
politicised; and the politicians sought to corrupt the process to benefit their own 
ethnic groups. In Kenya, for example, the land that belonged to the Kalenjin before 
colonial rule was allocated to the Kikuyu by Jomo Kenyatta’s government. Painting 
the picture of post-colonial politics in Africa, Mueller (2011: 100) asserts that: 
 
Land was expropriated and rules concerning citizenship were changed, as 
both were mobilized as forms of electoral patronage. This meant that 
existing institutions, laws and rules were all irrelevant and up for grabs with 
the introduction of multi-partyism. The only thing that mattered was ‘who 
was in control of the central government’, not what was on the books. 
 
The acquisition of prime land only represents half the story of Kikuyu domination in 
Kenya. The independence of Kenya presented the Kikuyu with other economic 
advantages. The Kikuyu have gone on to dominate other areas of influence; they lead 
strategic institutions and also became captains of industry. Unfortunately, one would 
never know how much of this could purely be attributed to Kikuyus’ nature as people; 
and how much of Kikuyu success could be linked to what could be described as 
‘social engineering’ by Kikuyu-dominated regimes. The Igbo people of Nigeria are 
widely regarded for their entrepreneurial streak. They have in many respects proved 
themselves to be strong-willed people, and have been successful without government 
intervention, and despite many challenges which began during the Biafra War in 
1967. The same could have been said for the Kikuyu, were it not for the State-assisted 
opportunities presented to them by the government. The economic prosperity of the 
Kikuyu helped to fuel the tensions that followed the 2007 elections.   
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4.9 Zambia  
 
This author has noted elsewhere in this treatise that Kenya cannot be studied in 
isolation. To get a better insight and perspective into the ethnic politics of Kenya, one 
needs to do a comparative analysis between Kenya and a country that has shared 
similar characteristics and experiences. As stated in the previous sections of this 
study, Zambia is an ideal country against which Kenya can be evaluated. This 
conclusion is based on the following reasons: 
 
 Both countries share a colonial history under the British. 
 Both countries became independent at around the same period. 
 To some extent, these countries have had a similar political trajectory; they 
both experienced a period of one-party politics, and then multi-party politics. 
 Kenya and Zambia are both multi-ethnic countries. These ethnic groups have 
competing interests. The major ethnic groups dominate politically and 
economically.  
 In both countries, the major ethnic groups have dominated the State or other 
strategic institutions.   
 Access to resources has always been a bone of contention between the various 
ethnic groups in Kenya. Equal access to resources has also been an issue in 
Zambian politics. 
As much as there are similarities between Kenya and Zambia, there are also 
fundamental differences between the two nations. Two of these critical differences are 
that: 
 Despite having almost twice the number ethnic groups, Zambia has seen less 
episodes of ethnic violence than Kenya.  
 Kenya’s elections have, in many instances, been marred by violence. On the 
other hand, elections in Zambia have are rarely disrupted by ethnic conflicts.  
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Even though Kenya’s and Zambia’s societies have followed a similar political 
trajectory, and to some extent have similar challenges and societal characteristics, 
they have to a greater degree experienced different political and social outcomes. The 
issue that is of the most interest to this author is that even with 71 different ethnic 
groups, with sometimes conflicting interests, Zambia has managed to avoid full-
blown ethnic conflicts. As illustrated many times in this study, Kenya has failed 
dismally to adequately accommodate the various ethnic groups. Social cohesion has 
been difficult to achieve in Kenya, because of the deep distrust between the ethnic 
groups. The question therefore arises: What has Zambia done differently that it has 
managed to avoid ethnic problems? By answering this question, it could be possible to 
expose the weaknesses within the Kenyan system. 
 
Of course, this author does not imply that there have not been tensions between the 
ethnic groups in Zambia. Just as the Kenyans, the Zambians are also acutely aware of 
their different identities. The above statement simply acknowledges that ethnic groups 
in Zambia live in relative peace. This author, therefore, believes that if one 
investigates this anomaly between these two nations, one should be able to answer the 
research question that was posed in Chapter 1 of this study. This author is of the view 
it would be sensible to discuss the issue of identity in Zambia.  
 
4.9.1 The development of Zambian politics 
 
Zambian politics has also been affected by the colonial history, as Kenya was. This 
era in Zambian history has been covered extensively in earlier chapters; it will, 
therefore, not be discussed at great length in this chapter. It is, therefore, sufficient to 
say that colonialism has impacted on the trajectory of politics in both Zambia and 
Kenya. During the wave of post-colonial politics in Africa, both Zambia and Kenya, 
as in many other countries in Africa, has had the challenge of addressing both the 
social and political challenges that were created by the British administrations.  
Post-colonial politics in African were made complex by the fact that African societies 
were not homogeneous. Governments that came into power had the unenviable task of 
accommodating different ethnic groups that did not necessarily have the same 
political outlook. The second aspect that made politics even more complex in the 
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African context was that liberation movements that were used to fight colonial 
governments. These groups were suddenly thrust into political power. These 
liberation groups had to adapt to a new political reality of being ruling parties. Their 
new role meant that liberation movements now had to accommodate the interests of 
all the other domestic ethnic groups.  
 
The other challenge for the liberation movements was that they themselves also 
mirrored the diversity of their very own societies. In other words, the membership of 
the ruling parties in Africa reflected the different ethnic groups. On many occasions, 
this has created ethnic factions within ruling parties, as different ethnic groups moved 
to assert themselves. This has sometimes led to what can be described as a crisis of 
governance. As ethnic groups position themselves for political power, the 
responsibility to provide an efficient public service and political direction falls by the 
wayside. This has been one of the challenges that liberation movements in countries, 
like Kenya and Zambia, have had to grapple with. In their attempt to gain a measure 
of control from warring factions – both within them and the society at large – these 
liberation movements have resorted to undemocratic means of governing. Kenneth 
Kaunda’s United National Independence Party (UNIP), for example, changed the 
constitution; and Zambia effectively became a “one-party State in December 1972” 
(Larmer, 2006: 50). “Though Bemba were in the forefront, UNIP attracted a multi-
ethnic following – with a major exception. In the South, the Nkumbula, and the Ila 
managed to maintain an allegiance of the Ila and the Tonga group with the African 
National Congress” (Horowitz, 1985: 430).  Horowitz further states that in the 1964 
elections, UNIP won 85% of the parliamentary seats on 70% of the vote.  
 
As far as Horowitz is concerned, this is the period when ethnic divisions manifested 
themselves. The same author observes that the Bemba-speaking ethnic group was 
“strongly represented in government positions and in UNIP. So, too, were Nyanja and 
other Easterners”. Having found it difficult to “harmonize Bemba and non-Bemba 
claims”, Kaunda saw it fit to declare Zambia a one-party State in 1972. Horowitz 
argues that Kenya’s political trajectory mirrored that of Zambia. He posits that the 
“Kenya African National Union (KANU), formed in 1959, embraced the two largest 
groups, the Kikuyu and the Luo. Most of the other major groups were at first 
organised into separate ethnic parties: one for the Kalenjin, one for the Kamba, one 
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for the Coastal groups, one for the Masai”. Horowitz argues that the fear of 
domination by the Kikuyu and the Luo convinced other ethnic groups to band 
together to form an alternative political formation, the Kenya African Democratic 
Union (KADU). Kenya also looked to the constitution to try and contain ethnic 
rivalry. Just as Zambians had done, Kenyans also introduced constitutional clauses 
that sought to criminalise opposition movements. It has been noted in previous 
discussions, that one-partyism did not end ethnic conflict. Horowitz observes that 
one-partyism does not end “bickering and disputation, but [it] merely shifts its 
venue”. This means that instead of inter-party conflicts, different ethnic groups wage 
their ethnic rivalry within the parties.     
4.9.2 The dynamics of identity in Zambia  
 
“Zambia's demographic situation is characterised by three dominant features: a high 
rate of natural increase, massive urbanisation, and wide variations in fertility and 
mortality levels between the provinces (independent of [any] differences between 
rural and urban areas)” (Osei-Hwedie & Osei-Hwedie, 1992: 87). 
 
 
Figure 4 (a) 
(Source: 
http://www.brooksidebc.org/outreach_missions/Zambia_country_demographics.html) 
 
Zambia is a typical African State, whose citizens belong to different ethnic groups and 
tribes. There are just over 70 ethnic groups that call Zambia home. Zambians are, of 
course, also conscious of their different identities, as are their fellow Africans in other 
countries. Given the number of ethnic groups in Zambia, it would be reasonable to 
expect episodes of ethnic tensions or violence in Zambia. The peculiar aspect of the 
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Zambian society is that even with such a high number of ethnic groups, there are 
rarely any incidents of ethnic violence. Ethnic groups have learnt to live with each 
other peacefully, or at least to co-exist without any conflicts. As illustrated in Figure 4 
(a), the Bemba-speaking group is the main ethnic group in Zambia; it comprises just 
over 30% of the population. The interesting fact, as far as differences in ethnic 
composition are concerned, is that in Zambia, the Bemba ethnic group has a clear 
majority. The Bemba community is almost three times larger than the second largest 
group, the Tonga (10.6%). It is not surprising that the Bemba-speaking community 
dominates Zambian politics. In the case of Kenya, however, the ethnic composition is 
slightly different. There is not much that separates the different ethnic groups, as far 
as numerical advantage is concerned. Despite their being a majority, the Kikuyu only 
form 22% of the population. The other ethnic groups have the following percentages 
in the Kenyan population: Luhya 14%, Luo 13%, Kalenjin 12%, Kamba 11% 
(CIA, The World Factbook, date of publication  unknown). As the numbers 
show, ethnic composition in Kenya has created a political environment that is 
conducive to ethnic coalitions. They also show that all the ethnic groups mentioned 
above have some form of political bargaining chip. Posner (2003: 127) presents an 
interesting observation; he is of the view that: 
 
The ethnic landscape is important, because the dynamics of ethnic 
competition and conflict stem not from the existence of ethnic groups, but 
from the geometry of their relative sizes and geographic locations. For 
example, countries containing a single large ethnic group, or two evenly 
matched groups, have been found to be more violence-prone than those 
containing a larger number of equally sized groups. 
 
The argument put forward by Posner is that ethnic groups do not derive their power 
from their mere existence. What deploys more power to ethnic groups is their size, 
and where they are located. As indicated elsewhere in this study, the Bemba have 
gained economic strength because they are situated in a place that offers economic 
opportunities. This author is, therefore, of the strong view that the ‘relative sizes’ of 
ethnic groups, as referred to by Posner, could partly explain why ethnic conflicts are 
more common in Kenya than they are in Zambia.  
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This researcher maintains that, unlike ethnic groups in Zambia that are dominated 
numerically by one group (i.e. the Bemba), the numerical advantages of the main 
ethnic group in Kenya (i.e. the Kikuyu) are not extensive. The smaller ethnic groups, 
therefore, believe that there are various political possibilities. “The supremacy of the 
Bemba group is directly related to its large size and its domination of the politically 
crucial mining towns of the Copperbelt” (Posner, 2003: 128). Because of the mining 
activities, the Copperbelt area has provided many economic and political advantages 
for the Bemba speakers. These economic advantages also explain why the Bemba 
speakers are in the centre of Zambian politics. The significance of economic might in 
politics cannot be denied. It is no accident that Kikuyu in Kenya, and Bemba speakers 
in Zambia, have dictated the political discourse in these two countries. 
 
4.9.3 Electoral violence in Kenya and Zambia 
 
 
One cannot deny the fact that Zambia has seen less incidents of violence that can be 
linked to elections. Kenya, on the other hand, has been a different story; ethnic 
skirmishes often arise around election time. It is safe to say that the 2007/8 ethnic 
violence was the worst yet in its history. The 2013 elections in Kenya have 
breathtakingly gone without any incident – barring a few protests. Commentators 
throughout the world have hailed the recent Kenyan election as a step in the right 
direction. Although the 2013 elections were devoid of any violence on the same scale 
as in the previous elections, they had their own fair share of problems. Raila Odinga 
challenged the outcome of the 2013 elections. This challenge was brought about by 
the uncertainty surrounding the technical glitches in vote counting. What is of interest 
to this author, as far as Kenya is concerned, is the violence that usually accompanies 
the elections. According to the Human Rights Watch (2011 Report, 3), there were 
about “1,133 or more killings committed during the violence, which pitted ruling 
party supporters and the police against opposition-linked armed groups and civilians. 
Victims of rape, assault, arson, and other crimes similarly await justice”. It has long 
been suspected that due to the nature of competitive politics in Kenya, the political 
candidates have sought to utilise every means possible to win elections, including the 
use of violence. The 1992 elections were also characterised by violence; 
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investigations into the 1992 election violence provided evidence, which supported the 
view that certain political figures had instigated the violence.     
 
After Moi agreed under diplomatic pressure to hold multi-party elections in 1992, 
organized groups affiliated with Moi’s party, the Kenya African National Union 
(KANU), incited violence against members of the Kikuyu ethnic group in the Rift 
Valley, where Kikuyus were suspected of supporting the nascent opposition. KANU 
supporters rallied Kalenjin residents around the idea that Kikuyus were “non-
indigenous” and had appropriated Kalenjin land. The committee’s report named 
several dozen senior and mid-level political figures, including cabinet members, 
members of parliament, local councillors, and chiefs, who had organized and funded 
the attacks. They were never held accountable, and [the] violence continued. Human 
Rights Watch estimated that between October 1991 and November 1993, 1,500 
Kenyans were killed and 300,000 [were] displaced (Human Rights Watch, 2011: 10). 
 
The politics of Kenya are a numbers game; the outcome of elections is highly 
dependent on the coalitions between the various ethnic groups. Given this highly 
competitive political environment, political figures, therefore, find it necessary to use 
any means possible to gain a competitive advantage. Citing Boone, Mueller (2011: 
100) argues that, “research finds that the less constrained elites are, in terms of laws 
and institutions, the greater the likelihood is that they [would] also resort to other 
means to gain or retain power, including using violence”. The indictment of the 
current president of Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta, together with other Kenyan political 
figures by the International Crimes Court reflects the level at which political elites 
have been involved in ethnic violence. The indictment of Uhuru Kenyatta was related 
to the violence that erupted in Kenya in 2007. If one looks back at the investigations 
that were carried out into the past electoral violence, one would realise that there have 
been few convictions. The unlikelihood of prosecution has created a culture of 
impunity. The weakness of Kenyan institutions also contributes immensely to the 
problem that Kenya has. The integrity of Kenyan institutions will be discussed in 
detail later in this chapter. Mueller is of the view that the character of Kenyan politics 
has predisposed this African nation to violence. He identified three critical factors that 
have set Kenya on a slippery slope: 
 
The three factors at the root of the 2007 implosion were: a gradual decline in 
the State’s monopoly of legitimate force, and a consequent generalized level 
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of violence not always within its control; deliberately weak institutions, 
mostly overridden by a highly personalized and centralized presidency, that 
could [not] and did not exercise the autonomy or checks and balances 
normally associated with democracies; and political parties that were not 
programmatic, were driven by ethnic clientism, and had a winner-takes-all 
view of political power and its associated economic rewards (Mueller, 2011: 
102). 
 
Mueller contends that the role of the State has weakened gradually; and it has, 
therefore, struggled to contain the differences between the different social actors. 
Mueller, of course, does not imply that Kenya needs an overbearing State; he merely 
suggests that an assertive and a strong State is necessary in violence-prone and 
ethnically diverse States. Mueller also observes that party politics in Kenya are 
dominated not only by ethnic issues, but by a winner-takes-all culture as well. The 
competitive nature of Kenyan politics has been discussed above.  
 
Stevenson (2008: 13) notes that “most of the violence in early 2008 was, in fact, 
vicious vigilantism with a distinctly tribal component. Perhaps the most gruesome 
example involved the forced public circumcisions of Luo males, whose tribe does not 
observe the practice, by Kikuyus, who do”. The violence between the various ethnic 
groups in Kenya created tensions between them? As discussed earlier in this chapter, 
ethnic groups look out only for their own interests; and they, therefore, vote on the 
basis of their own tribal interests. The centrality of ethnicity and tribalism has 
unfortunately created another problem for Kenya: it has limited the political choices 
for Kenyans. The candidates who win elections do so largely on the basis of their 
ethnic identity. This does not necessarily make them the best candidate. The most 
suitable candidates may lose elections – not based on the weakness of their political 
campaigns – but only because they belong to the less-influential ethnic group. The 
second problem presented by Kenya’s obsession with ethnicity is that any winning 
candidate rules over a divided society. He faces constant opposition from the ethnic 
groups that identify with different candidates. As indicated before, the successful 
candidates, whose winning ticket was their ethnic identity, are somehow compelled to 
look after the interests of those communities that supported them. The deliberate 
channelling of certain resources to certain communities in Kenya has been well 
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documented. The founding president of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta, channelled resources 
to Kikuyu communities.  
 
According to Steeves (2006: 212), Kenyatta’s successor, Daniel Arap Moi, a 
Kalenjin, also extended the same favours and benefits to the areas where Kalenjin and 
other ethnic groups dominate. Steeves notes that “Moi moved with deliberate care and 
shrewd calculation to shift the power base of KANU to Kalenjin ethnic dominance 
supported by the other key minority tribes”. Even though Zambian ethnic groups have 
had differences of opinion politically, the tensions have hardly escalated into violent 
encounters. Given the number of ethnic groups that are competing for political space 
in Zambia, it would not be unreasonable to expect the outbreak of violence between 
the Zambian people. This has not been the case, however; in fact the ethnic groups 
live in relative peace, as indicated in the previous sections of this project. How could 
it be that violence occasionally accompanies ethnic tensions in Kenya, and yet this has 
not been the case in Zambia? The answer to this question could partly be linked to a 
peculiar aspect of Zambian identity. Unlike the Kenyan ethnic groups who are divided 
along ethnic lines, Zambia’s ethnic groups are mainly divided on the basis of 
language rather than on ethnic identity. Citing Posner, Horowitz (2009: 5) notes that 
the “study of Zambia shows that candidates identify both in terms of their tribal 
community and their language group. Because language groups are larger than tribal 
groupings, candidates for national office can benefit by defining their “own” ethnic 
communities in terms of language, not tribe”.  
 
The study by Horowitz shows the differences on how ethnicity is treated by citizens 
of both Kenya and Zambia. Language is not essential in influencing political 
outcomes in Kenya. In other words, language is as strong a political factor as ethnic 
identity. The case of Zambia is, however, curious – in the sense that both ethnic (or 
tribal identity) and language groups are seen as significant. As indicated by Horowitz 
above, when running for national elections, it is more advantageous to identify with 
one’s own language group than with one’s ethnic identity. Language groups provide a 
clear advantage – in the sense that they are larger than ethnic groups. The fact that 
Zambians identify with both language and ethnicity has reduced the divisive nature of 
ethnic identity – as has been the case in Kenya. Zambians may belong to different 
ethnic groups, but they probably speak the same language.  The fact that Zambian 
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citizens are able to move comfortably from ethnic identity to identifying with a 
language group serves to confirm the constructionist theory, which views ethnicity as 
a fluid concept. Horowitz, however, points out that it would prove to be a difficult 
exercise for those who contest elections on the basis of the language group to which 
they belong. Horowitz advances the following view, “the problem arises from the 
volatility of electoral competition in Kenya. While it might be possible to strengthen 
the salience of the Bantu-Nilote-Cushite categorization scheme over time, politicians 
may be hesitant to invest in the costly work of doing so, because the payoff is 
typically uncertain. The problem is that candidates have little ability to predict the 
ethnic identity of their competitors in future electoral rounds”.             
 
Fearon (2004: 4) concurs with Horowitz’s view that for Zambian citizens, language is 
a critical part of Zambian politics. Zambia ethnic coalitions have formed along lines 
of either language or tribe, depending on whether the elections were national or local. 
Young (1976) famously observed that individuals’ perceptions of ethnic group 
memberships were “situational” – in the sense that they might identify with and 
mobilize, according to multiple different ethnic categorizations, shifting [their] 
identifications, depending on the political context. Past elections in Zambia have gone 
without any violent incidents. The overlapping of language and the “shifting 
identifications”, as referred to by Fearon, explains why ethnic violence does not 
accompany elections in Zambia. Msindo (2005: 81) is of the view that, just as 
ethnicity, “language is socially constructed as an ideological tool [focusing] on the 
linguistic awareness of its speakers and the non-referential (hidden and symbolic) 
functions and meanings of language”. 
 
4.9.5 Campaign strategies in Zambian politics  
 
The previous discussion expressed the view that in Kenya, politics can be 
characterised as ethnic-based. The ethnicity in Kenyan politics is often reflected 
during campaign strategies adopted by political elites. Although ethnic identity is a 
factor in Zambian politics, the political elites do not adopt ethnicity-based politics as a 
campaign strategy – as do their Kenyan counterparts. Ethnicity does not replace 
campaign issues, such as the economy, corruption, or foreign policy. Despite being a 
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multi-ethnic State, South Africa’s political figures hardly focus on ethnicity when 
campaigning for elections – simply because it is unlikely to yield any benefits 
politically; it would rather be likely to limit one’s career. 
 
 The other factor that renders ethnicity a less-favoured political subject is that any 
political figure that attempts to create tensions between ethnic groups for political 
gain is likely to suffer political costs. However, because of the centrality of ethnicity 
in Kenya, it provides clear political advantages. Cheeseman and Hinfelaar (2009:53) 
contend that like elections in South Africa, Zambian elections are about ‘issues’ and 
policy positions, “Continual repositioning of party platforms on major issues of 
economic policy and campaign style reveals that not all African elections take place 
in an ideological vacuum. As LeBas has recently argued, the policy positions and 
strategies adopted by parties matter; but they can only be understood fully within the 
context of the wider party system, and the way in which parties interact over time”. 
Cheeseman and Hinfelaar also affirm that in some societies there are limitations on 
how one can use ethnicity effectively for political gain. These authors cite, as an 
example, Michael Sata, who was able to garner support across the ethnic divide 
during the 2008 by-elections. “[The] ability of controversial opposition leader 
Michael Sata to mobilize a cross-ethnic support base of the ‘dispossessed’ in urban 
areas supports Larmer and Fraser’s claim that his rise to prominence derives in part 
from his ‘populist’ stance, and lays bare the limits of the ‘ethnic census’ model of 
party support”. Political parties in countries, such as South Africa and Zambia, have a 
history of holding a dim view of ethnic politics.  
 
The founding fathers of the ANC have long since expressed their view that the ANC 
is a ‘broad church’, which is home to various ethnic groups. Leaders such as, Pixley 
ka Seme (1911) and Dr Alfred Xuma (1949) have all denounced ethnicity. “Founders 
of the ANC, at the very inception of the party, warned against ethnicity” (Piombo, 
2009: 449). Analysts have predicted that “once in power, the ANC would splinter 
along ethnic lines, similar to what had happened to the Zambian Movement for 
Multiparty Democracy (MMD) in the 1980s, and following the pattern witnessed in 
many African countries in the 1960s” (Ndletyana, 2008: 144). The political elites in 
Kenya were, however, not bold enough to speak publicly against ethnicity like their 
South African counterparts. Politics in Kenya is publicly contested on an ethnic basis, 
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even within intra-party politics. After gaining independence, liberation movements 
were also thrown a curved ball – in the sense of the absence of a common enemy 
(colonialism), which united ethnic groups, and allowed for other kinds of rivalries, 
such as ethnic rivalries. Amidst the new reality of being the ruling parties, the 
liberation movements also had to deal with a society that was divided along ethnic 
lines.     
 
Ironically, the liberation movements that had been fighting aggressively for 
democratic principles suddenly resorted to undemocratic means to manage ethnic 
dissent. As mentioned elsewhere in this study, the liberation movements thought it 
would be prudent to outlaw opposition parties in the interest of uniting African 
nations. However, this did not work because even in one-party politics, ethnic 
tensions did rear their head. Ethnicity often plays itself out within the confines of the 
ruling parties. This researcher would argue that the manner in which ethnicity is 
handled by political parties might have wider implications for society in general. If 
one explores the different ethnic conflicts, one should be able to establish a link 
between ethnic conflicts and how political parties handle ethnic diversity. Kenya’s 
political parties, for example, have approached ethnicity in a manner that has 
polarised the different ethnic groups. There are many ways in which ethnicity has 
been politicised in Kenya. Firstly, any election victory in Kenya is interpreted, or is 
presented, as a win for a certain ethnic group. The elections are seen as a battle 
between various ethnic groups, rather than a contestation of ideas. Equally, political 
candidates hardly use policy direction as a strategy to use political parties. Ethnicity 
forms a greater part of political campaigning. 
 
The use of ethnicity during electoral campaigns was clearly manifested during the 
2007 elections in Kenya. As indicated in previous discussions, the 2007 elections 
were billed as a battle between the Kikuyu and the other ethnic groups. The 
politicisation of ethnicity was continued even further, when elected governments 
deliberately choose exploit State resources, or to provide services to specific ethnic 
groups, while at the same time failing to attend to the needs of other communities 
because of their ethnicity. Perhaps, it is not surprising that the politicisation of 
ethnicity has provided a fertile ground for ethnic conflicts in Kenya. Post-colonial 
politicians in Kenya missed an opportunity, when Kenya became independent, to 
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introduce a culture of inclusive politics in Kenya. There are few African countries that 
have dealt with ethnicity differently to Kenya, and have had different outcomes as a 
result. As indicated above, South Africa’s ruling party has, in many respects, been 
very careful on how it has dealt with the issue of ethnic diversity. When the African 
National Congress assumed power, it honoured the tradition and policy that was 
introduced by the party’s forefathers who stated that ethnicity should not be central to 
the ANC’s goal and mission. Consequently, ethnicity has not been at the core of 
South African politics. This researcher, however, does acknowledge that ethnic 
clashes have been a factor before; but ethnicity has not been strong enough to 
influence policy direction in South Africa. Zambia’s political parties do not contest 
elections on the basis of ethnicity, at least not as overtly as do the Kenyan politicians. 
This is reflected in the fact that Zambia has not witnessed ethnic conflicts like those 
seen in Kenya. The fact that ethnic conflicts develop in countries where political 
parties overtly politicise ethnicity should perhaps be interpreted as evidence that the 
politicisation of ethnicity increases the chances of political conflicts. This researcher, 
however, cannot argue authoritatively on this point, as it needs to be explored even 
further through studies. Kenya’s institutions have also been accused of sowing further 
divisions amongst ethnic groups, by not extricating themselves from the politics of 
Kenya. (For example, the Electoral Commission of Kenya [ECK]). The following 
sections will explore how Kenya’s institutions, especially those that have been given 
the task to safeguard democracy, have fared in comparison with Zambian institutions.  
 
4.10 Institutional Integrity      
 
As stated above, Kenya’s institutions have in many instances been found wanting – 
especially with regard to their role which in promoting democracy and the impartial 
administration of justice. The institutions that are of particular interest to this 
researcher are the Electoral Commission, the Judiciary, and the police service. 
Mueller (2011: 104) argues that the institutions in Kenya were deliberately rendered 
weak by the presidency, in order to centralise power in the office of the president. 
Mueller elaborates on this point by emphasizing that the factors that predisposed 
Kenya to violence after the 2007 elections were the following: 
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Institutions outside the presidency had been deliberately weakened over time 
through a series of constitutional amendments under both President Kenyatta and 
President Moi. They increased the power of the presidency, and reduced that of 
other arms of government, including the judiciary, parliament and various parts of 
the civil service. Furthermore, many of the checks and balances normally 
characteristic of democracies were abandoned both formally and informally. 
 
In any society, institutions are intended to act as a buffer between a powerful State 
and its citizens, even more so in weaker democracies. Nyambuga (2011: xix) 
describes a ‘weak democracy’ as a “system of liberal democracy that is not perfected, 
and that does not have strong supporting institutions. In this instance, institutions, 
such as the press, electoral commission, and even the judiciary are controlled by a 
strong executive arm of government”. Countries, such as Zimbabwe, and to a lesser 
degree Kenya, certainly do reflect some of the characteristics of a weak democracy, as 
identified by Nyambuga. Institutions in both countries are heavily politicised – and in 
the case of Kenya, heavily ethnicised.  
4.10.1 The Electoral Commission of Kenya 
 
 
Before one engages critically with the role played by the ECK, it is only prudent that 
one familiarises oneself with the mandate of the commission. The report by the 
Commonwealth Observer Group (2007: 10) describes the mandate of the ECK as 
follows. “The Constitution provides for an Electoral Commission consisting of a 
Chairman and a maximum of 21 members appointed by the President. The 
Constitution defines the Commission’s responsibilities as:  
  
 The registration of voters and the maintenance and revision of a register of voters;  
 Directing and supervising the Presidential, National Assembly and local 
government elections;  
 Promoting free and fair elections;  
 Promoting voter education throughout Kenya; and such other functions, as may be 
prescribed by the law”. 
 
The premature announcement by ECK of Mwai Kibaki as the winner of the 2007 
elections – despite indications that Raila Odinga could have defeated the incumbent 
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president – was a clear sign that the independence of the commission was 
compromised. Raila Odinga’s Orange Democratic Movement ‘lost’ the election, 
despite having won the parliamentary elections convincingly (99 seats to 43).  
 
According to the report published by the Human Rights Watch (Ballots to Bullets, 
2008, 21), the “the most damaging acts of fraud were committed during the final 
stages of tallying the presidential poll, when the Electoral Commission of Kenya 
(ECK) presided over what was, by all appearances, a desperate last-minute attempt to 
rig the contest in favour of the incumbent, Mwai Kibaki”. The report further 
illustrates how the ECK handed victory to Mwai Kibaki; it observes that: 
 
In the closing hours of the tabulation process, a lead of over one million votes 
for opposition candidate, Raila Odinga, evaporated under opaque and highly 
irregular proceedings, and was transformed into a razor-thin margin of victory 
for Mr Kibaki. The result was also entirely at odds with the Orange 
Democratic Movement’s successes in the parliamentary vote, in which the 
ODM won 99 seats to the PNU’s 43.55.The entire process quickly fell apart in 
confusion. In the face of public outrage and mounting pressure to reverse the 
move, five electoral commissioners publicly denounced the apparent fraud. 
Even the head of the ECK later said that he could not determine who [had] 
actually won the vote. 
 
The way in which the ECK handled the uncertainty surrounding the 2007 elections 
betrayed a certain level of incompetence and bias. After having declared the 
incumbent president the winner of the 2007 elections, the head of the Electoral 
Commission of Kenya confessed that he did not really know who the winner of the 
2007 elections was. This was a startling confession – especially coming from the head 
of the electoral commission. According to Kilonzo (2009: 245), “President Kibaki 
trailed most of the time, and only started catching up well into the vote-tallying 
exercise. He was ultimately declared the winner (by an extra 231 728 votes over the 
Orange Democratic Movement’s [ODM] candidate, Raila Odinga) in the late 
afternoon of 30 December 2007, and then hurriedly sworn in, notwithstanding 
raucous protests that the results had been rigged”. The actions of the Electoral 
Commission of Kenya led to the violence, which eventually developed into a full-
blown war. This does not in any way imply that the ECK was the sole contributor to 
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the ethnic violence that broke out in 2008. The commission did, however, create an 
environment where tensions grew between the various ethnic groups. Apart from the 
apparent bias displayed by the ECK officials during the 2007 elections, some 
observers also observed that the commission lacked the fundamental technical skills 
needed to deliver a credible election. Southall (2009: 445) states that the Report on 
the Independent Review Commission on the General Elections noted that the ECK, 
“found the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) to be technically and 
administratively incompetent, disproportionately expensive, and incapable of 
undertaking the fundamental task of efficiently registering voters (for instance, an 
estimated 1.2 million deceased voters were still on the electoral list)”. The Electoral 
Commission of Kenya has come under fire from different sectors that were critical of 
its role in the 2007 elections. “Since 1989, roughly 20 African nations have 
undergone transitions from one-party to multiparty rule”. According to Milimo (1993: 
35), Zambia is one of those African nations that moved into multi-party politics. 
Zambia held its first democratic elections during the 1991 elections. Just as any other 
African nation that has embraced multi-party elections, Zambia needed a strong, 
unbiased institution to manage the elections and to produce credible results. 
“Elections are central to competitive politics. They are central because, ideally, they 
should provide the opportunity for yesterday's winners to become today's losers, and 
for yesterday' s losers to become today' s winners. The model of democracy on which 
this theory of elections is based is liberal democracy. The centrality of elections to 
liberal democratic politics also presupposes the importance particularly of impartial 
electoral administration” (Jinadu, 997: 1). Electoral commissions are central to the 
effective and impartial administration of justice. Ideally, electoral commissions 
should be impervious to political interference, and should be allowed to fulfil their 
constitutional role. On many occasions, governments have tried to compromise the 
independence of their respective electoral commissions by appointing commissioners 
who were sympathetic to their cause. The 2008 upheavals in Kenya clearly showed 
what would be the result of an electoral body that is compromised. The Electoral 
Commission of Kenya was disbanded in 2008. This was largely due to the unsavoury 
role it played in the chaotic events during the 2007 elections. Despite the major 
overhaul that followed the 2008 debacle, the commission’s weaknesses were again 
exposed during the recent elections. The problems that emanated from the 2013 
elections were, however, of an administrative nature. The new electronic vote-
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counting system collapsed; and it was subsequently discontinued, in favour of manual 
counting. This resulted in long delays in getting the final outcome of the elections. 
These administrative problems that were experienced during the 2013 elections were 
enough to cause Raila Odinga to challenge the results.  
 
4.10.2 The Electoral Commission of Zambia 
 
To some extent, the Electoral Commission of Zambia has been able to insulate itself 
from political influence. The past elections in Zambia have been carried out without a 
hitch, save for the usual administrative glitches that can be expected in any election. 
Past elections have been declared ‘free and fair’ by most observers. When Zambia 
moved into an era of multi-party politics, the Electoral Commission of Zambia had 
criticism levelled against it.  
 
“ZEMCC in its Final Report identifies a number of other concerns about the work and 
function of the Commission. Firstly, it criticises the practice that announcements 
regarding the election procedures were being made by officials of UNIP; secondly, 
deep concern is expressed about the inadequate funding and staffing provided for the 
Electoral Commission and Electoral Office; and thirdly, the report alleges that the 
educational duty of the Electoral Office was not properly carried out” (Andreassen, 
Geisler, & Tostensen, 1991: 28). The criticisms that have been highlighted above 
could be explained by providing a political context of the time. As stated elsewhere, 
Zambia only moved into an era of multi-party politics in 1991. The first multi-party 
elections were always going to be a challenge, so the problems cited above should 
have been expected. The first democratic election in South Africa was also plagued by 
various problems, such as an insufficient number of ballots and slow-moving queues. 
The Electoral Commission of Zambia has become more assertive. For example: 
 
Rupiah Bwezani Banda was on the verge of declaring himself winner of the 20 
September presidential poll, after realising he had lost the elections to Michael 
Chilufya Sata's Patriotic Front (PF), sources close to the presidency have told 
Africa Confidential. It was only the intervention of top advisors, electoral officials, 
founding President Kenneth David Kaunda, and [the] United States and [the] 
European Union diplomats on 22 September that persuaded Banda not to subvert 
the results and stay in office. The Chairperson of the Electoral Commission of 
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Zambia (ECZ), Justice Irene C. Mambilima, is reported to have threatened to 
resign, and tell the world the truth, if Banda did not accept defeat (Africa 
Confidential, 2011: 20). 
 
In conclusion, the Electoral Commission of Zambia has been able to maintain its level 
of independence. This endorsement of previous past elections as free and fair by 
observers is a confirmation that the ECZ has successfully been able to deliver credible 
elections. Perhaps the strength of the ECZ is reflected in the fact that political elites 
have been unable to overtly influence the commission. Consequently, Zambian 
elections have hardly been mired in controversy. This is testimony to the impartial 
role of the commission. The Electoral Commission of Kenya has frequently taken 
centre stage in past Kenyan elections for all the wrong reasons. These have been 
highlighted above. These include being amenable to political influence. The 
administration and the management of elections in Kenya have proven not to be an 
easy task for the ECK.   
 
4.10.3 Law enforcement agencies and politics in Kenya 
 
 
The stability of any society is dependent on the professionalism of its institutions, 
especially the judiciary and the police. These institutions serve as critical pillars of 
constitutional and democratic values in many States. The police and the judiciary 
create structures that force those who hold public office to be accountable. Human 
history has provided the world with lessons on what happens when these institutions 
no longer serve their useful role. Lack of accountability replaces responsible 
governance; political parties also attempt to influence and infiltrate these institutions. 
In many respects, Zimbabwe serves as an example of how States deteriorate when the 
lines between politicians, police and the judiciary become blurred.  
The rule of law becomes a foreign concept; and consequently, these States are then 
referred to as ‘failed’ States. The integrity of the Kenyan institutions has also been 
compromised, especially after the 2007 elections. Various investigations that were 
carried after the 2008 ethnic violence revealed collusion between political elites and 
the police.  The commission of inquiry established that the role of these officers “was 
to disrupt polling, and where possible [to] ensure that government supporters amongst 
the candidates and voters prevailed” (Akech, 2011: 351). Auerbach (2003: 275) 
119 
 
asserts that instead of bringing a measure of control, when the violence broke out, 
law-enforcement officials took sides. Groups that supported the incumbent 
government committed acts of violence carried out with impunity, because of the 
protection they received from the police. Klopp (2009: 143) is of the view that the 
civil wars that occurred in Somalia, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Sudan were the result of 
“illicit accumulation of public wealth and political fragmentation”. Klopp further 
contends that if it were not for various interventions, Kenya would have experienced 
the same outcome as the countries mentioned above. 
 
From December 2007 to January 2008, brutal killings by the police, massacres, 
refugee flight from the country, massive regional economic dislocation and blatant 
electoral manipulation and deceit suggested Kenya was [on] a razor's edge away 
from such an outcome.' Indeed, violence was only stopped through the concerted 
efforts of civil society groups and global diplomacy, which culminated in Kenya's 
National Dialogue and Reconciliation process, and the current power-sharing 
agreement, or National Accord.  
 
The failure of the police to provide adequate protection to all citizens created an 
opportunity for gangs to terrorise communities. “Gangs, such as [the] Mungiki and 
others acted, as well as organized shake-down gangs, offering various types of ‘you 
can’t say no’ protection and services for fees. They moved into areas neglected by 
government, or where officials and police turned a blind eye in exchange for 
kickbacks. During this process, extra State violence became institutionalized with 
gangs like Mungiki infiltrating many businesses – much like the Mafia” (Mueller, 
2011: 103).  
 
4.10.4 The Judiciary and accountability in Kenya 
 
The constitutional reforms that were introduced in Kenya served as an 
acknowledgement that the judicial system of not in a healthy state. Akech (2011: 
342) notes that there were “widespread and credible allegations that the legislature 
and the judiciary are also abusing their powers and engaging in, or facilitating, 
corruption. These allegations have led to questions about the ability and legitimacy 
of these branches to hold the executive to account. For example, there is a perception 
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that legislators are no less corrupt than the executive actors they purport to hold 
accountable. Further, the legislature’s ability to function as a watchdog is 
compromised because some of its key committees are headed by legislators who 
have been implicated in corruption scandals”.  
 
Through these actions, the judiciary has lost legitimacy and credibility amongst 
Kenyan citizens. The other criticism against the Kenyan judiciary relates to the lack 
of convictions of those implicated in the 2008 ethnic conflict. The Kenyan 
judiciary’s questionable conduct was not only linked to Mwai Kibaki. The judiciary 
was also beholden to previous administrations. Otieno (2005: 72) is of the view that 
under Moi’s regime, the judiciary was also compromised. When the National 
Alliance of Rainbow Coalition (NARC) came into power in 2002 they promised to 
clean up the judiciary and complete the constitutional reforms. According to Otieno, 
the NARC expressed the view the that major block to reform was the corrupt 
judiciary, “The regime set about what it referred to as ‘radical surgery’ of the 
judiciary that was widely regarded as exceedingly corrupt and subservient to the 
executive under the Moi regime”.   
 
Mutonyi (2002: 24) notes that the “key to reducing corruption, therefore, begins with 
better systems and policies that make public officials accountable for their actions”. 
Mutonyi further suggests that these systems and policies could be summarised and 
be grouped into four categories. Firstly, thorough systems of policies and procedures 
need to be created, in order to create what Mutonyi refers to as ‘checks and 
balances’. For this to be possible, strong institutions are needed to create structures to 
promote political and legal accountability. As stated earlier in this section, what has 
been lacking in Kenyan society has been the presence of strong institutions to hold 
public officials accountable for their actions. Mutonyi identifies these structures as 
an “independent judiciary and efficient criminal justice system, a functioning 
parliament free of undue influence and interference from the executive or ruling 
party, an independent and critical press, and a commitment to good governance”. 
 
The second aspect that Mutonyi notes as a requirement for the stability of societies is 
the limitation of the role of the State in society – especially its ‘role’ in ‘buying’ 
patronage. The role of the State can also be limited, by “devolving its functions to 
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smaller units, in order to enhance accountability”. It was indicated at the beginning 
of this section that one of the problems that have contributed to the instability of the 
Kenyan political system is that political power is centralised in the presidency. 
Mutonyi further identifies the civil society that is “active, vibrant and vigilant 
external” as a key ingredient for an accountable government. Civil society consists of 
groups, such as trade associations, and other “groups committed to common causes, 
who can help ensure that different branches of government perform their assigned 
tasks”. The final piece of the puzzle in creating a government that is responsive to 
the needs of all its citizens is to ensure “integrity in the public sector through 
performance standards, incentives and integrity codes to enhance [the] 
professionalism and quality in the performance of public officials”. Unfortunately, 
all the critical aspects of good governance and stable societies that have been 
identified by Mutonyi are lacking or missing in the Kenyan society. The absence of 
these structures has resulted in Kenya’s government not being able to respond 
adequately to national crises, such as the ethnic conflict in 2008. The judicial system 
was also ineffective in dealing with matters that arose from the ethnic violence. 
Members of the judiciary felt that they were answerable to those political figures that 
had appointed them – rather than to the citizens. The fact that there have been so few 
people convicted for their role in the ethnic violence – despite so much death and 
destruction – is an indictment of Kenya’s judiciary. The following sections will 
discuss whether institutions, such as the Zambian institutions like the police and the 
judiciary, are able to discharge their constitutional functions without any interference 
from the political elite. However, this researcher believes it would be prudent to first 
explore the current politics in the SADC region. This author feels that such a 
discussion is necessary, because it would provide a context for the subsequent 
discussion on Zambia later.  
 
4.10.5 A discussion on the politics of the SADC region 
 
 
Zambia is a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). 
SADC aims to promote regional integration between member States in the Southern 
region. Political and economic co-operation are the main aims that the SADC 
community wishes to promote. Being a member of the SADC community, imparts 
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certain responsibilities to the member States. These include creating an environment 
and structures that are consistent with liberal democracies. The environment that is 
conducive to democratic principles includes a free press, a judiciary that is free from 
government interference, and an independent law- enforcement community. As 
demonstrated in the discussions above, on many occasions, the governments in Africa 
and other parts of the world (both First-World and Third-World countries) try to 
subvert these democratic values. Strong institutions, therefore, become crucial, merely 
for this reason. They play an oversight role; and hold the government accountable for 
its actions. It is in the interest of the SADC community to have stable States. Political, 
social and economic stability in member States is likely to result in a stable 
environment. Despite these lofty ideals, several governments in the SADC region 
have, on many occasions, been found wanting. In Zimbabwe, for example, the police 
have been heavily loyal to the ruling ZANU-PF, especially to president Mugabe. The 
loyalty of the police towards ZANU-PF if often reflected during elections. Opposition 
party (mainly the MDC) campaigns are often disrupted and politicians are targeted. 
When the leader of the opposition, Morgan Tsvangirai, was beaten up by the riot 
police in 2007, it made international headlines. The loyalty to Mugabe and the 
ZANU-PF is not unique to the police. In 2008, the Army Commander declared his 
loyalty to Robert Mugabe, and made it clear that he would not support any candidate 
that unseated Mugabe: even in a free and fair election. According to Hills (2007: 404), 
the “police enforce decisions taken by political authorities. In reality, policing is 
shaped by the politics of political order and accumulation in ways that are at variance 
with the requirements of accountability”. The Zimbabwean government is, however, 
not the only government that has manipulated the law-enforcement community. Even 
in countries that are relatively democratic, politicians have found it useful to have the 
support of the police and the intelligence community. In this case, South Africa is a 
good example. The tensions within the ANC – especially between the current 
president and the then president Mbeki, were played out in many areas: the army, the 
government, and not least, in the intelligence community and the police.  
 
Police commissioners in South Africa are notoriously loyal to the presidents who 
appoint them. Jackie Selebi was loyal to Mbeki, and vice versa. Mbeki famously 
attempted to block the prosecution of Selebi, after he had been charged for corruption. 
The then head of the NPA Vusi Pikoli was relieved of his duties because he refused to 
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bow to pressure. President Zuma was also able to manipulate the State agencies to his 
advantage. He was able to shake off legal charges – after ‘classified’ recordings were 
leaked to his legal team. Inexplicably, the then head of the NPA, Mokotedi Mpshe, 
decided to withdraw the charges against Zuma on the basis of these recordings.  
By discussing the relationship between political elites and the institutions, this author 
hoped to illustrate how politics can so easily seep into State organs that are supposed 
to be impervious to political influence. The discussion has deliberately focused on the 
SADC region because Zambia is located within this region.     
 
4.10.6 Police and politics in Zambia 
 
The previous discussion explored the relationship between politics and law-
enforcement agencies in the SADC region. The discussion focused more on how 
political elites can manipulate the activities of these institutions to serve their own 
political interests. The previous discussion revealed that there is a widespread abuse 
of the role of law-enforcement agencies – especially the police services. For example, 
incumbent administrations often use the police to limit certain freedoms that are 
protected by the constitution. Rallies organised by the opposition are in some cases 
disrupted by the police. When one analyses the nature of the relationship between 
political elites and the law-enforcement community in Zambia, it is always necessary 
to take into account the two different histories. Zambia’s history includes that of a 
one-party State, and also as a multi-party democracy. Zambia has had a chequered 
history as a one-party State. Kenneth Kaunda’s political philosophy was humanism; 
he (and his party) believed that one-party politics would be fundamental in bringing 
about this philosophy. Kaunda, therefore, took a dim view of opposition parties. The 
problem in one-party States is that the dominant political party or government 
becomes obsessed with controlling every facet of society.  
 
It often became much easier for a ruling party to become autocratic in a one-party 
State. Phiri has identified several features that distinguish an autocratic system from a 
system based on democratic values. An “autocratic political system is characterised 
by the following features: an official ideology; a single mass party typically led by 
one man; [and] a system of terroristic police control”.  This has been the case in many 
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countries (e.g. Kenya). According to Phiri (2001: 236), President Kaunda had 
effectively become autocratic, and rejected any democratic processes in the party and 
the nation. Law-enforcement agencies, such as the police, easily become an extension 
of the government. They became loyal to the government they serve, rather the 
citizens they are supposed to serve. Citing Kaunda’s views on the police, Phiri (2001: 
234) sums up the role of the police in Zambia as envisaged by Kaunda. Phiri observes 
that Kaunda threatened to “dismiss any police officer who appeared to have been 
serving the interests of the opposition”. This implied that the police should be serving 
the interests of the ruling party, and not those of the opposition. After relentless 
pressure from citizens and other sections of society, Kenneth Kaunda bowed to 
pressure, and was forced to abandon one-party politics. Zambia officially returned to 
plural politics in 1991. Tordoff and Young (1994: 298) contended that “multi-party 
competition is an important strand in a liberal democratic system of government”. 
These authors do acknowledge, however, that multi-party competition does not 
“guarantee democracy, nor does it necessarily imply a 'qualitative change in political 
practices' by eliminating clientelism or presidentialism, for example. "Some 
governments have created a semblance of democracy in their countries, in order to 
disguise their repressive regimes. Tordoff and Young further explain that “other 
essential elements in a democratic system of government include freedom of speech 
and expression, the unrestricted right to form interest groups, free and fair elections, 
the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary and freedom from arbitrary arrest, 
and popular participation in government”.  
 
Maintaining a government that is not based on democratic values can be expensive 
and unsustainable. It becomes nearly impossible for these countries to secure funding, 
or any form of foreign aid. Members of autocratic governments may be put on a 
sanctions programme. This has certainly been the case in Zimbabwe. Even though 
opposition parties are allowed to occupy a space in the politics of Zimbabwe, it has 
not prevented the government from interfering with the activities of opposition 
movements. This is one of the reasons why some countries in Europe have been 
reluctant to lift sanctions against the Zimbabwean government. Even though there was 
excitement when the Zambian government returned to multi-party politics, there were 
similar concerns about the quality of their democracy. How much power was UNIP 
prepared to concede? Sandbrook concurs (1996: 73); he asserts that “governments 
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have been known to deny opposition parties access to the publicly owned mass media, 
to restrict opposition rallies by requiring permits for such public meetings, to use 
public resources to subsidise the governing party’ s campaign, to permit militia and 
the police to intimidate supporters and agents of the opposition”.  
 
UNIP used all the State resources to scupper the election campaigns of opposition 
parties. Sandbrook notes that “regulations associated with Zambia’ s State of 
Emergency, such as restrictions on movements after dark, and the need to obtain 
permits to hold public meetings, limited [the] MMD’ s activities”.      
 
4.10.7 The role of the parliament in both Kenya and 
Zambia 
 
The role of parliament in any democratic society is critical. If all the institutions fail in 
any State, the role of parliament then becomes even more essential. The South 
African parliament has, in many cases, demonstrated what a functional parliament can 
achieve. Public servants who have been found to have subverted the law have been 
called to account. The most recent case involves the former Minister of 
Communication, Dina Pule, who has been found to have contravened various laws in 
the course of executing her duties. The portfolio committee on communications held 
the former minister to account for her transgressions. Following the completion of 
investigations, the committee recommended various sanctions to parliament.  
The various committees play an oversight role in parliament. Amongst other things, 
they make sure that public finances are used properly (i.e. as intended by national 
treasury) and they also make sure that elected officials do not abuse the privileges that 
come with their positions. Parliament, therefore, provides institutional checks and 
balances for the State. Parliament is, however, only effective if the opposition parties 
are also fulfilling their parliamentary roles adequately, because frequently ruling 
parties attempt to dominate and stamp their authority on parliament.  
 
“The history of the Kenyan Parliament is an example of steady progress from colonial 
autocracy on a true democratic trajectory. Legislation by Parliament in Kenya began 
some 104 years ago. Prior to that, it had wholly been done in the United Kingdom, 
and was conveyed in the form of royal instructions, commonly termed Orders-in-
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Council” (The Parliamentarian, 2010. 2). Like many former British colonies, Kenya’s 
institutions bore the characteristics of Britain. In fact, many African institutions first 
adopted the practices of various British institutions. As post-colonial governments 
stamped their authority, they sought to do away with any British legacy, and they 
modified these institutions.  
 
However, post-colonial governments did not always change these institutions for the 
better. The role of parliament was distorted, and the institution was used to address 
the insecurities of government leaders. In Kenya, for example, legislation was passed 
through parliament to reverse the progress that had been made in society, and to limit 
the political ambitions of political opponents. Jomo Kenyatta’s government 
introduced constitutional amendments that outlawed multi-party politics, and thereby 
reversed any democratic gains. The parliament was effectively dominated by one 
party. This did not only result in poor laws being passed through parliament; but since 
other political parties were not outlawed, it meant that the Kenyan parliament was 
starved of other political views. Admittedly, over the years there has been some 
positive transformation in Kenya’s parliament. It has moved from being a male-
dominated institution, to an institution where female Members of Parliament are 
playing a central role. Before 1997, the minority groups were under-represented in 
parliament: “[The] Kikuyu have traditionally dominated the parliamentary seats” 
(Ajulu, 1998: 280). However, “the number of elected and nominated women 
Members of Parliament (MPs) doubled between the 1997 and 2002 elections from 
nine to 18 women. Of a total of 210 MPs, 48 are from minority or indigenous 
communities, including three women, one of who is a cabinet minister.  
 
Furthermore, women’s participation in local authorities increased from 2.4 per cent in 
1988 to 13.3 per cent in 2002” (Makoloo, 2010: 6). The Kenyan parliament failed 
dismally to provide moral guidance during the 2008 ethnic conflict. Instead, 
politicians even deepened the divisions – by not denouncing the ethnic violence. 
Following various interventions by those seeking to address the political problems in 
Kenya (e.g. Kofi Annan) the “parliament was instrumental in establishing the 
coalition government, and in ensuring its sustainability and success. Members 
inevitably play a critical role in achieving [a] durable peace, which is linked to the 
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existence of credible democratic institutions and enhanced government 
accountability” (Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference, 2010).   
 
In divided societies, such as Kenya, parliament can be an effective institution in 
creating an environment where all citizens feel that their communities are represented. 
However, this is contingent upon citizens recognising the legitimacy of their 
parliamentary representatives.  In properly elected governments, “parliaments hold 
enormous responsibility and capacity to stem conflict and ensure [the] existence of an 
all-inclusive society. The role of legislation is key in creating a framework for 
addressing historical injustices, political stability and sustainable peace” 
(Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference, 2010). 
Simutanyi (2005: 1) observes that “after years of marginalisation, parliaments have 
begun to emerge as the key institutions in African governments. In many countries, 
legislatures have been given a new lease of life, after a long hiatus. The former-
dominated Parliaments now boast an increase in the numbers of opposition members, 
who have greatly contributed to the quality of Parliamentary debates”. In many 
respects, Zambia has experienced similar challenges as those of Kenya. As has been 
the case in Kenya, different ethnic groups have tried to dominate – both the political 
and economic landscape in Zambia. Traditionally, the Bemba-speaking people have 
been dominant in Zambian politics for a long time. As indicated earlier in this study, 
Zambia also went through an era of one-party politics. 
 
“Like many an ex-colony, Zambia attempted to adopt the government and political 
system of her former metropole, namely, the Westminster parliamentary model. In 
fact, it was a mixture of the American presidential system with that of traditional 
parliamentarianism, as practised in Great Britain and some of the older 
Commonwealth countries” (Milimo, 1993: 35). As an institution, the Zambian 
parliament was not successful in restraining ethnic rivalry. Bemba speakers 
dominated many positions in parliament and other political institutions. This 
contributed to the ethnic tensions that existed in Zambia. The Zambian parliament 
was, therefore, not immune to ethnic politics. Smaller ethnic groups were not well 
represented in parliament. Milimo (1993: 35) observed that: The postcolonial 
democracy in Zambia gradually eroded, and was replaced by the single-party State in 
1973, under the assumption that this was the best antidote for divisive tribalism. The 
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argument often advanced by African governments was that one-party politics did 
away with the ethnic rivalry. This, of course, could not be further from the truth, 
because ethnic rivalries were played out even within the corridors of parliamentary 
structures.  In 2002, Zambia launched efforts to transform the parliament.  The 
Parliamentary Reform Programme (PRP) was launched in 2002, with the “goal of 
improving the way MPs relate to their constituents, the executive, and civil society” 
(Inter-Parliamentary Union study, 2009: 16). 
 
The objective of PRP II was to create a “REAL” parliament for Zambia: a 
parliament that is Representative and Responsive, Efficient and Effective, 
Accountable and Accessible, Legitimate and Linked. A key feature of the 
programme was to improve parliamentary responsiveness to and linkages 
between the National Assembly and the executive, MPs and their constituents, 
MPs and the general public and civil society interest groups, and between the 
office of the Speaker and the MPs regarding the management and 
administration of the National Assembly.           
 
Perhaps the efforts to reform the parliament of Zambia could be counted as one of the 
reasons that ethnic competition in Zambia has not been observed to the same extent as 
in Kenya. As stated above, a conscious effort was made to make parliament accessible 
to different constituencies. Compared to Zambia, the only period in which Kenya’s 
politicians re-establish contact with their constituencies is when elections are around 
the corner.   
 
4.10.8 The effectiveness of civil society in Kenya and 
Zambia 
 
Civil society has widely been regarded as a critical component of any society. Civil 
society operates independently of the State, and it has the capacity to act as a buffer 
between citizens and the State. Shils (2001: 4) contends that “the idea of civil society, 
is distinctly different from the State, and is largely in autonomy from it. Civil society 
lies beyond the boundaries of the family and the clan and beyond the locality; it lies 
short of the State”. Makumbe (1998: 305) shared the same sentiments as Shils; he 
defined civil society “as an aggregate of institutions, whose members are engaged in a 
complex of non-State activities – economic and cultural production, voluntary 
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associations, and household life – and who in this way preserve and transform their 
identity, by exercising all sorts of pressures or controls upon State institutions”.  
 
Civil society could be characterised as forming a second tier to the State; its 
institutions are in involved in various aspects of social, economic activity and in other 
non-State activities. The power of these institutions lies in their ability to put pressure 
on the State and its institutions. Makumbe further notes that, an African context civil 
society “would include trade unions; professional associations; church and para-
church organisations; residents; student business and other special interest 
associations; the media; and various types of non-governmental organisations 
(NGO’s)”. Von Doep (1996: 27) contended that civil society “represents a potential 
location of power outside the State”.    
 
The fact that civil society is independent from the structures of the State is essential, 
because this gives it the ability to challenge State institutions and its agents. 
According to Shils, civil society has three main components. The first component is 
that civil society is made up of a complex array of institutions. These institutions play 
different roles in various aspects of society (e.g. economic, political, intellectual and 
religious areas). Secondly, there is a complex set of relationships that exist between 
the State and civil society. Trade unions in South Africa, for example, often claim to 
represent only the interests of workers; and they make a point of emphasizing their 
independence. The labour movement in South Africa, however, has indirect relations 
with the State. South Africa’s labour federation COSATU is part of the tripartite 
alliance, of which the ruling party is a member. This underscores the argument made 
by Shils that there exists a complex relationship between civil society and the State. 
The third component of civil society, according to Shils, “is a widespread pattern of 
refined or civil manners”. This author is interested in finding out how big a role civic 
society plays in Africa, and more specifically in Kenya and Zambia. The aspect of 
civil society that will be interrogated by this section is the transformative value of 
civic society. In other words: Does it change society in any meaningful way, 
especially as far as its role in ethnic politics is concerned?   
 
There are elements of political culture in African countries that are conducive to 
building strong civic institutions. Because many Africans still draw their identities 
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from collective social units like family, clan and ethnic group, there is a firm basis 
of group solidarity upon which to construct primary associations. Moreover, to the 
extent that many Africans still emphasize norms of reciprocity in social relations, 
they possess a reservoir of social capital, which can be invested in collective 
action (Bratton, 1994: 7).    
 
Although the activities of civil society have been limited in many African countries, 
other African nations, such as South Africa, have developed strong civil institutions. 
These institutions have been assertive in exposing State excesses. Civil organisations 
have not adequately fulfilled their role in Kenya. They have been accused of 
consorting with the government. Some individuals that have been active within the 
civil society have been offered government positions. All these factors have conspired 
to make the civil society less than fully effective. Houe (2010: 4) also notes that the 
other problem faced by Kenya’s civil society is that they lack legitimacy in the eyes 
of the public.  “CS is very influenced by political interests and also by tribal aspects, 
which has a tendency to divide CS, and create tensions and frustration among CS 
actors themselves. To a certain extent, the ongoing discussions and tension in CS has 
meant that some parts of CS are suffering from a lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the 
general public”. A civil society that lacks legitimacy would have a difficult time in 
convincing the rest of society to support it in is battles with State institutions. Just as a 
society needs an active and engaging civil society, the civil society also needs the 
support of the citizens of the nation. This was clearly illustrated in South Africa in the 
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC). When the then government led by president 
Mbeki refused to roll out the necessary drugs to prevent mother-to-child transmission 
of the HI virus, the TAC challenged this decision through the courts of law.  
 
The relevant aspect in the TAC vs the Minister of Health case is that the throughout its 
battles with the national government, it managed to garner the support of the South 
African citizens by making the case a moral issue. This case dented the image of the 
South African government. The TAC successfully presented the government as aloof, 
disaffected and out of touch with the societal realities of its own society. Coming back 
to Kenya; unfortunately Kenya has been lacking a robust and fearless civil society 
that courageously exposes he government excesses, especially the role of government 
or its agents in Kenya’s 2008 ethnic conflict. Lacking legitimacy, it has been difficult 
for Kenya to demonstrate its relevance in society. In his dissertation which studied the 
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role of the media in Kenya’s political conflicts, Nyambuga (2011: 250) noted that the 
media had been manipulated by those in power, in order to further their own interests. 
Nyambuga advances the following example: “Former President Moi used the media 
to try to popularize his choice for the presidency; but in the process he caused further 
rifts and tensions. He used the electronic media and opinion pieces in the print media 
to show Kenyans his then-preferred choice for the Presidency: Uhuru Kenyatta”.  
 
The manipulation of the media for political gain undermined the role of the media, 
which relates to reporting facts as objectively as possible. Nyambuga further 
observed that “the opinion pages of the East African Standard and Nation displayed 
partisan views, as they were direct opinions on different political and social events. 
These direct opinions contributed to readers’ attitude formation, as they formed the 
basis for discussions and actions”. Unlike the media, the church has been 
instrumental in bringing about regime change. Okoku (2002: 85) asserts that the 
reason for the prominent role of the church in the politics of Kenya is owing to the 
history of that country. He states that the negative socio-economic conditions and the 
hostile political environment (e.g. one-party politics) left the church as the only 
credible institution. Okoku further observes that, “in multi-ethnic and differentiated 
societies like Kenya, the church affords the means for a broad dissemination of its 
moral doctrines and social-political views. This enables it to contribute to the 
socialisation of African citizens – and thus affecting the prospects for democratic 
participation”. Mwaura and Martinon (2010: 45) also acknowledge the role played 
by churches in responding to the 2007 crisis. They state that “generally, the Kenyan 
Church responded to humanitarian aspects of the crises quite admirably. 
Nevertheless, [the] people expected more from churches in terms of messages of 
hope, reconciliation, justice, and a creative political intervention in the crisis”. 
  
The civil society in Zambia has been slightly more active than in Kenyan civil 
groups. Michael Sata and his predecessor, Frederick Chiluba, made attempts to 
extend their presidential terms. These attempts failed dismally, because they were 
aggressively opposed and dismissed by Zambians, not least by the civil groups. 
 
Zambians had the chance to decide whether Chiluba should be granted 
another term in office to finish the development projects he had initiated in 
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1991. However, the attempt was met with a massive, and well-co-ordinated, 
response from the Zambian public. Between February and early May 2001, a 
number of public demonstrations and debates took place – indicating that 
Zambian civil society exhibited a degree of strength, national reach and 
organizational capacity” (Rakner & SvAsand, 2004:53).  
 
The reaction to Chiluba’s attempts to subvert constitutional arrangements sums up 
the difference between civil society in Kenya and that in Zambia. While the civic 
organisations in Kenya were less aggressive when it came to opposing the abuse of 
office by politicians, their Zambian counterparts were vocal in opposing the whims 
of those in public office.  
While it cannot be concluded in this study that the vigilance of the Zambian civil 
society has shielded that country from ethnic conflicts, it can however be stated that 
“societies that have a strong civil society may have a tendency to experience higher 
levels of political representation, enabling collective groups to resist unpopular State 
policies, and to apply pressure on State institutions when they find they have erred” 
(Tusale, 2007: 362). 
 
4.11. Analysis of campaign speeches, social 
commentary, and more  
 
This section aims to analyse the content of political campaign speeches, social 
commentary, and narrative that occurred in 2007. The reason for embarking on this 
exercise is that campaign speeches of candidates often reveal how these candidates 
intend to approach the electoral process. Social commentary is also critical, as it 
captures the opinions of ordinary citizens and experts on a particular subject or event 
(e.g. elections). The author will analyse the political speeches, and opinions that were 
prevalent during elections and thereafter. The author must hasten to add that this 
component of the study is aimed to supplement the rest of the study. The list of the 
content to be analysed is by no means exhaustive; and only a small sample of 
speeches, opinions and social commentary will be analysed.  
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4.11.1 Tribalism 
 
‘Forty-one tribes against one’ – Orange Democratic Movement election campaign. 
  
As stated numerous times in this study, identity has become an integral part of 
Kenyan politics. The statement quoted above was central to the ODM’s 2007 
election campaign.  The above statement reflected the significance of identity and 
ethnicity in the politics and the electoral outcomes in Kenya. ODM’s campaign 
approach recognised this reality. It aimed to gather support from various ethnic 
groups by uniting them against the Kikuyu. The ODM was indirectly asking to be 
given a political mandate by these ethnic groups (in the form of votes) to remove the 
Kikuyu from power. To some extent, this strategy did yield results, even though their 
plans were scuppered by the rigging of the elections. 
 
‘We shall not be killed during the Mau Mau and be killed today by 
uncircumcised beings. We swear by the sacred Mugumo tree that when we 
descend upon Kijabe, we shall not leave any Luo alive’ – a flyer posted around 
Kijabe, a Christian mission base (9 January, 2008). 
 
The above quote shows the depth of animosity between the different ethnic groups in 
Kenya. The differences between the ethnic groups were not only limited to different 
political views; but they also extended to cultural practices. The author/s of the above 
quote made a mockery of the fact the Luo do not practise the cultural practice of 
circumcision. One could reasonably assume that the above quote was penned by a 
Kikuyu, or a group aligned with the Kikuyu. This ethnic group is one of the groups 
that do observe this rite of passage. Flyers and leaflets were used as the 
communication tools during the 2007 elections.  They were either used to 
communicate a message that carried a threat; or they were used to call members of 
an ethnic group to action.     
 
4.11.2 Elections – lack of credibility 
 
The prominent character of Kenya’s elections in 2007 was their lack of credibility. It 
also exposed the lack of institutional integrity in various institutions, especially the 
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Electoral Commission of Kenya. Naturally, ordinary citizens, political analysts and 
observers had strong views on this subject – following Kenya’s disastrous 2007 
elections.  
 
A lack of adequate transparency and security measures in the process of relaying 
the results from local to national level questioned the integrity of the final 
results’ – EU Observers.  
 
The above statement from the European Observers exposes the glaring lack of 
transparency in the 2007 Kenyan elections. The credibility of elections was 
compromised in many aspects. For example, the announcement of Mwai Kibaki by 
ECK as the winner of the 2007 elections – despite indications that his opponent could 
have won the elections – is but one example. Perhaps the most astounding aspect of 
the 2007 elections was the admission by the Election Committee Chair, Sam Kivuitu, 
that he did not know who had won the elections.  
 
‘I don’t know whether Kibaki won the election’ – Sam Kivuitu (Kenya Election 
Committee Chair, Jan 2, 2008).  
 
This admission by the senior member of the electoral committee was telling. It 
summed up the 2007 elections. This admission by Kivuitu could only mean two 
things: it could either mean that the Electoral Commission had lost control of the 
elections; or it could mean that they were heavily influenced by the ruling party. 
Either way, the ECK was severely compromised; and it was clear that they had failed 
in their mandate to deliver an election that could be trusted by every Kenyan citizen. 
The Kriegler Commission found a number of irregularities and inconsistencies in the 
way the ECK had conducted the elections. For example, “the Kriegler Commission 
found that electoral fraud had begun at the polling station level, and that it was 
rampant. It determined that the errors made in the various stages of the tallying 
process were so great and so widespread that it was impossible to reconstruct from the 
formal record who in fact had won the presidential contest” (Leornard & Owuor, 
2009: 2). It, therefore, comes as no surprise that Kivuitu declared that he was not 
certain whether Kibaki had won the 2007 elections. 
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‘The figures of President Kibaki have been inflated by as much as 300,000 votes. 
That is the kind of rigging we are talking about’ – comments attributed to Raila 
Odinga. 
 
The above observation by Raila Odinga captured the extent of irregularities in the 
2007 elections. As an incumbent president, Kibaki would have had the means to 
influence the elections. Kenya’s institutions have been dominated by the individuals 
from Kibaki’s ethnic group. The fact that the ECK announced Kibaki as the winner 
further confirms this view. The ability to deliver trusted elections was undermined by 
the ECK’s inability to remain neutral in the 2007 elections. These elections clearly 
showed the danger that could be presented by a compromised electoral commission.  
 
4.11.3 The land issue 
 
‘This is our land from before. Time has come for you to leave our land and 
return to yours! Whoever disobeys will die.’ – Leaflets were spread and were 
addressed by the Rift Valley Land Owners and Protectors army. 
 
As discussed in this study, the land issue has been one variable in the Kenyan politics 
that no president has been able to address adequately. As the above quote illustrates, 
Kenyans feel strongly about the land issue – to the point that some are even prepared 
to take another person’s life if they feel that their land has been ‘taken’. The quote on 
the pamphlet declares that “this was our land from before. Time has come for you to 
leave our land and return to yours”. This pamphlet was intended for the Kikuyu 
community. For many years, the Kikuyu have been accused of taking land that did not 
belong to them. Thanks to post-colonial ethnic politics, the Kikuyu were the main 
beneficiaries when the land was returned to the rightful owners. The only problem 
was that the Kikuyu were allocated land, which had not originally belonged to them. 
The pamphlets reveal a certain level of frustration.       
 
The various sentiments, opinions, social commentary cited above were meant to 
capture the mood that was pervasive in Kenya during the electoral process, and after 
the elections. The content of these commentaries was analysed, in order to expose 
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their underlying meaning. As stated at the beginning of this section, this discussion 
was merely intended to supplement the main component of the study. 
 
4.12. Conclusion 
 
Kenyan society is characterised by inequalities. This is evident in various sectors of 
Kenyan society. The political, social and economic structures bear evidence of a 
nation based on inequalities. This chapter has discussed how colonial structures laid 
the foundation for the present relationship between the various ethnic groups in many 
multi-ethnic countries on the African continent. This researcher did, however, state 
from the outset that this study would focus mainly on the trajectory of post-colonial 
politics, and how it affected ethnic relations – especially in Kenya.  
 
Various idiosyncrasies have also been discussed in this study. These include the fact 
that Kenya has about 41 ethnic groups; but none of them hold a clear majority that 
would enable them to contest the election alone. In order to achieve some form of 
political power or representation, the ethnic groups would have had to form coalitions 
with other ethnic groups; and this would mean excluding other ethnic groups. Also, in 
their attempts to maintain political power, the incumbent governments have had a 
tendency to channel various State resources to certain ethnic communities, in order to 
garner votes from these communities. These peculiarities in Kenyan politics have 
created an environment of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. Political relationships are a numbers 
game; coalitions are based on ‘ethnic arithmetic’, rather than on any common political 
vision and outlook.  
 
All these factors have conspired to craft a political environment that does not cater for 
all the different ethnic groups. It has also created systems and structures that are based 
on inequalities between the ethnic groups. The conflict theory insists that human 
beings need to interrogate the political, social and economic structures that are the 
creation of the State and its institutions.  As a result of the nature of politics in Kenya, 
identity had become a central aspect in its politics.  This researcher noted that, in his 
view, ethnic identities are constructed concepts; various reasons were advanced to 
support this view. Ethnic identity has been a determining factor for access to State 
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resources and other privileges. The political reality of Kenya gives credence to the 
arguments of a social constructionist view. Coalitions between ethnic groups in Kenya 
are not cast in stone; and ethnic coalitions are determined by the anticipated political 
outcomes. The role played by Kenya’s institutions in the 2008 ethnic conflict has also 
been discussed. The discussion focused specifically on the actions of the Electoral 
Commission of Kenya. The view has been expressed that institutional integrity has 
been lacking in Kenya. This has contributed either directly or indirectly to the 
electoral violence of 2008, and that of the previous ethnic conflicts in Kenya. As 
reflected in the reports that were cited in this study, law-enforcement institutions 
appear to be suffering from a lack of credibility. Police agencies were found to have 
either played a part in many attacks that were directed at certain ethnic groups; or the 
police turned a blind eye – on many occasions.   
 
This chapter has presented the research findings and the analysis thereof. It has 
interrogated various aspects of the Kenyan communities. From what has been 
discussed in this chapter, and previous chapters, one may confidently conclude that 
what transpired in Kenya after the 2007 elections was long in the making. As shown 
in this chapter, different variables in the Kenyan society and politics have conspired to 
create a highly ethnicised community. Chapter 5 will be the conclusion of this 
inquiry. A summary of the findings will be presented in this chapter.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
 
The previous chapter involved the analysis of the political and social landscape of 
Kenya. The author visited the various aspects that have contributed to the complexity 
of Kenya’s ethnic relations. This research has focused mainly on the 2007 ethnic 
conflict, but the causes of the conflict are long-standing. It would be appropriate to 
revisit the central research question at this point. The main aim of this is to uncover 
the reasons why ethnicity is at the core of Kenyan politics. There is no single 
contributing factor to this problem in Kenya. There are various aspects of Kenyan 
society that locate ethnicity in Kenya within the politics of everyday life. This chapter 
will deal with all these factors.  
 
5.1. The theoretical background of this study 
 
It was made clear that the Critical Theory will form the basis of this study. The 
exponents of the critical theory argue that various agents in society bring into 
existence various structures in society. These structures may impose far-reaching 
consequences in any society, and may serve to perpetuate the inequalities in society. 
According to critical reality theorists, these structures need to be studied by social 
theorists and citizens; and their existence should be questioned and interrogated 
thoroughly. In his theory of two publics in Africa, Ekeh (1975: 93) adequately 
illustrated how political and social structures created by colonial governments have 
shaped the way African societies have developed. “Modern African politics are in 
large measure a product of the colonial experience. Pre-colonial political structures 
were important in determining the response of various traditional political structures 
to colonial interference. But the colonial experience itself has had a massive impact 
on modern Africa. It is to the colonial experience that any valid conceptualization of 
the unique nature of African politics must look”. What Ekeh implies here is that 
colonialism has fundamentally changed the trajectory of African politics. Ekeh also 
echoed the sentiments expressed in the previous paragraph, which indicated that the 
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direction of African politics was altered by the structures that were imposed on Africa 
by the colonial administrations. The British created different political and social 
structures, one of which served the needs of the white immigrants, and one which 
serviced the needs of the black majority. The needs of the white community were well 
looked after by the colonial administration. The colonial administration paid little 
attention to the needs of the indigenous communities. The nature of relationship 
between the white administration and that of the communities was basically 
confrontational. As stated earlier in this study, this was not unique to Kenya. White 
governments in many African States have created parallel structures that 
accommodated different sets of communities.  
 
In South Africa, for example, the white Afrikaner government create two different 
sets of educational systems: one was meant for the privileged white communities; 
while the inferior Bantu education was designed for the black community. These are 
the kinds of structures that the conflict theory insists that we should challenge. Human 
beings do not always create political and social systems with the best of intentions. 
These systems are sometimes brought into existence to benefit one community, while 
denying other communities the same benefits. This study has also showed that post-
colonial governments were largely responsible for the systems and policies that 
African States have at the moment. For this reason, conflict theorists argue that 
human beings should not accept the structures created by governments or by their 
institutions as a given.  The different institutions and structures of both the Kenyan 
and the Zambian society have already been discussed in detail in this study.      
 
5.2. Colonialism and ethnic identities 
 
 
This study has shown how the colonial regime has contributed to Kenya’s social and 
political environment – causing it to become highly ethnicised. The colonial politics 
were not only about race; but they also transcended ethnic relations as well. It was 
noted in this study that the ethnic groups were removed from their ancestral land, in 
order to accommodate the British settlers. In Kenya’s case, the White Highlands were 
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allocated to white immigrants. The question of land in Kenya has been a highly 
divisive issue between the different racial groups and between ethnic groups.  
The colonial government introduced structures that set the tone for an unequal 
society. Mkhabela (2011: 2) is of the view that Kenya’s ethnic fighting can be traced 
to its colonial period. The British employed a policy of divide-and-rule, in order to 
create divisions within the ethnic groups. This policy made it difficult for the ethnic 
groups to challenge the colonial laws and structures, as a collective. It also resulted in 
tensions and distrust between the various ethnic groups. The policy of divide-and-rule 
was implemented in many forms. The study has also revealed that certain ethnic 
groups (e.g. the Kikuyu) were given access to certain government positions, while 
denying the same the privileges to other ethnic groups. This did not only create 
animosity between the ethnic groups, it also created a skewed labour market, in that 
the majority of government jobs went to a specific ethnic group. 
 
The ethnic groups that had access to government positions also had access to the skills 
needed for the State to function efficiently. These groups also attained the skills that 
were necessary to run the State effectively. It was noted in this study that Kenyans 
have found it difficult to create a national identity that united all the different ethnic 
communities. This is as a result of the societal imbalances created by colonialism. 
Colonialism in many African nations, including Kenya, has helped to amplify the 
ethnic differences between the various ethnic groups. These have been emphasised 
more than those common factors that have the potential to unite Kenyans. To 
summarise: the impact of colonialism – not only in Kenya, but in Africa as a whole – 
one could describe colonialism as having created fragmented African societies.  
5.3. The construction of ethnic identities 
 
A view was taken in this in this study, which argues that ethnic identity is a 
constructed concept. This author has presented an argument to support this 
contention. Human beings are not as attached to their ethnic identities as the 
advocates of primordialism would have us believe. This author pointed out in this 
study that human beings do not conduct their daily lives bearing the burden of their 
ethnic identity. Our ethnic identities do not influence what relationships we build as 
individuals. In other words, individuals are perfectly capable of cultivating cross-
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ethnic relationships with other individuals. “Ethnicity is a continually negotiated and 
changing cultural process, and identities across Africa are constantly being 
reinvented, within and beyond the political sphere” (Carotenuto, 2006: 54). As 
illustrated in the study, the Kenyan ethnic wars were a reflection of the construction 
of society. It was observed in this study that ethnic identities in Kenya often become 
an issue when the electoral process is in progress. Ethnic fissures usually appear when 
there are elections. Advocates of the constructionist theory emphasise the fact that 
ethnic identities only become useful and relevant to public officials when they are 
likely to yield an advantage. This has been the case in Kenya for many years.  
 
Kenyan politicians from different political persuasions have had no qualms about 
using ethnic identities to achieve their own political mileage. It is often in States, such 
as Kenya, that ethnic identities become constructed. The reason is that the 
manipulation of identity in such societies is likely to provide benefits. It was indicated 
in the study that Zambia has had significantly less ethnic clashes than those that 
Kenya has experienced. This, of course, is despite the fact that Zambia is home to 
almost double the number of the ethnic groups than can be found in Kenya. South 
Africa has also not had any major ethnic violence, certainly not in recent times. There 
are many other examples of African States whose ethnic groups live peacefully with 
each other.  In what way are these countries different from Kenya? The main 
difference is that, unlike Kenya, the manipulation of identities in other countries is 
unlikely to yield any political advantage; in fact, it is more likely to limit one’s 
political career or that of a political party. For example, any member that is affiliated 
to the ANC (or any other South African political party for that matter) is unlikely to 
get far, politically, by using ethnicity as a political tool. The same scenario is 
applicable in Zambia. In Kenya, however, this is not the case; ethnic identity has 
measurable political advantages. For example, the use of ethnic identity in political 
campaigns in Kenya has been tolerated by its polity, and is not frowned upon. The 
manipulation of ethnic identities has become acceptable in Kenya; while it is not 
tolerated in other African societies.    
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5.4. The politicisation of ethnicity 
 
This study has discussed the concept of politicisation of ethnicity in Kenya. This 
researcher explained that ethnicity is politicised when it is used by those in power to 
influence political and economic outcomes. Mkangi and Githaiga (2012: 3) claim that 
“In the political sphere, the key identified root causes of violent conflict include the 
politicisation of ethnicity”.  This has proved true in the context of the Kenyan society. 
Kenya’s political figures have for many years used ethnicity to benefit certain 
communities, usually those communities that are likely to serve their political 
aspirations.  
 
The politicisation of ethnicity in Kenya is not a new phenomenon; it certainly did not 
start in post-colonial Kenya. The colonial administrators have introduced the practice 
of politicising ethnicity in the politics of Kenya. Mkangi and Githaiga (2012: 3) share 
the same view; they state that. During colonial times, the divide-and-rule system 
emphasised and encouraged differences as a way of creating disunity and preserving 
colonial rule. These politicised ethnic differences persist and form the fault lines for 
exclusionary politics and conflict. Successive governments have used ethnicity as 
grounds for mobilisation and resource distribution, as evidenced by the ethnic make-
up of political parties and the public appointments of previous governments. The study 
has identified many ways in which ethnicity became politicised in Kenya. One of the 
mechanisms that have consistently been utilised by the Kenyan politicians to politicise 
ethnicity has been the flagrant exploitation of ethnic identities during elections. 
Electoral campaigns are often peppered with slogans that denigrate other ethnic 
groups. The politicians that are on the campaign trail are known for stoking up 
emotions by pitting ethnic groups against one another. The comments made by Odinga 
were cited in this study. Odinga characterised the 2007 elections as a battle between 
the Kikuyu and all the other ethnic groups. This has reduced the electoral process from 
one that is issue-based into one that is tantamount to a war between the different ethnic 
groups.  
  
The government has also been guilty when it comes to the politicisation of ethnicity. 
As far as the post-colonial government is concerned, Jomo Kenyatta started the 
practice of politicisation of ethnicity through the process of channelling certain 
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government resources to Kikuyu communities, while ignoring other communities. As 
indicated in the study, when Daniel Arap Moi succeeded Kenyatta, he also continued 
with the practice of giving priority to the needs of certain groups – showing thereby a 
lack of interest in the needs of other ethnic groups – especially the Kikuyu. Arap Moi 
channelled most State resources to the Kalenjin communities; he was a Kalenjin 
himself. It was also maintained in this study that the confrontational nature of politics 
in Kenya has made it difficult for Kenyans to foster any kind of national identity. The 
emphasis on ethnic identity has meant that the role of national identity has 
diminished; the ethnic identity vs national identity dynamic was also discussed in in 
some detail in the study.  
 
5.5. Ethnic identity vs national identity 
 
 
The 2007 ethnic conflict in Kenya revealed another fundamental problem in Kenyan 
society. As discussed above, the politics of ethnicity in Kenya has meant that ethnic 
identity has become a dominant form of identity in Kenya. This study revealed the 
fact that national identity is almost non-existent in Kenya. The main difference 
between Kenya and other African countries is that ethnicity in Kenya has not been 
well managed; and it has not been channelled into the form of a powerful national 
identity. Countries, such as Zambia and South Africa, have managed to channel 
different identities into a common national identity. This, however, does not imply 
that these two countries have not experienced problems relating to ethnic rivalry. 
Despite having different communities with different interests, South Africa has 
managed to have its citizens unite behind the flag when called upon to do so. The 
reason Kenya has not managed to do this successfully is the fact that Kenyan 
politicians have been very careless in handling ethnic differences. Ethnic groups have 
been pitted against each other through words and actions.  
 
The study has also demonstrated quite clearly that the nature of politics in Kenya does 
not accommodate all the various ethnic groups in Kenya adequately. This means that 
the ethnic groups that are relatively small in size and influence have no avenue 
through which they can express themselves politically. Political parties have shown 
no interest in representing the views of smaller ethnic groups. The only time that the 
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less dominant ethnic groups get any attention in Kenya is when elections are 
imminent. Dominant ethnic groups also tend to dominate the political arena. In 
countries like South Africa, on the other hand, great strides have been made to create 
an equal society – not only in terms of race and gender – but also through other facets 
of society, such as ethnicity. If one scans through the representatives in the South 
African parliament, one would note that almost all the ethnic groups are represented 
sufficiently, or at least reasonably, in parliament. This aspect of political 
representation has been missing in Kenyan society.     
 
5.6. Political coalitions based on ethnicity 
   
  
The other curious aspect of Kenya’s political community is that political coalitions are 
not based on shared political ideas, but on ethnicity. It was shown in this study that in 
an attempt to out-manoeuvre each other, the dominant ethnic groups have formed 
coalitions with other ethnic groups, in order to improve their chances of electoral 
support. These coalitions, however, were marriages of convenience, because they 
were not based on matters of common interest, or on any shared political outlook. 
They were more motivated by the political survival of the different ethnic groups.  
The less-dominant ethnic groups had their own reasons for attaching themselves to 
more prominent ethnic groups. Smaller groups interpreted their relationship with 
dominant groups as translating to political power. ‘Going it alone’ was a less 
attractive political option for smaller ethnic groups, as it increased the chances of 
remaining in the political wilderness. The nature of these political coalitions also 
created difficulty for the Kenyans. They also exposed the true basis of Kenya’s 
political system – ethnic politics.  
 
Parties that are formed on the basis of ethnicity are not new in Kenya. For example, 
Barkan (2004: 91) asserts that “the National Alliance of Kenya (NAK) was formed 
five months before the 2002 elections, linking Kibaki's Democratic Party – which 
drew its support from the Kikuyu people – with a dozen other ethno-regional parties”.   
The ethnic coalitions in Kenya should be seen within the context of their 
demographics. As explained in previous chapters, there is no single ethnic group that 
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forms a clear majority in Kenya. It was also mentioned that, despite being the biggest 
ethnic group, the Kikuyu only form 22% of Kenya’s population. This has made it 
impossible for any ethnicity-based political parties to win the elections without co-
operating at some level with other ethnic groups. These are some of the considerations 
that come into play when deciding to form political coalitions in Kenya. “The 
ubiquity of multi-ethnic party coalitions reflects the demographic reality that Kenya is 
a country of ethnic minorities, as opposed to the clear ethnic bifurcation in countries 
like Rwanda and Burundi” (Kagwanja & Southall, 2009: 265). These authors stress 
the point that, unlike other societies where ethnic groups have a numerical advantage, 
the situation in Kenya is quite complex. For example, in South Africa, the Zulus and 
the Xhosas are the two main ethnic groups, numerically. The Hutus and the Tutsis 
also share the same distinction in Rwanda. If these ethnic groups were to contest 
elections through ethnicity-based political parties, they could not rely heavily on the 
support of other ethnic groups to contest the elections successfully.  
 
With Kenya, however, the demographics have presented a different picture. The 
electoral success of one ethnic group is dependent or interlinked with that of other 
ethnic groups. Having discussed the uniqueness of the Kenyan situation, the question, 
therefore arises: are these political or ethnic coalitions having a bearing on the 
potential conflict in Kenya? This author is of the view that this question needs to be 
interrogated sufficiently through further research. It cannot be concluded in this study 
that ethnic coalitions have definitely contributed to the ethnic conflicts in Kenya. 
However, this author believes that these political coalitions based on ethnicity have 
further polarised the various ethnic groups in Kenya. 
 
Resnick (2011: 739) asserts that normal political party coalitions are good for 
fragmented societies. He submits that “in ethnically divided societies, coalitions may 
have the added benefit of encouraging dialogue among parties that transcends their 
individual ethnic, linguistic or religious orientations. In fact, Horowitz (2002) notes 
that pre-electoral coalitions are more amenable to attracting votes across group lines 
than [are] post-electoral compromises”. In Kenya, however, the coalitions are hardly 
the product of a union between political parties. As stated above, the coalitions in 
Kenya run along the lines of ethnicity.  
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As indicated above, this author would, therefore, conclude that even though it cannot 
be stated with absolute confidence that ethnic coalitions have resulted in the 2007 
ethnic conflict – it can, nevertheless, be concluded that the nature of these coalitions 
has created even deeper divisions and distrust between the various ethnic groups.      
 
5.7 Lack of social transformation in Kenya  
 
This study has indirectly revealed that, for many years there has been a lack of 
meaningful social transformation in Kenya. The post-colonial governments, starting 
from Jomo Kenyatta’s administration, missed the opportunity to mend relations 
between the various ethnic groups. Many avenues could have been used explore ways 
to improve relations between the ethnic groups. This researcher uses the term social 
transformation to refer to conscious efforts made by the Kenyan government to use all 
the resource of the State to develop and empower all Kenyan communities – 
regardless of their ethnic identity.  
 
This has to be a conscious decision taken by the government (with the support of its 
institutions) to strive to be a government that facilitates the development of all its 
citizens – and not just the select few. In reality, however, social transformation never 
took off the ground in Kenya. As illustrated in this study, Kenyan governments have 
sought to promote the interests of only a certain section of the Kenyan community. 
For example, Jomo Kenyatta and his government elevated the needs of the Kikuyu 
community above those of the other ethnic groups. Government posts were filled by 
the Kikuyu; and State institutions were also headed by those individuals who came 
from the Kikuyu ethnic group. Kenyatta’s successor, Daniel Arap Moi, continued 
with the same tradition of ethnic politics by looking after the interests of the Kalenjin 
community (and other smaller ethnic groups) to which he belonged. Social 
transformation should involve the empowerment of all communities through political 
representation and through economic empowerment. 
 
The Kikuyu have been the biggest beneficiaries of all the privileges associated with 
Kenya’s post-colonial politics. This status quo is related to the Kikuyu’s dominance 
in the politics of Kenya. The benefits that followed the end of colonial rule did not 
trickle down to the smaller ethnic groups. For example, with the re-allocation of land 
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from white settlers to the indigenous people of Kenya, the Kikuyu benefited the most 
from this process. The whole process of the re-allocation of land was flawed since the 
land was not returned to their original owners. For example, the White Highlands 
were allocated to the Kikuyu community – despite the fact that the land had originally 
belonged to the Kalenjin. The government was heavily dominated by those belonging 
to the Kikuyu community. As stated earlier, State institutions were also dominated by 
the Kikuyu community. This gave the Kikuyu access to the mainstream economy. 
This has resulted in slanted resource allocation in Kenya, which has led to a skewed 
level of growth in the economy.  
 
To some extent, ethnicity has been used as red herring by political figures, in order in 
order to attain political power. “Political power in Kenya has been used to acquire 
economic power, thereby placing an additional premium on the necessity of acquiring 
political power. This has been taken to absurd levels, where particular leaders have 
used their political positions to illegally acquire wealth, and upon being called to 
account, have said that their ethnic groups are being persecuted politically” (Minority 
Rights Group, 2005: 23). A society that places too much of a premium on ethnicity 
exposes itself to certain challenges. For example, skilled citizens are mainly sourced 
from one section of the community. Other skills that might be available from other 
ethnic communities are disregarded. In other words, ethnic politics prevents 
governments from utilising its human capital or resources to the fullest. Taking all the 
factors that have been discussed in study into consideration, this author submits the 
view that the 2007 ethnic conflicts were the product of a number of issues. These 
include political convenience and expedience, tribal chauvinism, a lack of institutional 
integrity, and the arrogance of the colonial structures.    
 
5.8 Limitations 
 
As with any academic project, this study also has its own inherent limitations. 
Although this study did reflect on other Kenyan elections, it was based mainly on the 
2007 elections. This in itself limits the study – in the sense that the problems 
associated with the 2007 elections were not necessarily the same issues that had 
affected the previous elections. The problems that led to ethnic conflicts in previous 
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elections were, therefore, not examined. The second limitation is that the author did 
not make use of primary data; most of the data used in this study were a product of 
studies and investigations that were carried out subsequent to the 2008 ethnic conflict.     
 
5.9 Recommendations 
 
This study has exposed the fact that Kenya faces many societal and political 
challenges. These challenges have resulted in what can be described as a highly 
politicised society. For Kenya to successfully transform into a society that is not 
burdened by ethnicity, it needs to take bold steps, in order to deal with the ethnic 
problem. The political figures and those who hold public office need to acknowledge 
that they have been responsible for politicising politics in Kenya.  
Kenya’s society has been politicised in many ways; and in many instances, ethnicity 
has been used to dispense power, and resources. This has resulted in the polarisation 
of the various ethnic groups in Kenya. Part of the solution to Kenya’s ethnic problem 
is to dissociate ethnicity from politics. One way to make this possible is by removing 
ethnicity as one of the conditions for accessing resources.  
 
The second problem that has plagued Kenya has been the alignment of politics on the 
basis of ethnicity. As stated in this study, political coalitions are not informed by 
issues of common interest, such as a similar political outlook. The political candidates 
are so concerned with securing numbers that political campaigns are less about issues 
of national interest, but more about tribal and ethnicity-related issues. The political 
campaign run by Odinga in 2008 illustrates this point. The anti-Kikuyu rhetoric was 
meant to incite other ethnic groups against the Kikuyu.  
 
Of course, the intention was to build enough support for his political party in the polls 
by getting all the other groups to unite against the Kikuyu. This would have worked 
for winning the elections; but this would have not have helped ethnic relations in the 
long run. Herein lies the problem with Kenyan politics: Political expedience overrides 
responsible politics. The long-term effects of ethnicizing politics become the least of 
politicians’ concerns. For Kenya to avoid future ethnic conflicts, it needs to discard 
ethnicity-based politics, and to rather focus on issue-based politics.   
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In any democracy the role of institutions cannot be overestimated. Institutions have 
the potential to consolidate weak democracies by creating a system of checks and 
balances. This makes it possible to hold those in public office to account. The manner 
in which the electoral commission of Kenya handled the 2007 electoral process 
showed how institutions can undermine the democratic process. The ECK flouted 
their own rules by announcing Kibaki as the winner – even though they were not 
certain that he had won the election. This decision proved to be the catalyst for the 
violence that followed the 2007 elections.  
 
The ECK was, however, not the only Kenyan institution to have been compromised 
due to lack of impartiality. It was indicated in this study that even law-enforcement 
agencies failed to remain impartial in the political crisis that occurred in 2008. 
Political institutions in Kenya need to be overhauled. This process needs to include an 
assessment of the capacity of these institutions to deal with crisis situations. However, 
the most challenging aspect in Kenya is that these institutions are not led by 
individuals with skills that add value, but only by those who belong to the dominant 
ethnic group. The question that was posed in this study related to the effects of 
political coalitions that are based heavily on ethnicity. The question is whether these 
political or ethnic coalitions are having a bearing on the potential conflict in Kenya. 
This question cannot be dealt with adequately in this study. The author is of the view 
that this question needs to be interrogated sufficiently through further research. Future 
studies that examine the causes of ethnic conflicts in Kenya would need to thoroughly 
examine the impact of political coalitions that are based on ethnicity.  
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